Abstract
In collaborative negotiation, stakeholder representatives are charged with the development of a mutually acceptable set of public policies. Although this approach has become popular in environmental negotiations, little is known about the characteristics of the outcomes that are reached. In this paper, we employ an Edgeworth box framework to investigate the nature of bargaining over public goods (environmental policies) that have multiple attributes. We then design and conduct laboratory experiments within this framework to test whether negotiated outcomes satisfy standard axiomatic bargaining predictions under a variety of conditions. Specifically, we test whether two parties with Pareto inefficient endowments of two goods will trade to Pareto improving and Pareto efficient outcomes, and to the Nash bargain in particular. We vary whether the Nash bargain coincides with or diverges from the outcome that maximizes the joint payoff, or the outcome that equalizes payoffs, and whether subjects are provided full or partial information. We find that bargainers reach Pareto improving and efficient outcomes across treatments, but withdraw support for the Nash bargain when it generates unequal payments or when payoff information is private. We conclude that this experimental framework offers a promising method for studying multi-attribute negotiations.
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Funding for this research was provided by the Donner Canadian Foundation and the College of Business and Economics of the University of Canterbury. We would like to thank two anonymous referees plus David Dickinson, Mike McKee, Francisco Gonzalez, Marian Miles, Chris Auld, and Steven Tucker for their suggestions.
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Bruce, C., Clark, J. The Efficiency of Direct Public Involvement in Environmental Policymaking: An Experimental Test. Environ Resource Econ 45, 157–182 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9310-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-009-9310-8