Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

The financial crisis, investor activists and corporate strategy: will this mean shareholders in the boardroom?

  • Published:
Journal of Management & Governance Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The concept of stakeholder engagement is gaining increasing attention in the mainstream media and may feature as part of a corporation’s strategy for corporate social responsibility. Not only are boards considering how they might engage with key stakeholders, but stakeholders are also pursuing greater participation in the strategic decisions of companies in which they invest. While this is an emerging concept in companies governed by unitary boards, as in North America, the issue of stakeholder engagement in various forms is also entering debate in other countries around the world. In general, however, the idea of shareholder or stakeholder representation on the boards of most UK and Commonwealth companies is anathema. Forces now influencing the development of strategies for stakeholder engagement and the rise of active investors include changing corporate governance rules which give investors more power in the election of directors, the increasing role of pension plans and hedge fund investment groups which have produced investors who keep a close eye on company performance and value, and a sluggish or turbulent stock market as a result of the financial crisis initiated by the credit crunch in the sub-prime mortgage markets. In this paper the phenomenon of stakeholder representation is examined and results of a recent survey conducted among a large sample of New Zealand directors are presented. The findings suggest that these traditionally oriented boards are increasingly inwardly focused and are without an agenda for building and managing shareholder and stakeholder relations. Accordingly, such boards are unlikely to regard stakeholder engagement as a serious strategic issue and are thus also likely to miss significant opportunities in the changed business environment to benefit from stakeholder support.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Wall Street Journal 30/09/08, p. 19, and 07/10/08, p. 4.

  2. Wall Street Journal 29/09/08, p. 19.

  3. Financial Times, 27/01/09, p. 7.

  4. Financial Times, 07/02/09. RBS Slims down 16-strong board in break from past. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e0ca96a8-f4b9-11dd-8e76-0000779fd2ac.html.

  5. Wall Street Journal 06-08/02/09, p. 14, John Thain.

  6. As proposed at the Heads of Nations annual meeting of the World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland, January 2009. See “UK financial regulator calls for world watchdog”. International Herald Tribune, 28 January 2008. Retrieved 06.02.09 http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2009/01/28/business/Davos-Forum-Financial-Regulation.php.

  7. E.g. “Bailout paves new road for capitalism”, Wall Street Journal 23/09/08, pp. 19–20; “Leaders discuss crisis response”, Wall Street Journal 23/09/08, p. 13.

  8. Online. Available at http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/005373.html.

  9. Care is required in the use of the term “corporate democracy” since it holds different meanings, as cautioned by Joo (2003, 2006). In this paper the term is used in the sense of a more participative involvement by shareholders and other stakeholders than is currently available through shareholder voting rights. It also is used in the sense of addressing issues of corporate hierarchy and corporate power. However, a more in-depth discussion of this debate is outside the scope of this paper.

  10. As may be the case in Japan.

  11. Troubled Assets Relief Programme.

  12. Connecticut has passed a law requiring them to do this.

  13. E.g. For more than half a century, Hewlett-Packard has argued that profit is not the main point of its business (The Economist 12/14/2002). DIY homeware and retail chain B&Q has found ways to improve services to disabled customers and those who shop with them through a network of some 300 partnerships between staff and local disability groups across the UK. Staff competence for this market group has improved as a result, attracting disabled customers as well as increasing employee satisfaction and productivity (Grayson and Hodges 2004).

  14. Recent examples include Fortis shareholder action over the BNP Paribus merger, Financial Times, 11/02/09 Fortis shareholders reject BNP deal http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/68065628-f84f-11dd-aae8-000077b07658.html and Elan over top management capability, Financial Times, 09/02/09 Investors urge shake-up of Elan’s “arrogant” management http://www.ft.com/cms/s/67cedd18-f649-11dd-a9ed-0000779fd2ac,Authorised=false.html.

  15. By contrast the shareholder perspective is consistent with a view of the corporation as an oligarchy.

  16. Of ~470,000 firms in New Zealand, in excess of 90% are classified as small and/or sole proprietorships http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-services/media-releases/nz-business-demographic-statistics/nz-business-demography-statistics-feb08-mr.htm.

References

  • AA1000-A standard for ethical performance http://www.mallenbaker.net/csr/CSRfiles/AA1000.html.

  • Aguilera, R. V. (2005). Corporate governance and director accountability. British Journal of Management, 16, S39–S53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andriof, J., & Marsden, C. (2000). Corporate citizenship: What it is and how to assess it. WP Corporate Citizenship Unit, Warwick Business School, at http://users.wbs.warwick.ac.uk/ccu/Publications/DGPF.html.

  • Angell, I. (2000). The New Barbarian manifesto: How to survive the information age. London: Kogan Page.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A. (2007). The myth of the shareholder franchise. Virginnia Law Review, 93(3), 675–732.

    Google Scholar 

  • Benn, S., & Dunphy, D. (2007). Corporate sustainability: Challenges for theory and practice. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bezemer, P. J., Maassen, G. F., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2007). Investigating the development of the internal and external service tasks of non-executive directors: The case of the Netherlands (1997–2005). Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1119–1129.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bosch, H. (1995). The director at risk: Accountability in the boardroom. Sydney: Pitman Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Brown, H., Jr. (1996). What do institutional investors really want? Corporate Board, 17(98), 5–9.

    Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, M. A., & Westphal, J. D. (2001). The strategic context of external network ties: Examining the impact of director appointments on board involvement in strategic decision making. Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 639–660.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carter, C. B., & Lorsch, J. W. (2004). Back to the drawing board: Designing corporate boards for a complex world. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Certo, T., Daily, C., & Dalton, D. (2001). Signaling firm value through board structure: An investigatioin of initial public offerings. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 26(2), 33–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheney, G. (2004). The corporate conscience and the triple bottom line. Accounting Today, 12–25, 12–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Child, J., & Rodriguez, S. B. (2003). The international crisis of confidence in corporations. Journal of Management and Governance, 7, 233–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clarke, T. (2007). The materiality of sustainability: Corporate social and environmental responsibility as instruments of strategi change. In S. Benn & D. Dunphy (Eds.), Corporate sustainability: Challenges for theory and practice (pp. 219–251). London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cramer A., & Hirschland, M. (2006). The socially responsible board. The Corporate Board, 26(161), 20–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davies, A. (1999). A strategic approach to corporate governance. Aldershot: Gower Publishing Limited.

    Google Scholar 

  • Directions. (2007). Towards effective governance: A New Zealand wide review of governance.

  • Doh, J. P., & Guay, T. R. (2006). Corporate social responsibility, public policy and NGO activism in Europe and the United States: An institutional-stakeholder perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 43(1), 47–73.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 65–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dulewicz, V., & Herbert, P. (2003). Does the composition and practice of UK boards bear any relationship to the performance of listed companies? Paper presented at the 6th International Conference on Corporate Governance and Board Leadership. UK: Henley Management College, 6–8 October.

  • EIU. (2001). Shareholders on the march: European companies face a new challenge from rising shareholder activism. Business Europe, 02/05/01, pp. 1–2.

    Google Scholar 

  • EIU. (2005). The importance of corporate responsibility. White Paper, London: The Economist Intelligence Unit Ltd.

    Google Scholar 

  • Elkington, J. (2007). The power of disruption. Director, 60(7), 24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Evans, W., & Freeman, E. (1998). A stakeholder theory of the modern corporation: Kantian capitalism. In T. L. Beauchamp & N. E. Bowie (Eds.), Ethical theory and business. Sydney: Prentice-Hall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frank, T. (2001). One market under god: extreme capitalism, market populism and the end of economic democracy. London: Secker and Warburg.

    Google Scholar 

  • Freeman, R. E. (1984). Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston: Pitman.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, M. (1970). The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits. The New York Times Magazine, September, p. 13 (see also pp. 32–33, 124, 126).

  • Garratt, B. (1997). The fish rots from the head—The crisis in our boardrooms: Developing the crucial skills of the competent director. London: Harper Collins Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. The Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 13–47.

    Google Scholar 

  • Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). (2002). Sustainability reporting guidelines. Amsterdam: GRI. Online. Available at http://www.globalreporting.org.

  • Goodpaster, K. E., & Matthews, J. B. (1982). Can a corporation have a conscience? Harvard Business Review, January/February, 132–141.

  • Grayson, D., & Hodges, A. (2004). Corporate social opportunity: 7 Steps to make corporate social responsibility work for your business. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hasnas, J. (1998). The normative theory of business ethics: A guide for the perplexed. Business Ethics Quarterly, 8(1), 19–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hawkins, J. A. (1997). Why investors push for strong corporate boards. The McKinsey Quarterly, 3, 144–148.

    Google Scholar 

  • Healy, J. (2003). Corporate governance and wealth creation in New Zealand. Palmerston North: Dunmore Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herman, R. D., & Renz, D. O. (2004). Doing things right: Effectiveness in local nonprofit organizations, a panel study. Public Administration Review, 64(6), 694–704.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hill, S. (1995). The social organization of boards of directors. British Journal of Sociology, 46(2), 245–278.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, A. J., Cannella, A. A., & Harris, I. C. (2002). Women and racial minorities in the boardroom: How do directors differ? Journal of Management, 28(6), 747–763.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383–396.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hirsch, P., Michaels, S., & Friedman, R. (1987). “Dirty hands” versus “clean models”: Is sociology in danger of being seduced by economics? Theory and Society, 16(3), 317–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hubbard, G., Samuel, D., Cocks, G. J., & Heap, S. (2007). The first X1: Winning organisations in Australia. Australia: Wiley.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M. (2005). Accountability and creating accountability: A framework for exploring behavioural perspectives of corporate governance. British Journal of Management, 16, S65–S79.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M. (2007). Boards, governance and value creation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Huse, M., & Rindova, V. (2001). Stakeholders’ expectations of boards of directors: The case of subsidiary boards. Journal of Management and Governance, 5, 153–178.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C. B. (2008). Company growth and board attitudes to corporate social responsibility. International Journal of Business Governance and Ethics, 4(1), 17–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C. B., & van der Walt, N. T. (2001). The strategic board: the changing role of directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 9(3), 174–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C. B., & van der Walt, N. T. (2004). Corporate governance, institutional investors and conflicts of interest. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 12(4), 534–551.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C., & van der Walt, N. (2005). Do board processes influence director and board performance? Statutory and performance implications. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13(5), 632–653.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingley, C., & van der Walt, N. (2008). Risk management and board effectiveness. International Studies of Management and Organization, 38(3), 43–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. (2000). Value maximization, stakeholder theory, and the corporate objective. Harvard Business School Working Paper 00-058.

  • Joo, T. W. (2003). A trip through the maze of ‘corporate democracy: Shareholder voice and management composition’. St John’s Law Review, 77, 735–767.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joo, T. W. (2006). Corporate governance and the “D-word”. Washington and Lee Law Review, 63(4), 1579–1591. Lexington, Fall.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kiel, G., & Nicholson, G. (2003). Boards that work: A new guide for directors. Sydney: McGraw-Hill.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knoepfel, I. (2001). Dow Jones sustainability group index: A global benchmark for corporate sustainability. Corporate Environmental Strategy, 8(1), 6–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kolk, A. (2003). Trends in sustainable reporting by the Fortune Global 250. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12(5), 279–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Korten, D. C. (2001). The responsibility of business to the whole. In R. Starkey & R. Welford (Eds.), The Earthscan reader in sustainable development. London: Earthscan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kostant, P. C. (1999). Exit, voice and loyalty in the course of corporate governance and counsel’s changing role. Journal of Socio-Economics, 28(3), 203–246.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krohe, J. (2004). The battle for corporate power. Across the Board, 41(2), 16–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lo, S.-F., & Sheu, H.-J. (2007). Is corporate sustainability a value-increasing strategy for business? Corporate Governance, 15(2), 345–358.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Luoma, P., & Goodstein, J. (1999). Stakeholders and corporate boards: Institutional influences on board composition and structure. Academy of Management Journal, 43(5), 553–563.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Makower, J. (2006). Milton Friedman and the social responsibility of business. World Changing. Online. Available at http://www.worldchanging.com/archives/005373.html.

  • Marens, R., & Wicks, A. (1995). Getting real: Stakeholder theory, managerial practice, and the general irrelevance of fiduciary duties owed to shareholders. Business Ethics Quarterly, 9(2), 273–293.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (2001). Corporate social responsibility: a theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1), 117–127.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mitchell, R. K., Agle, B. R., & Wood, D. J. (1997). Towards a theory of stakeholder identification and salience: Defining the principle of who and what really counts. Academy of Management Review, 22(4), 853–886.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mueller, J., Dana, L., & McDonald, G. (2008). Substance counts. The changing board rooms in New Zealand. Hawaii International Conference on Business, May 23, 2008, Honolulu.

  • OECD. (1999, 2004). OECD principles of corporate governance. Paris: OECD Publications.

  • Owen, D. L., Swift, T., & Hunt, K. (2001). Questioning the role of stakeholder engagement in social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting. Accounting Forum, 25(3), 264–282.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Perrow, C. (1986). Complex organizations. New York: Random House.

    Google Scholar 

  • Perrini, F. (2006). The practitioner’s perspective on non-financial reporting. California Management Review, 48(2), 73–103. Winter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly, 17, 218–228.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pomeranz, F. (1998). Corporate governance: Opportunity for institutions. Journal of Investing, 7(3), 25–29.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. (2006). Strategy and society: The link between competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business Review, 84(12), 78–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ray, D. M. (2005). Corporate boards and corporate democracy. Journal of Corporate Citizenship, 20, 93–105. Winter.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, J., McNulty, T., & Stiles, P. (2005). Beyond agency conceptions of the work of the non-executive director: Creating accountability in the boardroom. British Journal of Management, 16(Special Issue), S5–S26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schacter, M. (2005). Boards face new social responsibility. CA Magazine, May 2005, 12.

  • Selznick, P. (1992). The moral commonwealth: Social theory and the promise of community. Berkeley: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sternberg, E. (1999). The stakeholder concept: A mistaken doctrine. Foundation for Business responsibilities, Issue Paper No. 4, Henley-on-Thames: Foundation for Business Responsibilities.

  • Stiles, P., & Taylor, B. (2001). Boards at work: How directors view their roles and responsibilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sullivan, B., & Kelly, M. (2008). Activists in the boardroom. The Corporate Board, 29(171), 10–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • The Economist. (2002). Lots of it about. The Economist, 14 December, 62.

  • The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 25(164) Bailout paves new road for capitalism. September 23, 2008, 19–20.

  • The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 25(169) SEC is faulted for missing ‘red flags’ at Bear. September 29, 2008, 19.

  • The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 25(170) Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac face new US probe on accounting. September 30, 2008, 19.

  • The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 26(174) Companies turn to consultants for ways to go greener. October 06, 2008, 30.

  • The Wall Street Journal, Europe, 25(167) Leaders discuss crisis response. September 25, 2008, 13.

  • Tricker, R. I. (1994). Editorial: On theories of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 2(2), 55–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tyson, L. D. (2003). The Tyson report on the recruitment and development of non-executive directors. London: London Business School.

    Google Scholar 

  • Valor, C. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and corporate citizenship: Towards corporate accountability. Business and Society Review, 110(2), 191–212.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van der Walt, N. T., & Ingley, C. B. (2004). Do boards really influence outcomes? Board interaction, capability and performance. Paper presented at the 7th international conference on corporate governance and board leadership, 11–13 October. UK: Henley Management College.

  • Waddock, S. (2004). Creating corporate accountability: Foundational principles to make corporate citizenship real. Journal of Business Ethics, 52(4), 313–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Watkin, T. (2008). Employee seats at the top table—Is it likely? Management Magazine, August, 72–76.

  • Zald, M. (1969). The power and functions of boards of directors: A theoretical synthesis. American Journal of Sociology, 75, 97–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Coral Ingley.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Ingley, C., Mueller, J. & Cocks, G. The financial crisis, investor activists and corporate strategy: will this mean shareholders in the boardroom?. J Manag Gov 15, 557–587 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9130-9

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-010-9130-9

Keywords

Navigation