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Central–local conflicts in China’s environmental policy implementation: the case of the sloping land conversion program

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Abstract

Deforestation since the 1980s has led to substantial loss of ecological services in China. As a responsive strategy, China launched the most ambitious reforestation efforts in the developing world. However, like many other environmental policies, forestry policy has not been effectively implemented, mainly due to the fragmentation nature in China’s environmental governance institution. This paper highlights the impact of central–local conflicts on forestry policy implementation. With insufficient motivation, local governments tend to minimize their efforts in planning, monitoring, and supporting reforestation activities, which poses great challenges on the sustainability of the reforestation benefits. With extensive field experiences, this paper also raises three innovative strategies to solve the financial dilemma that leads to the effort minimization phenomenon, with both the advantages and disadvantages for each strategy critically discussed. It finally recommends ways by which the central government could improve design of reforestation policies, or other large-scale ecological programs, which involve local governments as a key liaison.

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Notes

  1. For a comprehensive formulation of the principal-agent theory, please refer to the classical work of Spence and Zeckhauser (1971), Hölmstrom (1979), and Shavell (1979).

  2. As Michael Spence and Richard Zeckhauser pointed in their 1971 work, as long as the central principal cannot completely monitor its local agents’ behavior at zero cost, the inefficiency of higher demand of risky compensation from local parties would be inevitable. In addition, effective incentives at the hand of political leaders are quite limited. Even when they are available, it may require a high cost to implement them.

  3. When examining the US EPA’s work around the 1980 election, Wood found that although the White House and senatorial oversight committees had “applied all of the available tools of administrative control toward moving EPA from vigorous implementation of the law. But the data analysis shows that in the end EPA’s revealed preference were completely opposite from what the model predicted.”

  4. Soil erosion in the three provinces has been believed to contribute most to floods in the Yangtze River and the Yellow River basins.

  5. In SFA’s system, ecological forests refer to timber-producing forests, and economic forests refer to orchard crops or trees with medicinal value.

  6. Unsuccessful implementation has been defined quite broadly in the SLCP. In addition to low survival of newly planted trees, many other faults may also cause administrative penalty on local officials. These include purchase of unqualified tree seedlings, ineffective complementary planting, appropriation of SLCP compensation, and even serious complaints from local farmers.

  7. Although, in realization of the substantive work involved in the SLCP implementation, the central government also allocates some administrative fees to provincial governments since 2002, they are far from enough to cover all implementation costs. As required in the Technical Regulation for the SLCP (tuigenghuanlin gongcheng zuoye jishu zhinan), county governments should establish a special fund out of their local budget to pay the SLCP project management fees, as a rate of RMB45-75/ha. Using this rate as a standard, reforesting 26 million ha of land means a total spending of RMB1-2 billion, which is non-trivial. In order to alleviate the financial burden on county governments, some regions make alternative arrangements. For example, in Yunnan, payment of the SLCP management fees is equally shared among provincial, municipal, and county governments.

  8. Bamboo was the major species used for reforestation in this region, as it not only was recognized as “ecological forests” under the SLCP but also generates considerable economic values.

  9. Chongqing has a typical hilly topography, with fragmented flat and hilly areas adjoining each other.

  10. Petition, also called shangfang in Chinese, is an approach frequently used by Chinese farmers when their conflicts with local governments cannot be resolved. They will visit higher authorities to appeal for help.

  11. Bennett (2008) has pointed out that the SLCP has been designed with little differentiation. Apart from the two regional regimes and three subsidy lengths, program stipulations devise little flexibility that allows for differentiation across targeted areas and participants.

  12. As stipulated in the SLCP plan, the property of newly planted trees belongs to the people or institutes who are entitled with the usufruct rights of croplands that are reforested under the SLCP.

  13. These components were listed as policy recommendations in the initial plan of the SLCP. However, they were listed as the SLCP facilitating programs in the 2007 policy revision.

  14. Ningxia was enrolled in the SLCP in 2002. A local farmer reported that his household’s spending on coal purchases had been double since they participated in the SLCP.

  15. This change should be mainly attributed to a policy retrenchment, not a decrease in the area of convertible lands. As to the year of 2007, there was still 1.06 million ha of sloping croplands, with a slope >25°, that had not been reforested (Gao and Guo 2012).

  16. Cases of social petitions and movements caused by shortage of the SLCP compensation delivery had been repeatedly reported by influential media agencies since 2003. For an incomplete list, such cases have been revealed in the county of Yingshan in Sichuang, the county of Cheng, Min, and Qinzhou in Gansu, the county of Nanzhang, Jiangxia, and xishui in Hubei, the county of Feng, Hanzhong, Ziyang, Xunyi, and Fengxiang in Shaanxi, the county of Gushi and Shangcheng in Henan, the county of Wushan in Chongqing, the county of Xingcheng and Kazuo in Liaoning, the county of Li and Xinning in Hunan, the county of Suiyang in Guizhou, the county of Huaining in Anhui, the county of Yongfu in Guangxi, and Suiling Farm in Heilongjiang.

  17. From 1999 to 2003, central subsidies included three parts: one time provision of free seedlings, an annual cash subsidy of RMB 300/ha, an annual in-kind grain subsidy of 1500 kg/ha in the Yellow River Basin and 2250 kg/ha in the Yangtze River Basin. Since 2004, the grain subsidy was transferred to cash subsidy at a fixed exchange rate of RMB 1.4/kg grain. Thus, for each hectare of cropland converted to forests, farmers could receive RMB 300 as livelihood subsidy, as well as RMB 2100 or RMB 3150 as compensation for loss of grain production depending on their residency location. From 2007, the compensation for grain loss has been reduced by half, but the livelihood subsidy remains the same. Thus, for each hectare of reforested land, farmers could totally receive a cash subsidy of RMB 1350 in the Yellow River Basin and RMB 1875 in the Yangtze River Basin (Li 2009).

  18. These programs include basic farmland construction, rural energy development, eco-migration, and complementary planting in reforestation sites.

  19. Central government investment in the first round of the SLCP accounted to RMB 157.73 billion (US$22.44 billion). The proposed investment increased to RMB 272.77 billion (US$44 billion) for the second round.

  20. According to economic development levels, China divides its territory into three zones: the eastern coast zone (most developed), the middle zone (less developed), and the western zone (least developed). The middle zone is comprised of 9 provinces and regions, including Shanxi, Inner Mongolia, Jilin, Heilongjiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, and Hunan. The western zone includes the 9 provinces of Sichuan, Chongqing, Guizhou, Yunnan, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, and Xinjiang.

  21. As stipulated in the SLCP Regulation, no <80 % of the reforested area should be planted with ecological forests. And the SFA further explained the regulation by defining ecological forests as those planted with the aim of reducing soil and water erosion and alleviating the hazards of sand storms, including water conservation forests, shelterbelt forests, bamboo forests, and even dry fruit forests with certain planting densities. For an incomplete list of ecological and economic species defined under the SLCP, see the SFA’s Notices of determination criterion for ecological and economic forests under the SLCP (2003 SFA).

  22. In economics, monopsony is a market form which is dominated by one buyer, as compared to the dominating seller in monopoly.

  23. Intercept from email communication with Jahiel, July 2013.

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  1. Beihang University, Beijing, China

    Xueying Yu

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Yu, X. Central–local conflicts in China’s environmental policy implementation: the case of the sloping land conversion program. Nat Hazards 84 (Suppl 1), 77–96 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11069-016-2339-4

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