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What determines UN approval of greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries?

An analysis of decision making on the CDM Executive Board

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Abstract

The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), established by the Kyoto protocol, can generate substantial rents for project participants via the sale of Certified Emission Reductions. For this reason, supposedly technical decisions about the approval of CDM methodologies and about the registration of projects may be driven by benefits to specific countries or interest groups. Our econometric analysis of data for about 250 methodologies and about 1000 projects discussed by the CDM Executive Board (EB) so far, suggests that indeed, along with formal quality criteria, political-economic variables determine the final EB decision.

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Flues, F., Michaelowa, A. & Michaelowa, K. What determines UN approval of greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in developing countries?. Public Choice 145, 1–24 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-009-9525-9

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