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Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony

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Summary

This paper studies some classic cases of the fallacy of begging the question based on appeals to testimony containing circular reasoning. For example, suppose agents a, b and c vouch for d’s credentials, and agents b, d, and e vouch for a’s credentials. Such a sequence of reasoning is circular because a is offering testimony for d but d is offering testimony for a. The paper formulates and evaluates restrictions on the use of testimonial evidence that might be used to deal with such problematic arguments. One is called the Non-repeater Rule: in an extended sequence of argumentation based on testimony, once a source x has been appealed to at any given point in the sequence, that same source x must never be appealed to again at any next point in the same sequence.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, 515 Portage Avenue, Manitoba, Winnipeg, Canada, R3B 2E9

    Douglas Walton

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  1. Douglas Walton
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Correspondence to Douglas Walton.

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Walton, D. Begging the Question in Arguments Based on Testimony. Argumentation 19, 85–113 (2005). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10503-004-2071-1

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