Abstract
German banks tend to emphasize how satisfied their clients are with the financial advice they offer. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that this satisfaction may have little to do with the quality of the information exchange between clients and advisors but rather with substitute factors like the friendliness and appearance of the advisor. Applying the theoretical perspectives of New Institutionalism and Behavioural Finance we explain in this article why the coexistence of information and interest asymmetry between retail clients and advisors must lead to poor advice quality and why the market’s self-healing powers and the actual regulatory framework fail in preventing that. We support our theoretical analysis with some empirical evidence from a recent study we conducted to test the factual quality of the advice German banks give in the retail banking area. The results obtained are very consistent with previous findings of a poor level of quality of the information exchange between client and advisor and predominantly confirm our theoretical conclusions. We finally offer some suggestions that might pave the way out of this dilemma.
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Notes
Financial assets available to private households have more than doubled from about EUR two trillion in 1990 to more than EUR 4.5 trillion. Including tangible assets, particularly real estate, total wealth in place surpasses EUR nine trillion. Due to a high savings ratio of about 10%, German citizens have of more than EUR 150 billion disposable income per year to invest (Deutsche Bundesbank 2007, pp. 24–25).
This is due, for example, to cuts in social security contributions and benefit cuts in social insurance (e.g., the lowering of net pension levels).
Under a neoclassical perspective individuals are perceived as rational decision makers who dispose of and process all relevant information. According to the expected utility theory, they distribute their resources including their human capital over their entire life span and react sensitively to external changes. Furthermore, since the market is assumed to be perfect, financial intermediaries and financial advice are irrelevant.
While information economics considers market uncertainties as unequal distribution of information among the market participants and focuses on the information flow during all contract phases (before and after a contract has been concluded), principal-agent theory more specifically characterised the researched transactional relationships as relationships between a client and an agent who works for him and focuses particularly on the time after the contract has been concluded.
This refers to the conclusion of an advising contract from a legal perspective, where an implicit oral agreement is sufficient. See e.g., Micklitz and Träger (2004), p. 127.
For example, according to Spiegel Verlag’s 6th representative debit and credit study 65% of Germans in 2004 had not heard about stocks. See Spiegel (2004), p. 86.
Three kinds of goods—search, experience, and credence goods—can be distinguished based on the degree of information asymmetry between seller and buyer. A search good is a product or service with features and characteristics which can be easily evaluated before purchase. An experience good, in contrast, is a product or service where product characteristics such as quality or price are difficult to observe and/or evaluate in advance, but these characteristics can be ascertained upon consumption. A credence good, finally, is a good whose utility impact is difficult or impossible for the consumer to evaluate, even after use and consumption, respectively. Only the seller of the good knows the utility impact of the good, creating a situation of asymmetric information (Darby and Karni, 1973; Nelson 1970; Oehler and Kohlert 2008; Weiber and Adler 1995).
The term hidden quality characterises the problem that the principal (client) cannot evaluate the agent’s (advisor’s) potential (e.g., skills, knowledge, and experience) as well as determination for performance in advance. He therefore has considerable leeway to behave in an opportunistic way.
Hold-up occurs when the agent’s true intentions are ex ante hidden from the principal (hidden intention) and the latter is able to observe and evaluate the formers actions but cannot act on them since he has already made a sunk, relationship-specific investment (e.g., advising feel; Williamson 1975; Spremann 1996, p. 698). In the case of moral hazard, the agent usually has more information about his or her actions than the principal does and thus can use this information advantage to act inappropriately (from the view of the principal). The latter can either observe but not evaluate the actions of the agent (hidden information) or neither observe nor evaluate them (hidden action; Holmstrom 1979; Oehler 2006).
For a detailed review and assessment of the legal framework see Kohlert (2009), pp. 150–239.
In this paper we focus on the advice giving and taking process. For the clients, however, not only this core phase but also the pre-advice and post-advice phases are of enormous importance for the clients. For a detailed analysis of the pre-advice, advice, and post-advice phases in their entirety see Kohlert (2009), pp. 209–239.
For example, selecting the level of risk tolerance on a scale from 1 to 10, and proportion of stocks = 100 − age.
The higher the client’s financial knowledge is, the greater the efforts advisors will make to thoroughly advice him, since a client who has a high expertise can much easier discover and evaluate poor performance delivered by the advisor and particularly he can pass the information about what he experienced on to others. This enables him to effectively destroy welfare positions of the advisor. In consequence, the advisor´s motivation to act in an opportunistic way declines while simultaneously his motivation to make a good impression rises.
Participant observation refers to research that involves social interaction between the researcher and the study subjects in the environment of the latter, during which data are systematically and unobtrusively conducted. Covert participant observation is performed without the knowledge of possibly interested third parties and specifically without the knowledge of those being observed. Due to these characteristics it is much better suited for the financial advice context than more traditional methods of research such as questionnaires and interviews. The method is often called “Mystery Shopping” in a practical context.
We used data from the actual German Income and Expenditure Survey, the Public Sector Collective Agreement as well as publicly available job databases to determine the test clients´ yearly gross income, calculated the corresponding net income and monthly data, and finally defined the clients´ monthly discretionary income based on Bundesbank (German Central Bank) data about savings quotes for different income levels.
We built behavioural multi-factor models using a combination of behavioural science concepts such as subjective competence, risk perception, involvement and locus of control, amongst others, and, based on those models, developed behavioural specifications for each test client type.
For example, the only information our test clients should provide were their name and their wish for advice; all other information basically had to be asked for by the advisors. Also, the clients had inherited money, and, after paying inheritance tax, spent some of it on consumption and they now seek advice on investing the remaining amount of EUR 50.000. For a detailed description see Kohlert (2009), pp. 263–268; Oehler and Kohlert (2008).
The secondary quality areas contain criteria which do not directly relate to the quality of the information exchange between advisor and client but are still important components of the advice quality, even if only with regard to the clients´ satisfaction (e.g. friendliness of the advisor, orderly appearance of the service personnel).
Representative results require that all relevant characteristics of the advice giving situation are identically distributed in the sample as they are in reality, and not only by themselves, but also in conjunction with each other (Haas 2002). It is impossible, however, to develop the corresponding test plan, not only because of the enormous number of test visits that would be needed, but also because the elements of the underlying population do not even exist at the time when the sample is being constructed. As it is always the case with observational research, the underlying population cannot be empirically defined and the sampling units cannot be clearly determined. They mostly are not even known (Kromrey 2006, p. 363). Even using a representative sample of potential event spaces and times as substitutes (Finn and Kayande 1999; Kromrey 2006, pp. 363–364) fails, since the corresponding distributions are also unknown. Therefore, the extent to which the sample resembles the underlying population cannot be determined (Haas 2002).
For a realistic view on the representativity of related studies see Oehler (2004), p. 182.
First, it was taken care for a sufficiently high number of observed advising sessions. In the literature, recommendations ranging from three to 40 tests per researched group can be found. Moreover, biases in the sample were avoided by carefully designing the test plan. The real client flow was approximated by avoiding the scheduling of the sessions at “convenient” times like the afternoon and instead distributing the test contingent over several days of the week and different times of the day. Finally, as also suggested in the literature, tests under special conditions were avoided (e.g. just before close of the bank).
The reason for this, however, is the high financial knowledge and experience of the KT type because of which there were no point deductions in the fit category if the advisor provided wrong, distorted, or incomplete information.
The U test we used to compare the results of the three groups is a non-parametric test employed with ordinal data in a hypothesis-testing situation involving a design with independent samples. If the result of the U test is significant, it indicates there is a significant difference between medians of the samples and a high likelihood the samples represent populations with different median values. The null hypothesis accordingly is that the tested samples are drawn from a single population, and therefore that their probability distributions are equal.
While the A and C types were grammar school teachers with an gross income of EUR 37,300 and total wealth of about EUR 80,000, the B type was a physiotherapist (secondary school) with a gross income of EUR 19,200 and total wealth of about 60,000 EUR (always including the inheritance of EUR 50,000).
Habschick and Evers (2008), p. 12.
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Oehler, A., Kohlert, D. Financial Advice Giving and Taking—Where are the Market’s Self-healing Powers and a Functioning Legal Framework When We Need Them?. J Consum Policy 32, 91–116 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-009-9099-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10603-009-9099-4