Abstract
The ethical governance of the global Internet is an accelerating global phenomenon. A key paradox of the global Internet is that it allows individual and collective decision making to co-exist with each other. Open source software (OSS) communities are a globally accelerating phenomenon. OSS refers to groups of programs that allow the free use of the software and further the code sharing to the general and corporate users of the software. The combination of private provision and public knowledge and software, and the seeming paradox of economic versus social motivations have stimulated a wide debate between researchers and policymakers. In this article, we analyze OSS communities from the viewpoint of “intrinsic motivation,” knowledge creation, and collective Internet governance. We believe that the growth of global OSS has fundamental implications for business ethics and the governance of the global Internet in the twenty-first century.
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Choi, C.J., Kim, S.W. & Yu, S. Global Ethics of Collective Internet Governance: Intrinsic Motivation and Open Source Software. J Bus Ethics 90, 523–531 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0057-5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-009-0057-5