Abstract
This paper addresses a decision to be made by a group of evaluators as to how to allocate a pool of monetary resources to a set of candidates. The group decision is an aggregation of the individual allocation recommendations by the evaluators. Evaluators may also be candidates to receive allocations and not allowed to vote a recommendation for themselves. Further, evaluators can elect to exclude some candidates from their evaluations because they do not believe they are qualified to judge some candidates. Two models are presented for aggregation of individual evaluations using the mean and median, respectively, as the basis for the group consensus. In circumstances where some evaluators do not recommend allocations for all candidates, the calculation of the mean recommendations requires the solution of a system of linear equations and the calculation of the median recommendations requires an iterative search algorithm. Conditions for existence of a group consensus allocation for each model are described and the strengths and weaknesses of each model are explored. The models can be applied to a variety of different group decisions, including rating of candidates for a job or allocating a budget.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Arrow K (1963) Social choice and individual values. Yale University Press, New Haven
Balinski M, Laraki R (2007) A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 104(21): 8720–8725
Blair G (1958) Cumulative voting: patterns of party allegiance and rational choice in Illinois state legislative contests. Am Polit Sci Rev 52(1): 123–130
Brams S (2008) What do you think you’re worth? Plus Magazine. http://plus.maths.org/content/what-do-you-think-youre-worth. Accessed 29 May 2011
Brams S, Taylor A (1996) Fair division: from cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge Press, New York
Brouwer L (1910) Über abbildung von mannigfaltikeiten. Math Ann 71: 97–115
de Clippel G, Moulin H, Tideman N (2008) Impartial division of a dollar. J Econ Theor 139: 176–191
Karlin S (1969) A first course in stochastic processes. Academic Press, New York
Knobloch V (2009) Three-agent peer evaluation. Econ Lett 105: 312–314
Laffond G, Lainé J (2008) The budget-voting paradox. Theor Decis 64: 447–478
Luenberger D (1979) Introduction to dynamic systems. Wiley, New York
Moulin H (2004) Fair division and collective welfare. MIT Press, Cambridge
Mueller D (2003) Public choice III. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Nambiar K (2001) Arrow’s paradox and the fractional voting system. e-atheneum.net http://www.e-atheneum.net/science/fractional_voting_print.pdf. Accessed 3 Dec 2010
Saari D (2000) Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes I. Pairwise votes. Econ Theor 15: 1–53
Saari D (2000) Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes II. Positional voting. Econ Theor 15: 55–102
Saaty T (1980) The analytic hierarchy process. McGraw-Hill, New York
Sydsaeter K, Strom A, Berck P (2005) Economist’s mathematical manual. Springer, Berlin
Tideman N, Plassman F (2008) Paying the partners. Public Choice 136: 19–37
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Stengel, D.N. Aggregating Incomplete Individual Ratings in Group Resource Allocation Decisions. Group Decis Negot 22, 235–258 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-011-9260-8
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-011-9260-8