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Notes
Γ can be empty. If you don’t like my examples, feel free to choose your own, everything I have to say should apply to those as well.
If this were the real story about the justification of laws of logic, we would be in a similar position to the one Hume thinks we are in with regard to the justification of induction; the methods we used for coming to believe laws of logic would not be ones that would provide a real justification for such beliefs, and so skepticism threatens [9]
Perhaps it is [13].
References
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