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The growing influence of the UNFCCC Secretariat on the clean development mechanism

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Abstract

Using principal–agent theory, we explain the effect of an exogenous increase in financial resources on the autonomy of international bureaucracies. This can be empirically demonstrated at the example of the unexpectedly large inflow of fees for the registration of clean development mechanism (CDM) projects and issuance of emission credits on the political influence of staff in the UNFCCC Secretariat. Through document analysis, interviews and econometric analysis, we show that CDM staff was able to gain substantial influence over concrete policy decisions and even change the structure of relevant decision-making and consultation processes. We also show that this may reinforce rather than reduce the role of special interests expressed via country representatives in the CDM Executive Board. While one might be worried about the erosion of democratic principles at the international level, from a normative perspective, the overall effect is difficult to assess. If the international civil service is competent and committed to the delivery of the global public good, its increasing autonomy and influence may also be socially advantageous.

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Notes

  1. According to Biermann and Siebenhüner (2009, p. 7), an international bureaucracy is a “hierarchically organized group of civil servants who are expected to act following the mandate of the organization and the decisions of the assembly of member states.”

  2. A notable exception in a similar context as ours is Hawkins and Jacoby (2006) although they do not explicitly mark this theoretical break.

  3. Art. 8 of the UNFCCC lists the tasks of the Secretariat. Art. 14 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997) specifies that the Secretariat exercises the same functions under the Protocol as under the UNFCCC.

  4. The CDM was set up under Art. 12 of the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC 1997a), and Art. 12,4 specifies that it is to be supervised by an Executive Board (EB). Para 19 of decision 3/CMP1 (UNFCCC 2005b) specifies that the Secretariat shall serve the EB.

  5. While there was an initial agreement that the share of proceeds should be adjusted once enough funding to cover administrative cost would be available (UNFCCC 2005a, para 38), this appears to have been overlooked, and the Secretariat seems to have never alerted anyone regarding this clause. Moreover, individual member countries formally had the right to claim back their contributions from the times before the project fees were introduced. Again, this has never been requested.

  6. Most of the interviewees requested anonymity so that we cannot reveal their names or concrete role within the UNFCCC process.

  7. This EB decision and all those cited in the following are included in the respective annexes of UNFCCC (various years b).

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Comparative and International Studies (CIS), University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, 8050, Zurich, Switzerland

    Katharina Michaelowa & Axel Michaelowa

Authors
  1. Katharina Michaelowa
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  2. Axel Michaelowa
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Correspondence to Axel Michaelowa.

Appendix

Appendix

See Tables 3 and 4.

Table 3 Distribution of UNFCCC resources across different funds and activities, 2012
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Table 4 UNFCCC institutional development—resources, leadership and key events
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Michaelowa, K., Michaelowa, A. The growing influence of the UNFCCC Secretariat on the clean development mechanism. Int Environ Agreements 17, 247–269 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10784-016-9319-8

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