Abstract
Although rhetoric is not a category of ancient Indian philosophy, this paper argues that Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, 2 eighth-century Indian Buddhist philosophers, can nonetheless be seen to embrace a rhetorical conception of rationality. That is, while these thinkers are strong proponents of rational analysis and philosophical argumentation as tools for attaining certainty, they also uphold the contingent nature of all such processes. Drawing on the categories of the New Rhetoric, this paper argues that these Buddhist thinkers understand philosophical argumentation to be directed at a universal audience of rational beings, where this universal audience is not an actual audience but a rhetorical one constructed through the author’s particular and historically contingent conception of what counts as rational. A reception theory of rationality is one that holds that the rationality of an argument depends upon its acceptance by a rational audience. When philosophers recognize the historically contingent nature of what counts as rational, they can embrace a reception theory of rationality that neither reduces the rational to mere opinion nor restricts it to a single, absolute, and timeless standard.
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Notes
See Dharmakīrti’s Vādanyāya 22, 15–20: … na yogavihitaḥ kaścid vijigīṣuvāda nāma/parānugrahapravṛttās tu santo vipratipannaṃ pratipādayanto nyāyam anusareyuḥ satsādhanābhidhānena bhūtadoṣodbhāvanena vā sākṣipratyakṣaṃ tasyaivānuprabodhāya/tad eva nyāyānusaraṇaṃ satāṃ vādaḥ … “…in fact, there is no so-called ‘debate between those desirous of victory’ (vijigīṣuvāda) which is endowed with [the rules of] logic (yoga). Rather, those good people who are acting in order to help others by pointing out a misunderstanding (vipratipanna) should follow formal reasoning (nyāya), either through the statement of a correct proof or by pointing out real faults [in the other’s reasoning], in the presence of witnesses, in order to bring just that [other person] to knowledge. This very adherence to reasoning (nyāyānusaraṇam) is debate for good people.”
See, among many possible resources, Kennedy (1963, p. 23). See also Socrates’ discussion of rhetoric as persuasion in Plato’s Gorgias 452e and 453d–454a and Phaedrus 261a–b.
Tindale (1999, pp. 37–41) offers a helpful analysis of the place of logic in the New Rhetoric. In short, the authors of the New Rhetoric do not seek to dismiss symbolic logic, but rather to incorporate it into a larger vision of reason that includes logic but is not limited to it. Cf. also Toulmin (1990, 2001).
In a short article published posthumously, i.e., Perelman (1984), Perelman acknowledged that the universal audience was the most misunderstood element of the New Rhetoric. Although his remarks in that article went some way to clarify its meaning, the category remained (and remains) difficult for many. Excellent treatments of the universal audience include those by Crosswhite (1989, 1996), Gross (1999), and Tindale (1999).
This statement assumes a relatively uncomplicated presentation of philosophical argumentation. It does not take into account situations such as that found in the Platonic dialogues where the philosopher, in this case Plato, presents his or her ‘arguments’ in what amounts to a much more rhetorically opaque medium, that of the dialogue. For the purposes of the current essay, I limit my discussion to arguments and statements that appear to be intended to be taken at face value. This is, of course, tricky to determine.
TS 3587 and TSP ad TS 1–6 (B 15, 23–24): tāpāc chedāc ca nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ/parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyaṃ madvaco na tu gauravāt//. The same idea appears also at TS 3343 and TSP ad cit., where Kamalaśīla explains that “heating it, rubbing it on a touchstone, and cutting it” stands for testing the Buddha’s words through perception, inference that functions through the force of real entities, and scripturally based inference: yathā kaladhautaṃ suvarṇam amalaṃ sarvadoṣarahitaṃ parīkṣyamāṇaṃ tāpādibhir na vikriyāṃ pratipadyate tathā bhagavadvacoratnaṃ pratyakṣeṇa tāpasadṛśena vastubalapravṛttānumānena nikaṣaprakhyeṇāgamāpekṣānumānenāpi chedadṛṣṭāntasūcitena na vikriyate/. Cf. also Kamalaśīla’s comments on the verse in the Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṅkṣipti (Derge edition, tshad ma, vol. ve, 93a4 ff.).
The TSP begins with a protracted defense of the necessity for stating the aim (prayojana) of the treatise. Kamalaśīla’s argument makes clear that he understands this to be a necessity in relation to an ideal audience of judicious persons. In the first line of the commentary, for example, we read (TSP B 2, 5): …śāstre prekṣāvatām abhidheyaprayojanāvasāyapūrvikā pravṛttir…/“Judicious persons act toward a treatise having first determined its subject matter and purpose.”
An example of the application of the law contradiction occurs at TSP ad TS 682 (guṇapadārthaparīkṣā, B 281, 3–4): vyāhata iti parasparaviruddhaḥ/bhedābhedayoḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatayā yugapad ekatra viruddhatvāt/ “Obstructed means mutually contradictory, since it is contradictory for that which is different and that which is non-different to exist simultaneously in a single place because they are [an instance of contradiction that is] characterized as mutually exclusive (parasparaparihārasthita).” TSP ad TS 3353–3354 (B 1065, 22–24) discusses the two types of contradiction: tathā hi dvividha eva bhāvānāṃ virodho nirūpyamāṇo ’vatiṣthate/parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo vā yathā bhāvābhāvayoḥ kramākramayor vā sahānavasthānalakṣaṇo vā yathāgniśītasparśayoḥ//“That is, contradiction between things is described as being just two-fold: either it is defined as mutual exclusion, as in the case of existence and nonexistence or gradual and simultaneous; or, it is defined as mutual incompatibility, as in the case of fire and an icy touch.” Cf. PVin 2.53 and NB 3.73–75. An example of the application of the law of the excluded middle occurs at TSP ad TS 1303–1304 (pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā, B 476, 24–477, 4): nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ/anyo ’nyaparihāreṇa sthiter anyatvatattvayoḥ pakṣayoḥ/yau hi parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇau tayor ya ekaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ so ’paravidhināntarīyakaḥ/parasparaparihāreṇa vānyatvatattve vyavasthite/anyatarasvabhāvavyavacchedenānyatarasya paricchedāt/tasmān nāsti tṛtīyarāśisambandhaḥ// “Nor is the third position [i.e., that the universal is both other than and the same as particulars] correct, for the two positions concerning being other and being the same are established as mutually exclusive. And regarding two [positions] which are defined as established through mutual exclusion, when one of the two is negated, then that amounts to the affirmation of the other. And being other or being the same are established through mutual exclusion, because one of them is determined by means of the exclusion of the nature of the other. Therefore there is no possibility of a third option (tṛtīyarāśi).”
See, e.g., TSP ad TS 155 (puruṣaparīkṣā, B 97, 16–17): prekṣāpūrvakāripravṛtteḥ prayojanavattayā vyāptatvāt/. “[Śāntarakṣita has asked for what reason the supreme person (puruṣa) created the world] because the actions of judicious persons necessarily have a purpose.”
Cf. TS 419–425 (sthirabhāvaparīkṣā) and TSP ad cit. In this passage, Śāntarakṣita claims that only a crazy person (unmatta) would undertake an investigation into something that was causally inefficacious (i.e., could serve no purpose), and, further, that such causally inefficacious pseudo-entities do not qualify as being real things (vastu). Cf. also PV 1.211, cited in TSP ad TS 422–424: arthakriyāsamarthasya vicāraiḥ kim tadarthinām/ṣaṇḍhasya rūpe vairūpye kāminyāḥ kim parīkṣayā/“Why would those who seek the [thing in question] bother to analyze something that lacks causal efficacy? Why would a lustful woman bother to investigate whether a eunuch is beautiful or ugly?” The same verse appears as MA 8 and at TSP ad TS 1610 (pramāṇāntarabhāvaparīkṣā).
See, e.g., TSP ad TS 3009–3016 (svataḥprāmāṇyaparīkṣā, B 957, 11–12): na hy ākrośamātreṇaiva vinā pramāṇaṃ prekṣāvatām āśaṅkānivṛttir yuktā/“In the absence of a means of trustworthy awareness (pramāṇa), a mere proclamation alone is incapable of eliminating doubt for judicious persons.”
TSP ad TS 3605, for example, suggests that a nyāyavādin is someone who has mastery of the technicalities of how to use a reductio ad absurdum, or prasaṅga, to defeat an opponent.
For the idea that the convention “true” requires a probative pramāṇa, see TSP ad TS 652 (guṇapadārthaparīkṣā): yasya na kiṃcit sādhakaṃ pramāṇam asti na tat prekṣāvatāṃ sadvyavahāraviṣayo yathā vandhyāsutādi//. For the idea that the convention “untrue” is likewise also applied on the basis of a pramāṇa (i.e., the pramāṇa of nonperception of a perceptible entity), see TSP ad TS 704 (karmapadārthaparīkṣā): yad upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptaṃ san nopalabhyate tat prekṣāvatām asadvyavahāram avatarati//.
TSP ad TS 2790–2791 (śrutiparīkṣā, B 897, 21–23): yady ayam artho yukty upetaḥ syāt/tadā kim iti bauddho nābhyupagacchet/na hi nyāyopapanne ’rthe prekṣāvato ’nabhyupagamo yuktaḥ// “If it is correct that this thing is to be accepted, then why would the Buddhist not accept it? For it is not correct for a judicious person not to accept a thing that has been proved through reasoning.” A similar principle can also be seen at work in Dharmakīrti’s PV 4, the chapter on inference-for-another (parārthānumānapariccheda), where Dharmakīrti holds that proponents in a debate should not to be considered responsible for every position accepted by the system or school to which they belong, but only for the thesis they advance in the current dispute. See PV 4.42 and PV 4.53ff. Translated in Tillemans (2000).
In many cases, Kamalaśīla signals the provisional status of an argument by means of the technical term abhyupagamya, “having [provisionally] accepted…” For one example, see TSP ad TS 587 (dravyapadārthaparīkṣā, B 244, 20–22): etac ca sarvaṃ paramāṇūnāṃ siddhiṃ bāhyasya cārthasya prayakṣatvasiddhim abhyupagamyoktam/yasya tu vijñānavādino na bāhyo ’rtho nīlādirūpatayā pratyakṣasiddhaḥ/…. There are a great many such instances in the TSP.
The main criticism has come from Tibetan scholars and has been thematized around what came to be known as the thal rang gi khyad par or the ‘prāsaṅgika-svātantrika distinction.” For analysis of this distinction in terms of both the Indian and the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, see the articles collected in Dreyfus and McClintock (2003).
See TS 1209–1211 and TSP ad cit., where Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla make clear that communication requires a degree of shared error to function. They give the example of two persons afflicted with the same eye disease who are able to discuss the two moons. Similarly, ordinary people are able to use language to discuss various things despite the fact that words cannot refer to real things without distortion. Since all persons, even judicious ones, participate in this distortion whenever they use language, even rational discourse is ultimately flawed.
Stanley Fish takes this point one step further when he argues that the fact that “all arguments are made within assumptions and presuppositions that are themselves subject to challenge and change” necessitates that “everyone is obliged to practice the art of persuasion” (Fish 1980, p. 368, emphasis added). In other words, even those who traffic in the discourse of certainty cannot avoid the necessity of persuading others. Put in New Rhetorical terms, even the universal audience is always particular.
Abbreviations
- B:
-
Bauddha Bharati edition of the Sanskrit texts of Tattvasaṃgraha and Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, ed. Dwarikadas Shastri
- MA:
-
Madhyamakālaṃkāra of Śāntarakṣita
- NB:
-
Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti
- PV:
-
Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti
- PVin:
-
Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti
- TS:
-
Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita
- TSP:
-
Tattvasaṃgrahapaññjikā of Kamalaśīla
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McClintock, S.L. Rhetoric and the Reception Theory of Rationality in the Work of Two Buddhist Philosophers. Argumentation 22, 27–41 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9071-x
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-007-9071-x