Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments

  • Original Paper
  • Published:
Experimental Economics Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Many economic, political and social environments can be described as contests in which agents exert costly effort while competing over the distribution of a scarce resource. These environments have been studied using Tullock contests, all-pay auctions and rank-order tournaments. This survey provides a comprehensive review of experimental research on these three canonical contests. First, we review studies investigating the basic structure of contests, including the number of players and prizes, spillovers and externalities, heterogeneity, risk and incomplete information. Second, we discuss dynamic contests and multi-battle contests. Then we review studies examining sabotage, feedback, bias, collusion, alliances, group contests and gender, as well as field experiments. Finally, we discuss applications of contests and suggest directions for future research.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Fig. 1
Fig. 2
Fig. 3
Fig. 4
Fig. 5
Fig. 6

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Our survey is comprehensive, so we tried to include all experimental papers on contests which were available in 2012. We used Google Scholar, RePEc, and SSRN to locate most of the published as well as working papers. Then, we sent an e-mail to the ESA Google Group requesting additional working papers that we could not locate in our original search.

  2. Whether this correlation comes from non-pecuniary benefits from winning or other sources demands further research. For instance, it may be the case that subjects who make errors in assessing their bidding strategies for a prize of value zero also are likely to make errors in bidding for higher value prizes. At the same time, it may well be the case that the non-pecuniary benefits from winning are not invariant to the monetary value of the prize.

  3. Early treatments of special cases of all-pay auctions include Hirshleifer and Riley (1978), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Dasgupta (1986).

  4. In the symmetric complete information all-pay auction with a continuous strategy space and n = 4, there is a continuum of asymmetric Nash equilibria in which one or two players place probability mass at 0. Hence, a significant incidence of zero bids may be consistent with behavior in asymmetric equilibria.

  5. An important advantage of rank-order tournaments over alternative compensation schemes is that tournament incentives are not affected by common shocks (random noise that impacts all players equally), since common shocks do not change the relative ranking of players’ efforts (Wu and Roe 2005; Wu et al. 2006; Agranov and Tergiman 2013). As a result of filtering common shocks, tournaments reduce agents’ risk exposure, making them more attractive than other compensation schemes. Wu and Roe (2005) and Wu et al. (2006) show both theoretically and experimentally that in the presence of common shocks tournaments outperform fixed performance contracts and piece-rates by eliciting higher efforts.

  6. Freeman and Gelber (2010) conduct an experimental test of Moldovanu and Sela (2001) based on a real-effort experiment. They find that subjects’ performance is higher when multiple prizes are offered than when a single prize is offered.

  7. Shared contests have also been studied by Masiliunas et al. (2012), Fallucchi et al. (2013), Shupp et al. (2013), and Chowdhury et al. (2014).

  8. In two-player all-pay auctions, Dechenaux and Mancini (2008) find that low-valuation players behave more aggressively than in Noussair and Silver’s (2006) six-player auctions, suggesting that this finding does not prevail in smaller auctions.

  9. Using a real-effort experiment, Gill and Prowse (2012) study a sequential-move tournament in which the second mover observes the first mover’s performance before choosing how much effort to expend. The results of the experiment provide evidence of a discouragement effect: second movers decrease their effort after observing a high effort by the first movers.

  10. The first experimental study of a competitive environment resembling a war of attrition is Phillips and Mason (1997). However, in the dynamic Cournot game they analyze, players do not choose the time at which they wish to exit. Rather, a player remains in the game until he is forced to exit when his cumulative profit falls to zero.

  11. The static volunteer’s dilemma is a simultaneous move game in which each of n players has two actions, “volunteer” and “not volunteer”. Any player who volunteers incurs a cost, c. If at least one player volunteers then all players receive an identical prize, v. If none of the players volunteer, then all players earn a payoff of zero. If v − c > 0, the game has multiple Nash equilibria, including pure strategy equilibria in which one player volunteers and n − 1 players do not volunteer, as well as a symmetric equilibrium in non-degenerate mixed strategies. Diekmann (1985, 1986) experimentally studies symmetric games and the effect of the number of players on the probability of volunteering, and finds that a player’s likelihood of volunteering is decreasing in the number of players. Diekmann (1993) experimentally studies an asymmetric version of the game where players differ in their cost of volunteering, and finds that the players with the lowest cost of volunteering are more likely to volunteer.

  12. The experiment by Otsubo and Rapoport (2008) also implements a finite horizon, complete information war of attrition (framed as a dynamic volunteer’s dilemma), but focuses on symmetric players.

  13. In a recent paper, Caldara (2012) examines complete information common value pay-to-bid auctions, which resemble wars of attrition.

  14. Irfanoglu et al. (2014) also investigate a best-of-three contest and compare its performance with a static contest. Mago and Sheremeta (2014) examine the best-of-three contest modeled as an all-pay auction. Their results are qualitatively similar to the findings of Mago et al. (2013).

  15. The above studies provide evidence on behavior in races where opportunities for cooperation are nonexistent. Silipo (2005) sets up an experiment to examine the incentives for cooperation that may arise before the start of a patent race or emerge during its course. His model is based on Fudenberg et al. (1983) but allows for collusion. Silipo employs a three-by-two design that varies the degree of asymmetry in starting positions and the value of the prize. He observes rather high rates of cooperation, but mostly when the players are symmetric. With asymmetries, in the sense that one of the subjects has a head start in the race, cooperation does not emerge as often. Furthermore, when the prize value is low, any cooperation typically breaks down as contestants approach the finish line. Like the Harris and Vickers models, Fudenberg et al.’s (1983) model exhibits the property that once a player has established a sufficient lead, this player makes all the investment while the laggard gives up. For duopolies that do not cooperate, Silipo does find evidence that points to such a discouragement effect.

  16. An early study of a contest in which effort from previous stages is carried over to later periods is Sbriglia and Hey’s (1994) real-task experiment.

  17. In multi-stage contests, with or without carryover, the discount rate that players apply to future payoffs affects the intertemporal allocation of effort. Deck and Jahedi’s (2014) experiment seeks to test whether individual contestants discount future gains and whether they strategically anticipate that others also discount future payoffs.

  18. Chark et al. (2011) study two-stage elimination lottery contests with large group sizes, no binding constraints, and groups that are of unequal sizes. Qualitatively, their results are similar to Parco et al. (2005) and Amaldoss and Rapoport (2009), although Chark et al. find little evidence for over-expenditure in the first stage.

  19. Baye and Hoppe (2003) show that the innovation tournament is strategically equivalent to a Tullock contest with an endogenous prize.

  20. Recently, the Colonel Blotto game became available on Facebook, known as Project Waterloo (Kohli et al. 2012).

  21. An exception is Fallucchi et al. (2013) who investigate the role of information feedback in a chosen-effort lottery contest and find that additional feedback about rivals’ efforts reduces aggregate effort. One notable difference is that Fallucchi et al.’s experiment lasts for 60 periods, while Mago et al.’s experiment lasts only for 20 periods.

  22. Filippin and Guala (2013) show that subjects in the role of a principal choose to discriminate in favor of their in-group members even when all contestants are symmetric and exert the same efforts.

  23. In a related experiment with sabotage, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2008) fail to replicate the finding that two-player contests are prone to collusive behavior.

  24. In a related study, Leibbrandt and Saaksvuori (2012) document similar results in contests between groups.

  25. Similarly, Ong and Chen (2013) find that women bid significantly more than men in all-pay auctions with complete information. Moreover, controlling for the gender of the bidder and the opponent, Ong and Chen argue that observed behavior is consistent with equilibrium behavior where women attach a higher valuation to winning the all-pay auction than men.

  26. For a laboratory experiment on tournaments used as an intrinsic motivation for giving see Duffy and Kornienko (2010). Also, see Sheremeta (2010a, b).

  27. Dickinson and Isaac (1998) and Dickinson (2001) were the first to show the effectiveness of an all-pay auction as an incentive mechanism in raising contributions to public goods. Although, these studies do not explicitly use the term “all-pay auction,” the incentives are such that the highest contributor to the VCM receives a prize.

  28. Another explanation for the lack of overbidding in rank-order tournaments is the high dispersion of the performance noise \( \varepsilon_{i} \). The substantial amount of noise in the CSF may lead subjects to restrain effort, thereby decreasing overbidding. In fact, Nieken (2010) finds that when given the choice between two distributions of performance noise, subjects are reluctant to choose the distribution with the higher variance even when a risk neutral player would find it beneficial to do so. This finding confirms our conjecture that aversion to random shocks in the CSF could help explain the absence of overbidding in rank-order tournaments. Finally, the lack of overbidding in rank-order tournaments can be driven by the fact that the marginal benefit of effort around 0 is very low. In a lottery contest or an all-pay auction it is virtually impossible to win with the effort of 0, but in a rank-order tournament it is possible. Whether it is the convexity of costs, the presence of noise in the CSF, or the low marginal benefit of effort that mitigates overbidding in rank-order tournaments is an interesting question for future research.

References

  • Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2010). Inter-group conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game. American Economic Review, 100, 420–447.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Abbink, K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2012). Parochial altruism in inter-group conflicts. Economics Letters, 117, 45–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Agranov, M., & Tergiman, C. (2013). Incentives and compensation schemes: An experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 238–247.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahn, T. K., Isaac, R. M., & Salmon, T. C. (2011). Rent seeking in groups. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 29, 116–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Altmann, S., Falk, A., & Wibral, M. (2012). Promotions and incentives: The case of multistage elimination tournaments. Journal of Labor Economics, 30, 149–174.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., Meyer, R. J., Raju, J. S., & Rapoport, A. (2000). Collaborating to compete. Marketing Science, 19, 105–126.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Amaldoss, W., & Rapoport, A. (2009). Excessive expenditure in two-stage contests: Theory and experimental evidence. In F. Columbus (Ed.), Game theory: Strategies, equilibria, and theorems. Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Amegashie, J. A., Cadsby, C. B., & Song, Y. (2007). Competitive burnout: Theory and experimental evidence. Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 213–239.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, L. A., & Freeborn, B. A. (2010). Varying the intensity of competition in a multiple prize rent seeking experiment. Public Choice, 143, 237–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, L. A., & Stafford, S. L. (2003). An experimental analysis of rent seeking under varying competitive conditions. Public Choice, 115, 199–216.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Arad, A. (2012). The tennis coach problem: A game-theoretic and experimental study. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 12, 10.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Arad, A., & Rubinstein, A. (2012). Multi-dimensional iterative reasoning in action: The case of the Colonel Blotto game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 84, 571–585.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Avrahami, J., & Kareev, Y. (2009). Do the weak stand a chance? Distribution of resources in a competitive environment. Cognitive Science, 33, 940–950.

    Article  PubMed  Google Scholar 

  • Baik, K. H. (1993). Effort levels in contests: The public-good prize case. Economics Letters, 41, 363–367.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Baik, K. H. (1994). Effort levels in contests with two asymmetric players. Southern Economic Journal, 61, 367–378.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baik, K. H., Cherry, T. L., Kroll, S., & Shogren, J. F. (1999). Endogenous timing in a gaming tournament. Theory and Decision, 47, 1–21.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Baik, K. H., & Shogren, J. F. (1992). Strategic behavior in contests: Comment. American Economic Review, 82, 359–362.

    Google Scholar 

  • Balafoutas, L., Kerschbamer, R., & Sutter, M. (2012). Distributional preferences and competitive behavior. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83, 125–135.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Balafoutas, L., & Sutter, M. (2012). Affirmative action policies promote women and do not harm efficiency in the lab. Science, 335, 579–582.

    Article  CAS  PubMed  ADS  Google Scholar 

  • Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2005). Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120, 917–962.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2006). The evolution of cooperative norms: Evidence from a natural field experiment. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy, 6, 1–26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bandiera, O., Barankay, I., & Rasul, I. (2013). Team incentives: evidence from a firm level experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, 1079–1114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barankay, I. (2011). Rankings and social tournaments: evidence from a crowd-sourcing experiment. Working Paper.

  • Bartling, B., Fehr, E., Marechal, M. A., & Schunk, D. (2009). Egalitarianism and competitiveness. American Economic Review, 99, 93–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barut, Y., & Kovenock, D. (1998). The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auction with complete information. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 627–644.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Barut, Y., Kovenock, D., & Noussair, C. N. (2002). A comparison of multiple-unit all-pay and winner-pay auctions under incomplete information. International Economic Review, 43, 675–708.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., & Hoppe, H. C. (2003). The strategic equivalence of rent-seeking, innovation, and patent-race games. Games and Economic Behavior, 44, 217–226.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1993). Rigging the lobbying process: An application of the all-pay auction. American Economic Review, 83, 289–294.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1994). The solution to the Tullock rent-seeking game when r is greater than 2: Mixed-strategy equilibria and mean dissipation rates. Public Choice, 81, 363–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (1996). The all-pay auction with complete information. Economic Theory, 8, 291–305.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2005). Comparative analysis of litigation systems: an auction-theoretic approach. Economic Journal, 115, 583–601.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, M. R., Kovenock, D., & de Vries, C. G. (2012). Contests with rank-order spillovers. Economic Theory, 51, 350–351.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bigoni, M., Fort, M., Nardotto, M., & Reggiani, T. (2011). Teams or tournaments? A field experiment on cooperation and competition in academic achievement. Working Paper, Università di Bologna.

  • Bilodeau, M., Childs, J., & Mestelman, S. (2004). Volunteering a public service: An experimental investigation. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 2839–2855.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blimpo, M. P. (2014). Team incentives for education in developing countries: A randomized field experiment in Benin. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 6, 90–109.

  • Bloch, F. (2012). Endogenous formation of alliances in conflicts. In Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas (Eds.), Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bolle, F., Tan, J. H. W., & Zizzo, D. J. (2014). Vendettas. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 93–130.

    Google Scholar 

  • Borel, E. (1921). La théorie du jeu les équations intégrales a noyau symétrique. Comptes Rendus de l’Académie, 173, 1304–1308; English translation by Savage, L. (1953). The theory of play and integral equations with skew symmetric kernels. Econometrica, 21, 97–100.

  • Brookins, P., & Ryvkin, D. (2014). An experimental study of bidding in contests of incomplete information. Experimental Economics, 17, 245–261.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bull, C., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (1987). Tournaments and piece rates: An experimental study. Journal of Political Economy, 95, 1–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bullock, D., & Rutström, E. (2007). Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test. Experimental Economics, 10, 21–36.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Caldara, M. (2012). Bidding behavior in pay-to-bid auctions: An experimental study. Working Paper.

  • Calsamiglia, C., Franke, J., & Rey-Biel, P. (2013). The incentive effects of affirmative action in a real-effort tournament. Journal of Public Economics, 98, 15–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, J., Holmes, J., & Matthews, P. (2008). Charity auctions: A field experiment. Economic Journal, 118, 92–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, J., Matthews, P., & Schirm, J. (2010). Tournaments and office politics: Evidence from a real effort experiment. American Economic Review, 100, 504–517.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Casas-Arce, P., & Martinez-Jerez, F. A. (2009). Relative performance compensation, contests, and dynamic incentives. Management Science, 55, 1306–1320.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010). Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 604–611.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: theory and experimental results. Economic Science Institute, Working Paper.

  • Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and efficiency in competitive coordination games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26–43.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Cason, T. N., Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2014). Asymmetric and endogenous communication in competition between groups. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26–43.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Chark, R., Rapoport, A., & Zwick, R. (2011). Experimental comparison of two multiple-stage contest designs with asymmetric players. Public Choice, 147, 305–329.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Charness, G., & Kuhn, P. (2011). Lab labor: What can labor economists learn from the lab? In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (pp. 229–331). Amsterdam: Elsevier.

    Google Scholar 

  • Chen, H., Ham, S. H., & Lim, N. (2011). Designing multiperson tournaments with asymmetric contestants: An experimental study. Management Science, 57, 864–883.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Cherry, T. L., & Cotten, S. J. (2011). Sleeping with the enemy: The economic cost of internal environmental conflicts. Economic Inquiry, 49, 530–539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury, S. M., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2013a). An experimental investigation of Colonel Blotto games. Economic Theory, 52, 833–861.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury, S. M., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2011a). A generalized Tullock contest. Public Choice, 147, 413–420.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury, S. M., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2011b). Multiple equilibria in Tullock contests. Economics Letters, 112, 216–219.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury, S. M., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Strategically equivalent contests. Theory and Decision. doi:10.1007/s11238-014-9440-5.

  • Chowdhury, S. M., Sheremeta, R. M., & Lee, D. (2013b). Top guns may not fire: Best-shot group contests with group-specific public good prizes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 92, 94–103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Chowdhury, S. M., Sheremeta, R. M., & Turocy, T. L. (2014). Overbidding and overspreading in rent-seeking experiments: Cost structure and prize allocation rules. Games and Economic Behavior., 87, 224–238.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Chung, T. Y. (1996). Rent-seeking contest when the prize increases with aggregate efforts. Public Choice, 87, 55–66.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cinar, Y., & Goksel, T. (2012). An experimental analysis of Colonel Blotto games under alternative environments. İktisat İşletme ve Finans, 27, 39–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, D. J., & Konrad, K. A. (2007). Asymmetric conflict: Weakest link against best shot. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 457–469.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Clark, D. J., & Riis, C. (1998). Influence and the discretionary allocation of several prizes. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 605–625.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cohen, C., & Shavit, T. (2012). Experimental tests of Tullock’s contest with and without winner refunds. Research in Economics, 66, 263–272.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Corazzini, L., Faravelli, M., & Stanca, L. (2010). A prize to give for: An experiment on public good funding mechanisms. Economic Journal, 120, 944–967.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cornes, R., & Hartley, R. (2012). Risk aversion in symmetric and asymmetric contests. Economic Theory, 51, 247–275.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Coughlan, P. J., & Plott, C. (1997) An experimental analysis of the structure of legal fees: American rule vs. English rule. California Institute of Technology, Working Paper.

  • Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 448–474.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, P. (1986). The theory of technological competition. In J. E. Stiglitz & G. F. Mathewson (Eds.), New developments in the analysis of market structure. Cambridge: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D., Razzolini, L., Reilly, R., & Wilson, B. J. (2006). Raising revenues for charity: Auctions versus lotteries. In D. D. Davis & M. Isaac (Eds.), Research in Experimental Economics (Vol. 11). Greenwich: JAI Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Davis, D., & Reilly, R. (1998). Do many cooks always spoil the stew? An experimental analysis of rent seeking and the role of a strategic buyer. Public Choice, 95, 89–115.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • De Paola, M., Scoppa, V., & Nisticò, R. (2012). Monetary incentives and student achievement in a depressed labor market: Results from a randomized experiment. Journal of Human Capital, 6, 56–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2012). A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Economic Science Institute, Working paper.

  • Dechenaux, E., & Mancini, M. (2008). Auction-theoretic approach to modeling legal systems: An experimental analysis. Applied Economics Research Bulletin, 2, 142–177.

    Google Scholar 

  • Deck, C., & Farmer, A. (2009). Strategic bidding and investments in final offer arbitration: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 70, 361–373.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deck, C., Foster, J., & Song, H. (2012). Alliances in defense against an opportunistic opponent: Theory and experiments. Working Paper.

  • Deck, C. & Jahedi, S. (2014). Time discounting in strategic contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.

  • Deck, C., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2012). Fight or flight? Defending against sequential attacks in the game of siege. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 1069–1088.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R., Sol, J., & Verbeke, W. (2013). Tournament incentives in the field: Gender differences in the workplace. Journal of Labor Economics, 31, 305–326.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Delfgaauw, J., Dur, R., Sol, J. & Verbeke, W. (2014). The effects of prize spread and noise in elimination tournaments: A natural field experiment. Journal of Labor Economics, forthcoming.

  • DeScioli, P., & Wilson, B. J. (2011). The territorial foundations of human property. Evolution and Human Behavior, 32, 297–304.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dickinson, D. L. (2001). The carrot vs. the stick in work team motivation. Experimental Economics, 4, 107–124.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Dickinson, D. L., & Isaac, M. R. (1998). Absolute and relative rewards for individuals in team production. Managerial and Decision Economics, 19, 299–310.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diekmann, A. (1985). Volunteer’s dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, 605–610.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Diekmann, A. (1986). Volunteer’s dilemma: A social trap without a dominant strategy and some empirical results. In A. Diekmann & P. Mitter (Eds.), Paradoxical effects of social behavior: Essays in honor of anatol rapoport (pp. 187–197). Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Diekmann, A. (1993). Cooperation in asymmetric volunteer’s dilemma game: Theory and experimental evidence. International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 75–85.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Dixit, A. K. (1987). Strategic behavior in contests. American Economic Review, 77, 891–898.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender. American Economic Review, 101, 556–590.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Drago, R., & Heywood, J. S. (1989). Tournaments, piece rates, and the shape of the payoff function. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 992–998.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duffy, J., & Kornienko, T. (2010). Does competition affect giving? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 74, 82–103.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Durham, Y., Hirshleifer, J., & Smith, V. L. (1998). Do the rich get richer and the poor poorer? Experimental tests of a model of power. American Economic Review, 88, 970–983.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ederer, F. (2010). Feedback and motivation in dynamic tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19, 733–769.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ederer, F. & Fehr, E. (2009). Deception and incentives: how dishonesty undermines effort provision. IZA, Working Paper.

  • Eisenkopf, G. & Teyssier, S. (2012). Horizontal and vertical social preferences in tournaments. Working Paper.

  • Eisenkopf, G., & Teyssier, S. (2013). Envy and loss aversion in tournaments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 34, 240–255.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Erev, I., Bornstein, G., & Galili, R. (1993). Constructive intergroup competition as a solution to the free rider problem: A field experiment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 463–478.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ericsson, K. A., & Charness, N. (1994). Expert performance: Its structure and acquisition. American Psychologist, 49, 725–747.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eriksson, T., Poulsen, A., & Villeval, M. C. (2009a). Feedback and incentives: Experimental evidence. Labour Economics, 16, 679–688.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eriksson, T., Teyssier, S., & Villeval, M. C. (2009b). Self-selection and the efficiency of tournaments. Economic Inquiry, 47, 530–548.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ernst, C., & Thöni, C. (2013). Bimodal bidding in experimental all-pay auctions. Games, 4, 608–623.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Falk, A., Fehr, E., & Huffman, D. (2008). The power and limits of tournament incentives. WZB, Working Paper.

  • Fallucchi, F., Renner, E., & Sefton, M. (2013). Information feedback and contest structure in rent-seeking games. European Economic Review, 64, 223–240.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fehr, D., & Schmidt, J. (2011). Exclusion in the all-pay auction: An experimental investigation. WZB, Working Paper.

  • Fershtman, C., & Gneezy, U. (2011). The trade-off between performance and quitting in high-power tournaments. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9, 318–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Filippin, A., & Guala, F. (2013). Costless discrimination and unequal achievements in an experimental tournament. Experimental economics, 16, 285–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fonseca, M. A. (2009). An experimental investigation of asymmetric contests. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 27, 582–591.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Freeman, R. B., & Gelber, A. M. (2010). Prize structure and information in tournaments: Experimental evidence. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2, 149–164.

    Google Scholar 

  • Friedman, L. (1958). Game-theory models in the allocation of advertising expenditure. Operations Research, 6, 699–709.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Fu, Q., & Lu, J. (2009). The beauty of “bigness”: on optimal design of multi winner contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 146–161.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., Gilbert, R., Stiglitz, J., & Tirole, J. (1983). Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races. European Economic Review, 22, 3–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, D., & Tirole, J. (1986). A theory of exit in duopoly. Econometrica, 54, 943–960.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Fullerton, R., Linster, B. G., McKee, M., & Slate, S. (1999). An experimental investigation of research tournaments. Economic Inquiry, 37, 624–636.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerchak, Y., & He, Q. M. (2003). When will the range of prizes in tournaments increase in the noise or in the number of players? International Game Theory Review, 5, 151–166.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Gill, D., & Prowse, V. (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition. American Economic Review, 102, 469–503.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy, U., Niederle, M., & Rustichini, A. (2003). Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118, 1049–1074.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy, U., & Rustichini, A. (2004). Gender and competition at a young age. American Economic Review, 94, 377–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy, U., & Smorodinsky, R. (2006). All-pay auctions—An experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 61, 255–275.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gradstein, M. (1995). Intensity of competition, entry and entry deterrence in rent seeking contest. Economics and Politics, 7, 79–91.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gradstein, M., & Konrad, K. A. (1999). Orchestrating rent seeking contests. Economic Journal, 109, 536–545.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grosskopf, B., Rentschler, L., & Sarin, R. (2010). Asymmetric information in contests: Theory and experiments. Texas A&M University, Working Paper.

  • Gunnthorsdottir, A., & Rapoport, A. (2006). Embedding social dilemmas in intergroup competition reduces free-riding. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101, 184–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gürtler, O., & Harbring, C. (2010). Feedback in tournaments under commitment problems: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19, 771–810.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gürtler, O., Münster, J., & Nieken, P. (2013). Information policy in tournaments with sabotage. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 115, 932–966.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C. (2006). The effect of communication in incentive systems—An experimental study. Managerial and Decision Economics, 27, 333–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2003). An experimental study on tournament design. Labour Economics, 10, 443–464.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2005). Incentives in tournaments with endogenous prize selection. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 127, 636–663.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2008). How many winners are good to have? On tournaments with sabotage. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65, 682–702.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2011). Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. Management Science, 57, 611–627.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., Irlenbusch, B., Krakel, M., & Selten, R. (2007). Sabotage in corporate contests—An experimental analysis. International Journal of the Economics of Business, 14, 367–392.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harbring, C., & Lünser, G. K. (2008). On the competition of asymmetric agents. German Economic Review, 9, 373–395.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1985). Perfect equilibrium in a model of a race. Review of Economic Studies, 52, 193–209.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, C., & Vickers, J. (1987). Racing with uncertainty. Review of Economic Studies, 54, 1–21.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42, 1009–1055.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, S. (2008). Discrete colonel Blotto and general Lotto games. International Journal of Game Theory, 36, 441–460.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Healy, A., & Pate, J. (2010). Can teams help to close the gender competition gap? Economic Journal, 155, 1192–1204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Herbst, L., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2014). Endogenous group formation in experimental contests. Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, Working Paper.

  • Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2008). The appearance of homo rivalis: Social preferences and the nature of rent seeking. University of Nottingham, Working Paper.

  • Hillman, A., & Riley, J. G. (1989). Politically contestable rents and transfers. Economics and Politics, 1, 17–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hirshleifer, J., & Riley, J. G. (1978). Elements of the theory of auctions and contests. UCLA, Working Papers.

  • Holt, C. A., Kydd, A., Razzolini, L., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). The paradox of misaligned profiling: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

  • Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hörisch, H., & Kirchkamp, O. (2010). Less fighting than expected—Experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions. Public Choice, 144, 347–367.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hortala-Vallve, R., & Llorente-Saguer, A. (2010). A simple mechanism for resolving conflict. Games and Economic Behavior, 70, 375–391.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Hossain, T., Hong, F., & List, J. A. (2014). Framing manipulations in contests: A natural field experiment. Working Paper.

  • Irfanoglu, B., Mago, S. D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Sequential versus simultaneous election contests: An experimental study. Working Paper.

  • Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263–291.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Kalra, A., & Shi, M. (2001). Designing optimal sales contests: A theoretical perspective. Marketing Science, 20, 170–193.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Katz, E., Nitzan, S., & Rosenberg, J. (1990). Rent-seeking for pure public goods. Public Choice, 65, 49–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ke, C. (2011). Fight alone or together? The need to belong. Working Paper.

  • Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2013). Brothers in arms – An experiment on the alliance puzzle. Games and Economic Behavior, 77, 61–76.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Ke, C., Konrad, K. A., & Morath, F. (2014). Alliances in the shadow of conflict. Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.

  • Kimbrough, E., Rubin, J., Sheremeta, R., & Shields, T. (2013). Commitment problems in conflict resolution. Economic Science Institute, Working Paper.

  • Kimbrough, E. O., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Side-payments and the costs of conflict. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 278–286.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimbrough, E. O., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Why can’t we be friends? Entitlements and the costs of conflict. Journal of Peace Research, 51, 487–500.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kimbrough, E. O., Sheremeta, R. M., & Shields, T. (2014). When parity promotes peace: Resolving conflict between asymmetric agents. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 99, 96–108.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Klose, B., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Behavior in all-pay and winner-pay auctions with identity-dependent externalities. Working Paper.

  • Klumpp, T., & Polborn, M. K. (2006). Primaries and the New Hampshire effect. Journal of Public Economics, 90, 1073–1114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kohli, P., Bachrach, Y., Stillwell, D., Kearns, M., Herbrich, R., & Graepel, T. (2012). Colonel Blotto on facebook: The effect of social relations on strategic interaction. ACM Web Sciences 2012, ACM Conference on Web Sciences.

  • Konrad, K. A. (2009). Strategy and dynamics in contests. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

    MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Konrad, K. A., & Kovenock, D. (2009). Multi-battle contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 256–274.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Kosfeld, M., & Neckermann, S. (2011). Getting more work for nothing? Symbolic awards and worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 86–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovenock, D., & Roberson, B. (2010). The optimal defense of networks of targets. Purdue University, Working Paper.

  • Kovenock, D., & Roberson, B. (2012). Conflicts with multiple battlefields. In Michelle R. Garfinkel & Stergios Skaperdas (Eds.), Oxford handbook of the economics of peace and conflict. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovenock, D., Roberson, B., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010). The attack and defense of weakest-link networks. Chapman University, Working Paper.

  • Kräkel, M. (2008). Emotions in tournaments. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 67, 204–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kräkel, M., & Nieken, P. (2012). Relative performance pay in the shadow of crisis. University of Bonn, Working Paper.

  • Kräkel, M., Nieken, P., & Przemeck, J. (2012). Risk taking and investing in electoral competition. European Journal of Political Economy, 2014(33), 98–120.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (1997). An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction. Journal of Economic Theory, 72, 343–362.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Krishna, V., & Morgan, J. (1998). The winner-take-all principle in small tournaments. In M. R. Baye (Ed.), Advances in applied microeconomics. Stamford, CT: JAI Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Krueger, A. O. (1974). The political economy of the rent-seeking society. American Economic Review, 64, 291–303.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kugler, T., Rapoport, A., & Pazy, A. (2010). Public good provision in inter-group conflicts: Effects of asymmetry and profit-sharing rule. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 421–438.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhnen, C. M., & Tymula, A. (2012). Feedback, self-esteem and performance in organizations. Management Science, 58, 94–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kvasov, D. (2007). Contests with limited resources. Journal of Economic Theory, 136, 738–748.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Lacomba, J. A., Lagos, F. M., Reuben, E., & van Winden, F. (2014). On the escalation and de-escalation of conflict. Games and Economic Behavior, 86, 40–57.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Landry, C., Lange, A., List, J. A., Price, M. K., & Rupp, N. (2006). Toward an understanding of the economics of charity: Evidence from a field experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 747–782.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lange, A., List, J. A., & Price, M. K. (2007). Using lotteries to finance public goods: Theory and experimental evidence. International Economic Review, 48, 901–927.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, E. P. (1999). Personnel economics past lessons and future directions—presidential address to the society of labor economists. Journal of Labor Economics, 17, 199–236.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, E. P. (2000). Performance pay and productivity. American Economic Review, 90, 1346–1361.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economy, 89, 841–864.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee, D. (2012). Weakest-link contest with group-specific public good prizes. European Journal of Political Economy, 28, 238–248.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leibbrandt, A., & Saaksvuori, L. (2012). Communication in intergroup conflicts. European Economic Review, 56, 1136–1147.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leininger, W., & Yang, C. L. (1994). Dynamic rent-seeking games. Games and Economic Behavior, 7, 406–427.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Leuven, E., Oosterbeek, H., Sonnemans, J., & van der Klaauw, B. (2011). Incentives versus sorting in tournaments: Evidence from a field experiment. Journal of Labor Economics, 29, 637–658.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leuven, E., Oosterbeek, H., & van der Klaauw, B. (2010). The effect of financial rewards on students’ achievement: Evidence from a randomized experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 1243–1265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lim, N. (2010). Social loss aversion and optimal contest design. Journal of Marketing Research, 47, 777–787.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lim, N., Ahearne, M., & Ham, S. H. (2009). Designing sales contests: Does the prize structure matter? Journal of Marketing Research, 46, 356–371.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lim, W., Matros, A., & Turocy, T. L. (2014). Bounded rationality and group size in Tullock contests: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 99, 155–167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Linster, B. G., Fullerton, R. L., Mckee, M., & Slate, S. (2001). Rent-seeking models of international competition: An experimental investigation. Defence and Peace Economics, 12, 285–302.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • List, J. A., van Soest, D., Stoop, J., & Zhou. H. (2014). On the role of group size in tournaments: Theory and evidence from lab and field experiments. NBER, Working Paper.

  • Liu, T. X., Yang, J., Adamic, L. A., & Chen, Y. (2014). Crowdsourcing with all-pay auctions: A field experiment on Taskcn. Management Science, 60, 2020–2037.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Long, N. V., & Vousden, N. (1987). Risk-averse rent seeking with shared rents. Economic Journal, 97, 971–985.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ludwig, S., & Lunser, G. K. (2012). Observing your competitor—The role of effort information in two-stage tournaments. Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 166–182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lugovskyy, V., Puzzello, D., & Tucker, S. (2010). An experimental investigation of overdissipation in the all pay auction. European Economic Review, 54, 974–997.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mago, S. D., Savikhin, A. C., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Facing your opponents: Social identification and information feedback in contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, forthcoming.

  • Mago, S. D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Multi-battle contests: An experimental study. Economic Science Institute, Working Paper.

  • Mago, S. D., Sheremeta, R. M., & Yates, A. (2013). Best-of-three contest experiments: Strategic versus psychological momentum. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 31, 287–296.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Masiliunas, A., Mengel, F., Reiss, J. P. (2012). Behavioral variation in Tullock contests. Working Paper.

  • Matros, A., & Armanios, D. (2009). Tullock contest with reimbursements. Public Choice, 141, 49–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maynard Smith, J. (1974). Theory of games and the evolution of animal contests. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 47, 209–221.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • McBride, M., & Skaperdas, S. (2014). Conflict, Settlement, and the Shadow of the Future,”. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 105, 75–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McDonald, J., & Tukey, J. (1949). Colonel Blotto: A problem of military strategy. Fortune, June.

  • McKelvey, R., & Palfrey, T. (1995). Quantal response equilibria for normal form games. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 6–38.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Michelitch, K. (2009). Do quotas make gender and ethnic groups expend less effort in competition? Working Paper.

  • Millner, E. L., & Pratt, M. D. (1989). An experimental investigation of efficient rent-seeking. Public Choice, 62, 139–151.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Millner, E. L., & Pratt, M. D. (1991). Risk aversion and rent-seeking: An extension and some experimental evidence. Public Choice, 69, 81–92.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Minor, D. (2012). Coarse thinking and competition. Working Paper.

  • Moldovanu, B., & Sela, A. (2001). The optimal allocation of prizes in contests. American Economic Review, 91, 542–558.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moldovanu, B., Sela, A., & Shi, X. (2007). Contests for status. Journal of Political Economy, 115, 338–363.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Montero, M., Possajennikov, A., Sefton, M., & Turocy, T. L. (2014). The value of votes in weighted voting games: Majoritarian contests with asymmetric battlefields. University of Nottingham, Working Paper.

  • Morgan, J., Orzen, H., & Sefton, M. (2012). Endogenous entry in contests. Economic Theory, 51, 435–463.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Morgan, J., & Sefton, M. (2000). Funding public goods with lotteries: experimental evidence. Review of Economic Studies, 67, 785–810.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Müller, W., & Schotter, A. (2010). Workaholics and dropouts in organizations. Journal of the European Economic Association, 8, 717–743.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nagel, R. (1995). Unraveling in guessing games: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 85, 1313–1326.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nalbantian, H. R., & Schotter, A. (1997). Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 87, 314–341.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nalebuff, B. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1983). Prizes and incentives: Towards a general theory of compensation and competition. Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 21–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niederle, M., Segal, C., & Vesterlund, L. (2013). How costly is diversity? Affirmative action in light of gender differences in competitiveness. Management Science, 59, 1–16.

  • Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1067–1101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Niederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2011). Gender and competition. Annual Review of Economics, 3, 601–630.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nieken, P. (2010). On the choice of risk and effort in tournaments-Experimental evidence. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 19(3), 811–840.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noussair, C., & Silver, J. (2006). Behavior in all pay auctions with incomplete information. Games and Economic Behavior, 55, 189–206.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Öncüler, A., & Croson, R. (2005). Rent-seeking for a risky rent—A model and experimental investigation. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 17, 403–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Onderstal, S., Schram, A. J. H. C., & Soetevent, A. R. (2013). Bidding to give in the field. Journal of Public Economics, 105, 72–85.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ong, D., & Chen, Z. (2013). Tiger women: An all-pay auction experiment on gender signaling of desire to win. Working Paper.

  • Oprea, R., Wilson, B. J., & Zillante, A. (2013). War of attrition: Evidence from a laboratory experiment on market exit. Economic Inquiry, 51, 2018–2027.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orrison, A., Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (2004). Multiperson tournaments: an experimental examination. Management Science, 50, 268–279.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orzen, H. (2008). Fundraising through competition: Evidence from the lab. CeDEx, Working paper.

  • Otsubo, H., & Rapoport, A. (2008). Dynamic volunteer’s dilemma in finite and discrete time: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 52, 961–984.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parco, J., Rapoport, A., & Amaldoss, W. (2005). Two-stage contests with budget constraints: An experimental study. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 49, 320–338.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, O., & Mason, C. (1997). Wars of attrition in experimental duopoly markets. Southern Economic Journal, 63, 726–742.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Potters, J. C., De Vries, C. G., & Van Winden, F. (1998). An experimental examination of rational rent seeking. European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 783–800.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prendergast, C. (1999). The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature, 37, 7–63.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Price, C. R., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2011). Endowment effects in contests. Economics Letters, 111, 217–219.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Price, C. R., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Endowment origin, demographic effects and individual preferences in contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.

  • Riley, J. G., & Samuelson, W. F. (1981). Optimal auctions. American Economic Review, 71, 381–392.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberson, B. (2006). The Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory, 29, 1–24.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  ADS  Google Scholar 

  • Roberson, B., & Kvasov, D. (2012). The non-constant sum Colonel Blotto game. Economic Theory, 51, 397–433.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. American Economic Review, 76, 701–715.

    ADS  Google Scholar 

  • Ryvkin, D. (2010). Contests with private costs: beyond two players. European Journal of Political Economy, 26, 558–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ryvkin, D. (2011). Fatigue in dynamic tournaments. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20, 1011–1041.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sacco, D., & Schmutzler, A. (2008). All-pay auctions with negative prize externalities: Theory and experimental evidence. Working Paper.

  • Savikhin, A. C., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Simultaneous decision-making in competitive and cooperative games. Economic Inquiry, 51, 1311–1323.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sbriglia, P., & Hey, J. D. (1994). Experiments in multi-stage R&D competition. Empirical Economics, 19, 291–316.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schelling, T. (1960). The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmitt, P., Shupp, R., Swope, K., & Cadigan, J. (2004). Multi-period rent-seeking contests with carryover: Theory and experimental evidence. Economics of Governance, 5, 187–211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schotter, A., & Weigelt, K. (1992). Asymmetric tournaments, equal opportunity laws, and affirmative action: Some experimental results. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 511–539.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schram, A., & Onderstal, A. M. (2009). Bidding to give: an experimental comparison of auctions for charity. International Economic Review, 50, 431–457.

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2010a). Expenditures and information disclosure in two-stage political contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 54, 771–798.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2010b). Experimental comparison of multi-stage and one-stage contests. Games and Economic Behavior, 68, 731–747.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2011a). Contest design: An experimental investigation. Economic Inquiry, 49, 573–590.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2011b). Perfect-substitutes, best-shot, and weakest-link contests between groups. Korean Economic Review, 27, 5–32.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2013). Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27, 491–514.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). Behavioral dimensions of contests. In R. D. Congleton & A. L. Hillman (Eds.), Companion to political economy of rent seeking. London: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheremeta, R. M., & Wu, S. Y. (2011). Optimal tournament design and incentive response: An experimental investigation of canonical tournament theory. Working Paper.

  • Sheremeta, R. M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests? Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175–197.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Shogren, J. F., & Baik, K. H. (1992). Favorites and underdogs: Strategic behavior in an experimental contest. Public Choice, 74, 191–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R. M., Schmidt, D., & Walker, J. (2013). Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 257–267.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Silipo, D. B. (2005). The evolution of cooperation in patent races: Theory and experimental evidence. Journal of Economics, 85, 1–38.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Sisak, D. (2009). Multiple-prize contests—The optimal allocation of prizes. Journal of Economic Surveys, 23, 82–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stahl, D., & Wilson, P. (1994). Experimental evidence on players’ models of other players. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 25, 309–327.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stein, W. (2002). Asymmetric rent-seeking with more than two contestants. Public Choice, 113, 325–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stracke, R., Höchtl, W., Kerschbamer, R., & Sunde, U. (2014a). Optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests: An experimental analysis. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 102, 43–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Stracke, R., Höchtl, W., Kerschbamer, R., & Sunde, U. (2014b). Incentives and selection in promotion contests: Is it possible to kill two birds with one stone? Managerial and Decision Economics, Forthcoming.

  • Sutter, M., & Strassmair, C. (2009). Communication, cooperation and collusion in team tournaments—An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 506–525.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Szentes, B., & Rosenthal, R. W. (2003). Three-object two-bidder simultaneous auctions: chopsticks and tetrahedra. Games and Economic Behavior, 44, 114–133.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, S. (2003). The economic design of sporting contests. Journal of Economic Literature, 41, 1137–1187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, S., & Valletti, T. M. (2005). Incentive effects of second prizes. European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 467–481.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, C. R. (1995). Digging for golden carrots: An analysis of research tournaments. American Economic Review, 85, 872–890.

    Google Scholar 

  • Treich, N. (2010). Risk-aversion and prudence in rent-seeking games. Public Choice, 145, 339–349.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1967). The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft. Western Economic Journal, 5, 224–232.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient rent seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, & Gordon Tullock (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society (pp. 97–112). College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Van Dijk, F., Sonnemans, J., & van Winden, F. (2001). Incentives systems in a real effort experiment. European Economic Review, 45, 187–214.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vandegrift, D., Yavas, A., & Brown, P. (2007). Incentive effects and overcrowding in tournaments: An experimental analysis. Experimental Economics, 10, 345–368.

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  • Vasilaky, K. (2011). Incentives for information exchange: Getting women to share in rural Uganda. Working Paper.

  • Vogt, C., Weimann, J., & Yang, C. L. (2002). Efficient rent-seeking in experiment. Public Choice, 110, 67–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wärneryd, K. (2003). Information in conflicts. Journal of Economic Theory, 110, 121–136.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Wasser, C. (2013). Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests. Economic Theory, 53, 239–268.

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  • Weigelt, K., Dukerich, J., & Schotter, A. (1989). Reactions to discrimination in an incentive pay compensation scheme: A game-theoretic approach. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 44, 26–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weimann, J., Yang, C. L., & Vogt, C. (2000). An experiment on sequential rent seeking. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 41, 405–426.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu, S. Y., & Roe, B. (2005). Behavioral and welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance contracts: Some experimental evidence. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 87, 130–146.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Wu, S. Y., Roe, B., & Sporleder, T. (2006). Mixed tournaments, common shocks, and disincentives: An experimental study. Working Paper.

  • Young, H. P. (1978). A tactical lobbying game. In Peter C. Ordeshook (Ed.), Game theory and political science (pp. 391–404). New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zizzo, D. J. (2002). Racing with uncertainty: A patent race experiment. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 20, 877–902.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

We thank two anonymous referees and the Editor of this journal for their valuable suggestions. We have benefitted from the helpful comments of Loukas Balafoutas, Michael Baye, Mike Caldara, Tim Cason, Gary Charness, Subhasish Chowdhury, Cary Deck, David Dickinson, John Duffy, Jörg Franke, David Gill, Turkmen Goksel, Arye Hillman, Tanjim Hossain, Yaakov Kareev, Changxia Ke, Erik Kimbrough, Kai Konrad, Wolfgang Leininger, Noah Lim, Mike McBride, Aidas Masiliunas, Kristin Michelitch, Florian Morath, David Ong, Amnon Rapoport, Brian Roberson, Ariel Rubinstein, Dmitry Ryvkin, Tal Shavit, Jason Shogren, Matthias Sutter, Katya Vasilaky, Casper de Vries, Bart Wilson and participants in seminars at Chapman University, the University California at San Diego, and the University of Texas at Dallas, and the 2012 International Foundation for Research in Experimental Economics Conference at Chapman University. We thank Andy Schotter and Charles Noussair for providing data and Jianing You and David Zhang for valuable research assistance. Part of this work was completed while Kovenock and Sheremeta were visiting the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance. We remain solely responsible for any errors or omissions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Kent State University, Kent, OH, 44242, USA

    Emmanuel Dechenaux

  2. Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, CA, 92866, USA

    Dan Kovenock & Roman M. Sheremeta

  3. Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH, 44106, USA

    Roman M. Sheremeta

Authors
  1. Emmanuel Dechenaux
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Dan Kovenock
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Roman M. Sheremeta
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Roman M. Sheremeta.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D. & Sheremeta, R.M. A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Exp Econ 18, 609–669 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Revised:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-014-9421-0

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Search

Navigation