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Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 44, Issue 6, pp 793–803 | Cite as

The Justification of the Basic Laws of Logic

  • Gillian RussellEmail author
Article

Take a correct sequent of formal logic, perhaps a simple logical truth, like the law of excluded middle, or something with premises, like disjunctive syllogism, but basically a claim of the form \({\Gamma } \vDash \phi \)

Keywords

Logic Epistemology Analytic Quine Carnap Kripke 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2015

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyWashington University in St LouisSt LouisUSA

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