The four-principle formulation of common morality is at the core of bioethics mediation method

Abstract

Bioethics mediation is increasingly used as a method in clinical ethics cases. My goal in this paper is to examine the implicit theoretical assumptions of the bioethics mediation method developed by Dubler and Liebman. According to them, the distinguishing feature of bioethics mediation is that the method is useful in most cases of clinical ethics in which conflict is the main issue, which implies that there is either no real ethical issue or if there were, they are not the key to finding a resolution. I question the tacit assumption of non-normativity of the mediation method in bioethics by examining the various senses in which bioethics mediation might be non-normative or neutral. The major normative assumption of the mediation method is the existence of common morality. In addition, the four-principle formulation of the theory articulated by Beauchamp and Childress implicitly provides the normative content for the method. Full acknowledgement of the theoretical and normative assumptions of bioethics mediation helps clinical ethicists better understand the nature of their job. In addition, the need for a robust philosophical background even in what appears to be a purely practical method of mediation cannot be overemphasized. Acknowledgement of the normative nature of bioethics mediation method necessitates a more critical attitude of the bioethics mediators towards the norms they usually take for granted uncritically as valid.