Abstract
In this paper, I argue against Millian Descriptivism: that is, the view that, although sentences that contain names express singular propositions, when they use those sentences speakers communicate descriptive propositions. More precisely, I argue that Millian Descriptivism fares no better (or worse) than Fregean Descriptivism: that is, the view that sentences express descriptive propositions. This is bad news for Millian Descriptivists who think that Fregean Descriptivism is dead.
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Caplan, B. Millian Descriptivism. Philos Stud 133, 181–198 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4544-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-005-4544-y