Summary
In a (first price) all-pay auction, bidders simultaneously submit bids for an item. All players forfeit their bids, and the high bidder receives the item. This auction is widely used in economics to model rent seeking, R&D races, political contests, and job promotion tournaments. We fully characterize equilibrium for this class of games, and show that the set of equilibria is much larger than has been recognized in the literature. When there are more than two players, for instance, we show that even when the auction is symmetric there exists a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. Moreover, for economically important configurations of valuations, there is no revenue equivalence across the equilibria; asymmetric equilibria imply higher expected revenues than the symmetric equilibrium.
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We are grateful to Jacques Crémer, Chuangyin Dang, Jürgen Dennert, Chaim Fershtman, Martin Hellwig, Arthur Robson, Heinrich Ursprung, Eric van Damme, Ton Vorst, and the referees for helpful comments. We benefitted from presentations at the World Congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona, the European Meeting on the Economics of Information at Tilburg University, the Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings at the University of Illinois, and seminars at Texas A&M University, The Pennsylvania State University, Tilburg University and the University of Montreal. Baye is grateful for support from the CentER for Economic Research at Tilburg University and the Tinbergen Institute where earlier versions of this paper were completed. Kovenock acknowledges support from Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, the Tinbergen Institute, the Center for Economic Studies at the University of Munich, the Institut d'Analisi Economica CSIC at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Krannert School of Management, and the Jay N. Ross Young Faculty Scholar Award.