Abstract
Examines the connections among believing, saying, and expressing in situations where the sentence used is a declarative sentence containing at least one proper name. Proposes a new way of understanding these connections. Develops an argument for the thesis that, although we typically believe the singular propositions expressed by our uses of name sentences, we rarely use such sentences because we believe those propositions.
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References
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Ryckman, T.: 1986, ‘Belief, Linguistic Behavior, and Propositional Content’,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47, 277–87.
Ryckman, T.: 1988, ‘The Millian Theory of Names and the Problems of Negative Existentials and Non-Referring Names’, in D. Austin (ed.),Philosophical Analysis: A Defense by Example, Reidel, Dordrecht, 241–49.
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Ryckman, T.C. On believing, saying and expressing. Synthese 79, 191–200 (1989). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869623
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869623