Abstract
In this paper we explore material simplicity, defined as the virtue disposing us to act appropriately within the sphere of our consumer decisions. Simplicity is a conscientious and restrained attitude toward material goods that typically includes (1) decreased consumption and (2) a more conscious consumption; hence (3) greater deliberation regarding our consumer decisions; (4) a more focused life in general; and (5) a greater and more nuanced appreciation for other things besides material goods, and also for (6) material goods themselves. It is to be distinguished from simple-mindedness, a return to nature, or poverty. Simplicity overlaps with traditional virtues such as temperance, frugality, and wisdom, and sustains and enables traditional virtues such as justice and generosity. Simplicity is a virtue because it furthers human flourishing, both individual and social, and sustains nature’s ecological flourishing. For analytic purposes, we consider six areas in which simplicity can make important contributions: (1) basic individual flourishing, (2) basic societal flourishing, (3) individual freedom or autonomy, (4) the acquisition of knowledge, (5) living meaningfully, and (6) preserving and protecting nonhuman beings. The proven failure of materialism to secure subjective happiness or objective flourishing argues for the practice of voluntary simplicity and for the radical reform of modern consumer societies.
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Notes
This is a regional adaptation of an older Indian story.
We do not, however, claim the primacy of virtue ethics over other general theoretical approaches to ethics, and nothing that follows depends upon this primacy. Any ethical theory will have some conception of human excellence, or virtue; any plausible ethical theory, we believe, should recognize simplicity (in our sense) as a virtue.
For example, we can flourish in more complex ways than the other natural beings we know, so that it makes sense to talk about our living autonomously or meaningfully.
Science has led us to understand our relative cosmic unimportance, appreciate the complexity of other life forms here on earth, and recognize our literal kinship with them. It thus helps make the case for the value and importance of nonhuman living beings. There is something pre-Darwinian, even pre-Newtonian, about the anthropocentrism still common among contemporary ethicists (Rolston 1988).
Hursthouse (1999) limits her criteria in an attempt to achieve the level of rational certainty and consensus that botanists and ethologists can achieve talking to one another about plants and nonhuman animals. But this level of certainty and consensus is forever unattainable among those discussing ethics, precisely because people are more complex than other natural beings, and our goals are more open-ended. In other words: virtue ethics does not solve the meta-ethical problems that bedeviled twentieth century ethical philosophy. This is not its value. Its value is in allowing us to intelligently discuss human virtue and flourishing. Best to admit this and work to construct a robust account of human flourishing adequate to this (very important) task: not justifying ethics to the skeptic, beyond a reasonable doubt; but rather, providing provisional guidance (always partial, dubitable, and revisable) to those already committed to the task of living the best lives possible.
Compare courage, a virtue for the soldier facing death on the battlefield and for the nervous applicant looking to make a good impression in a job interview.
These virtues, in turn, overlap in the tradition. Note for example that sophrosune, the virtue explored in Plato’s Charmides, may be translated into English as either “temperance” or “soundmindedness,” the latter a close kin to prudence.
For a start, see Plato, Apology and Republic.
Valerie Tiberius’s (2008) otherwise excellent book on wisdom makes no connection between material simplicity and her subject. You may find “Terrell, Huntington,” in the index to John Rawl’s A Theory of Justice, but not “temperance.” Greater attention to the real world impediments to wisdom and justice would lead philosophers to pay more attention to material simplicity.
This point is emphasized by Crocker (1998), who uses it to de-emphasize the importance of consuming less—mistakenly, in our opinion.
For this reason, Comte-Sponville (2001) errs in describing simplicity as “an antidote to introspection” and imaging this virtue as a sort of primitive integrity.
However, we want to leave room for communities to choose simplicity, not just individuals. We do not agree with a purely voluntaristic view of the cultivation of virtue. The primary purpose of law is to force citizens to act more virtuously than they otherwise would.
As one reviewer put it: “simplicity is more like a clearing of the stage. It judges conspicuous consumption” or gluttony “to be not worthwhile, and so eliminates some practices. But it does not itself put a worthier goal in place of consumption.” We might say that simplicity is an enabling virtue.
Not to mention that rules can neither enact nor apply themselves, facts discussed extensively in the recent philosophical literature.
Note that material simplicity doesn’t guarantee any of this. But it does make it more likely. In our observations, fathers who coach their kids’ soccer teams, mothers who chaperone school field trips, community activists who show up for city council meetings, all tend to be less materialistic than average.
For a more detailed discussion of consumption and cars, see Cafaro (1998).
Incredibly, none of Pacala and Socolow’s wedges focus on limiting population growth, despite the critical role it plays in causing global warming (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007). For a discussion of the need for environmentalists to address population issues, see Cafaro and Staples (2009).
For the classic argument, see Epicurus, Letter to Menoeceus and Principle Doctrines. An excellent updating of Epicurus from a modern environmentalist perspective is Stephanie Mills’ Epicurean Simplicity (2003).
Pleasure is ephemeral, experienced most strongly when we satisfy basic needs for food, sex, safety, or comfort. Happiness, on the other hand, refers to the positive feelings people experience when they break through the limits of homeostasis—when they do something that stretches them beyond what they are (Seligman 2000). Psychologists have shown that pleasant experiences are not the sole or even primary determinants of happiness, thus understood. We are all probably aware of some vice we pursue that while pleasurable in the moment, is likely to cause us unhappiness in the long run.
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Gambrel, J.C., Cafaro, P. The Virtue of Simplicity. J Agric Environ Ethics 23, 85–108 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9187-0
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-009-9187-0