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Dura lex, sed lex? Insights from the subjective theory of opportunity cost

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Abstract

Seeking a grounding in Buchanan (Cost and choice: an inquiry in economic theory, 1969) subjective theory of opportunity cost, this paper sets out to fix a notional locus of the law in order to determine the cost of law enforcement. The paper also explores the impact of unlawful activities on the economy and analyses the evolution of individual criminal activities in collective criminal organizations such as the mafia.

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Notes

  1. Ferrara’s “cost of reproduction” foreshadows or anticipates the concept of opportunity cost. On this see Eusepi (1991).

  2. Becker (1968) and Buchanan (1969).

  3. I owe this point to Geoffrey Brennan.

  4. I am referring, of course, to the morals perceived by the individuals, not to the Kantian morals. For the distinction between morality and morals see Pound (2002).

  5. See Eusepi (2006) and for a different view Kliemt (2006).

  6. For further details on this point see Eusepi (2006). Especially pp. 37–40.

  7. For a slightly different approach see Freeman (1996).

  8. “…of two men equally innocent, or equally guilty, the most robust and resolute will be acquitted, and the weakest and most pusillanimous will be condemned, in consequence of the following excellent mode of reasoning. I, the judge, must find some one guilty” (Beccaria 1819 p. 64).

  9. c.f. Von Lampe (2002).

  10. In the mafia hierarchy a soldier is a low ranking member who serves as an “enforcer”.

  11. Levitt (1998) explains the increase in juvenile criminal actions vis à vis adults’ as dependent on the alleged effect of the severity degree of the penal law. This thesis should be taken cum grano salis because it seems to warrant the position that harsh laws automatically decrease juvenile crimes. Draconian laws are, at the most, preferable to anarchy, but they should be kept at arms length in democracies.

  12. For FBI data, see Muhlhausen (2006).

References

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Acknowledgements

I wish to thank Geoffrey Brennan for his written comments provided as discussant at the ECSPC/CIDEI conference. A thank goes also to Alessandra Cepparulo, Maria Delle Grotti and Flavio Verrechia for their assistance.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Economics and ECSPC, Faculty of Economics, Sapienza University of Rome, Via del Castro Laurenziano, 9, 00161, Rome, Italy

    Giuseppe Eusepi

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  1. Giuseppe Eusepi
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Correspondence to Giuseppe Eusepi.

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Eusepi, G. Dura lex, sed lex? Insights from the subjective theory of opportunity cost. Eur J Law Econ 26, 253–265 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-008-9082-6

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