Abstract
Michael Huemer has argued for the justification principle known as phenomenal conservativism by employing a transcendental argument that claims all attempts to reject phenomenal conservativism ultimately are doomed to self-defeat. My contribution presents two independent arguments against the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism after briefly presenting Huemer’s account of phenomenal conservativism and the justification for the self-defeat argument. My first argument suggests some ways that philosophers may reject Huemer’s premise that all justified beliefs are formed on the basis of seemings. In the second argument I contend that phenomenal conservativism is not a well-motivated account of internal justification, which is a further reason to reject the self-defeat argument. Consequently, the self-defeat argument fails to show that rejecting phenomenal conservativism inevitably leads one to a self-defeating position.
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Notes
Huemer (2001, p. 99).
This analogy is given in Huemer (2001, p. 100).
Huemer (2001, pp. 107–108).
Huemer (2007, p. 39).
Huemer (2007, pp. 39–41).
Huemer (2007, p. 41).
Normal contexts are those that do not involve self-deception, wishful thinking, or leaps of faith. See the qualification given in Huemer (2007, p. 39), and Huemer’s discussion of the basing relation in Huemer (2001, pp. 55–57). See also Huemer’s account of self-deception and wishful thinking (references given in note 3 of this article).
This same distinction is sometimes made with the concepts of doxastic justification (for “one’s having a justified belief that p”) and propositional justification (for “one’s having justification for believing that p”). See, for example, Fumerton (1995, pp. 91–92); Pollock and Cruz (1999, pp. 79–80); Conee and Feldman (2004, pp. 201–208); Bergmann (2007, p. 6).
Both of these arguments for premise one are discussed in more detail in my summary of Huemer’s defense of premise in Sect. 2 above. For this reason, I have kept the present account of them abbreviated.
A referee for this journal has reminded me that externalists may not get off so easily. They too must have some account of the basing requirement. For example, some externalists may be happy to co-opt Huemer’s seemings as the salient belief-forming input that meets the basing requirement. While this move is available to some externalists, it is also important to remember that other externalists are at liberty to brush aside any basing relation that requires something available from the subject’s perspective.
Huemer (2001, pp. 20–22, 104, 113, 178).
Huemer (2007, p. 45).
However, Huemer does claim that PC is necessarily true, and not merely a contingent truth about justified beliefs in our world. See Huemer (2001, p. 103).
Huemer (2001, pp. 20–22, 104, 113, 178).
Huemer (2001, p. 104). Emphasis added.
BonJour (1985, p. 41).
BonJour (1985, pp. 43–44).
Lehrer (2000, pp. 187–188).
Lehrer (2000, p. 188).
For an account of the kind of connection to truth that I have in mind for internalists, see McGrew and McGrew (2007, Ch. 2).
Huemer (2001, p. 103).
Actually, it would be worse since the beliefs held by BonJour’s clairvoyant and Lehrer’s Mr. Truetemp would infallibly be true, whereas people in this circumstance would not necessarily have a true belief by following their seemings.
I am indebted to an anonymous refereed for this journal, Richard Fumerton, and especially Ali Hasan who have provided critical feedback on earlier versions of this essay that have substantially improved it.
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DePoe, J.M. Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservativism. Philos Stud 152, 347–359 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9482-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-009-9482-7