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Understanding Auditors’ Sense of Responsibility for Detecting Fraud Within Organizations

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Abstract

The objective of this study is to evaluate auditors’ perceived responsibility for fraud detection. Auditors play a critical role in managing fraud risk within organizations. Although professional standards and guidance prescribe responsibility in the area, little is known about auditors’ sense of responsibility for fraud detection, the factors affecting perceived responsibility, and how responsibility affects auditor performance. We use the triangle model of responsibility as a theoretical basis for examining responsibility and the effects of accountability, fraud type, and auditor type on auditors’ perceived fraud detection responsibility. We also test how perceived responsibility affects auditor brainstorming performance given the importance of brainstorming in audits. A sample of 878 auditors (241 external auditors and 637 internal auditors) participated in an experiment with accountability pressure and fraud type manipulated randomly between subjects. As predicted, accountable auditors report higher detection responsibility than anonymous auditors. We also find a significant fraud type × auditor type interaction with external auditors perceiving the most detection responsibility for financial statement fraud, while internal auditors report similar detection responsibility for all fraud types. Analysis of the triangle model’s formative links reveals that professional obligation and personal control are significantly related to responsibility, while task clarity is not. Finally, the results indicate that perceived responsibility positively affects the number of detection procedures brainstormed and partially mediates the significant accountability–brainstorming relation.

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Notes

  1. The governance literature (e.g., Adamec et al. 2005; Lapides et al. 2007; Rossiter 2011) describes management, the board of directors, external auditors, and internal auditors as four “pillars” of governance and suggests that the occurrence of fraud provides evidence of failures among these primary governance mechanisms (CAQ 2010; IIA et al. 2008; Kochan 2002).

  2. Balkaran (2008) distinguishes external auditing and internal auditing by noting that external auditors are not part of the organizations they audit, but are instead engaged by them, while internal auditors are “integral” parts of their organization serving management and the board of directors as clients.

  3. The professional (e.g., ACFE 2014; AICPA 2009), research (Alleyne and Elson 2013; Hunt 2014), and education (e.g., Albrecht et al. 2016; Girgenti and Hedley 2011; Wells 2014) literature typically describe financial statement fraud, asset misappropriation, and corruption as the three primary types of fraud. The ACFE (2014) reports that misappropriation of assets is involved in 87 % of cases, corruption in 33 % of cases, and financial statement fraud 8 % of cases. However, the ACFE also finds that the median loss in financial statement fraud cases is $1 million, compared to $250,000 for corruption cases and $120,000 for asset misappropriation cases.

  4. The literature provides a variety of definitions of accountability in a variety of contexts (e.g., Bovens 2007; Brandsma and Schillemans 2012; DeZoort et al. 2006; Tetlock 1985, 1992). The Schlenker definition of accountability as an antecedent social pressure construct is consistent with alternative definitions of accountability in individual judgment and decision-making studies.

  5. For example, the extant literature provides evidence that auditor brainstorming quality is affected by the quality of brainstorming guidance used (Trotman et al. 2009), the use of face-to-face sessions (Carpenter 2007), and documentation specificity (Hammersley et al. 2010). Brazel et al. (2010) find that brainstorming quality is linked to a number of process variables, including use of an audit partner or forensic specialist to lead the brainstorming session, attendance by an information technology specialist, and early timing of brainstorming in the audit process.

  6. The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) (2009) defines professional skepticism as “an attitude that includes a questioning mind and a critical assessment of audit evidence” (p. 13).

  7. The study and all research materials also were approved by the Institutional Review Boards at the researchers’ universities. The materials were developed in consultation with groups of accounting and psychology researchers to ensure case realism, understandability, and content validity for the framework’s measurement items. We also pretested the materials with 114 undergraduate and graduate accounting students. The development and pretest procedures led to minor modifications to the instrument.

  8. Nelson et al. (2003) reviewed 515 earnings management efforts reported by auditors and found that 31 % of attempts reported were income-decreasing.

  9. Beasley and Jenkins (2003) describe open brainstorming as a very unstructured approach where individuals can identify ideas freely with very few rules and procedures to impede the process.

  10. The study’s primary results are not affected by including participants who missed at least one manipulation check question.

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Acknowledgments

We gratefully acknowledge the generous help we received from The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) Research Foundation and from professionals at the participating public accounting firms, IIA chapters, and IIA affiliates. We also appreciate research assistance and helpful comments from Bruce Barrett, Steve Farmer, Francesca Gino, Dana Hermanson, Travis Holt, Denise Leggett, Mark Nelson, Kurt Reding, Barry Schlenker, Jonathan Stanley, Jeffrey Swerdlow, Mark Taylor, Erin Weber, and workshop and seminar participants at the American Accounting Association Auditing Midyear Conference, Kennesaw State University, and The University of Alabama.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Culverhouse School of Accountancy, The University of Alabama, 361 Stadium Drive, Box 870220, Tuscaloosa, AL, 35487-0220, USA

    F. Todd DeZoort

  2. School of Accountancy, Wichita State University, 1845 Fairmount Street, Wichita, KS, 67260, USA

    Paul D. Harrison

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Correspondence to F. Todd DeZoort.

Additional information

The internal auditor results are summarized in a report provided to The IIA Research Foundation.

Appendix A: Experimental Materials

Appendix A: Experimental Materials

Panel A: Background Information

(Internal auditors only) HQT is a tool manufacturer that sells to distributors and select retailers. HQT is a publicly-held firm that has to file annual reports with governmental regulators. The company has had stable financial health and growth. Prior year results and current year planning indicate that HQT has effective internal controls and competent management and directors. The internal audit department, of which you are a member, has a very good reputation.

(External auditors only) HQT is a tool manufacturer that sells to distributors and select retailers. HQT is an SEC client and has been your firm’s audit client for 2 years. The company has had stable financial health and growth. Prior year results and current year planning indicate that HQT is an average risk client with effective internal controls and competent management, directors, and (in-house) internal auditors. Your firm has given unqualified audit opinions for each of the past 2 years. Your firm does not provide any non-audit services to HQT.

Summary (Unaudited) Annual Financial Information

Revenues

$13 million

Pretax Income

$1.4 million

Net Income

$1.0 million

EPS

$1.05/share (forecast $1.04/share)

A/R (net)

$1.0 million

Inventory

$2.8 million

Current Assets

$4.7 million

PP&E (net)

$3.9 million

Total assets

$10.5 million

Current liabilities

$2.0 million

Total liabilities

$5.6 million

Total equity

$4.9 million

Panel B: Fraud Treatments

(Financial statement fraud) During the fiscal year that you are about to audit, a new fraud has developed at HQT in an area where you will conduct audit work. Specifically, a member of HQT management prematurely recorded expenses by purchasing $100,000 of unneeded supplies prior to year-end and immediately expensed them as “Supplies Expense” even though none of the supplies were used. The manager was substantially under budget for the year and bought the supplies to use up the current year’s budget and prematurely start recognizing next year’s expenses.

(Misappropriation of assets) During the fiscal year that you are about to audit, a new fraud has developed at HQT in an area where you will conduct audit work. Specifically, a member of HQT management has stolen $100,000 cash from the company prior to year-end using a billing scheme. The manager created a fictitious (shell) company, sent false invoices to HQT for services that were not provided, and then converted the cash paid to the shell company.

(Corruption) During the fiscal year that you are about to audit, a new fraud has developed at HQT in an area where you will conduct audit work. Specifically, a member of HQT management has paid $100,000 in bribes this year to major distributors to ensure preferential treatment for HQT products. The fraudulent disbursements were expensed using an account called “Consulting Fees.”

Panel C: Triangle Model of Responsibility Link Questions (adapted from Schlenker et al. 1994)

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DeZoort, F.T., Harrison, P.D. Understanding Auditors’ Sense of Responsibility for Detecting Fraud Within Organizations. J Bus Ethics 149, 857–874 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-016-3064-3

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