Abstract
To investigate the use of non-family versus family executives in family-dominated, publicly listed firms, we consider ownership concentration both at the firm level and within the dominant family. Whereas the appointment of family executives is supported by an institutional logic of family control, the use of non-family, professional executives is guided by a shareholder logic. We suggest that higher levels of ownership held by the dominant family relative to other shareholders propel family owners to adopt the family logic, and higher levels of ownership held by the largest family owner relative to other family members weaken the family logic in favor of the shareholder logic. We test our hypotheses on a sample of 2174 firm-year observations covering 635 family-dominated Chinese entrepreneurial firms listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Statistical results indicate that ownership by family increases, and ownership concentration in family decreases, the use of non-family CEO and non-family top management team.
We’re sorry, something doesn't seem to be working properly.
Please try refreshing the page. If that doesn't work, please contact support so we can address the problem.
References
Almandoz, J. 2012. Arriving at the starting line: The impact of community and financial logics on new banking ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 55: 1381–1406.
Anderson, R. C., Mansi, S. A., & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding family ownership and the agency cost of debt. Journal of Financial Economics, 68: 263–285.
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. 2003. Founding family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58: 1301–1329.
Anderson, R. C., & Reeb, D. M. 2004. Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 209–237.
Bennedsen, M., Nielsen, K. M., Pérez-González, F., & Wolfenzon, D. 2007. Inside the family firm: The role of families in succession decisions and performance. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122: 647–691.
Berrone, P., Cruz, C., Gómez-Mejía, L. R., & Larraza-Kintana, M. 2010. Socioemotional wealth and corporate responses to institutional pressures: Do family-controlled firms pollute less?. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55: 82–113.
Bhappu, A. D. 2000. The Japanese family: An institutional logic for Japanese corporate networks and Japanese management. Academy of Management Review, 25: 409–415.
Brief, A. P., Buttram, R. T., & Dukerich, J. M. 2001. Collective corruption in the corporate world: Toward a process model. In M. E. Turner (Ed.). Groups at work: Theory and research: 471–500. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Cai, D., Luo, J.-H., & Wan, D.-F. 2012. Family CEOs: Do they benefit firm performance in China?. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(4): 923–947.
Cameron, A. C., & Miller, D. L. 2015. A practitioner’s guide to cluster-robust inference. Journal of Human Resources, 50: 317–372.
Cannella, A. A., Jones, C. D., & Withers, M. C. 2015. Family- versus lone-founder-controlled public corporations: Social identity theory and boards of directors. Academy of Management Journal, 58: 436–459.
Chu, W. 2011. Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28: 833–851.
Chung, C. N., & Luo, X. 2008. Institutional logics or agency costs: The influence of corporate governance models on business group restructuring in emerging economies. Organization Science, 19: 766–784.
Chung, C. N., & Luo, X. R. 2013. Leadership succession and firm performance in an emerging economy: Successor origin, relational embeddedness, and legitimacy. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 338–357.
Chung, H.-M., & Chan, S.-T. 2012. Ownership structure, family leadership, and performance of affiliate firms in large family business groups. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(2): 303–329.
Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. 2000. The separation of ownership and control in east Asian corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 81–112.
Cruz, A. D., Howorth, C., & Hamilton, E. 2013. Intrafamily entrepreneurship: The formation and membership of family entrepreneurial teams. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 37: 17–46.
De Massis, A., Kotlar, J., Mazzola, P., Minola, T., & Sciascia, S. 2016. Conflicting selves: Family owners’ multiple goals and self-control agency problems in private firms. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice. https://doi.org/10.1111/etap.12257.
Deephouse, D. L., & Jaskiewicz, P. 2013. Do family firms have better reputations than non-family firms? An integration of socioemotional wealth and social identity theories. Journal of Management Studies, 50: 337–360.
Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Crespi, R., & García-Cestona, M. 2013. When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 823–842.
Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Lópezpuertas-Lamy, M., & Crespi, R. 2016. A clash of governance logics: Foreign ownership and board monitoring. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 349–369.
DiMaggio, P. J. 1997. Culture and cognition. Annual Review of Sociology, 23: 263–287.
Dunn, M. B., & Jones, C. 2010. Institutional logics and institutional pluralism: The contestation of care and science logics in medical education, 1967–2005. Administrative Science Quarterly, 55: 114–149.
Eddleston, K. A., & Kellermanns, F. W. 2007. Destructive and productive family relationships: A stewardship theory perspective. Journal of Business Venturing, 22: 545–565.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. 1983. Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26: 301–325.
Feldman, E. R., Amit, R., & Villalonga, B. 2016. Corporate divestitures and family control. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 429–446.
Filatotchev, I., Lien, Y.-C., & Fiesse, J. 2005. Corporate governance and performance in publicly listed, family-controlled firms: Evidence from Taiwan. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 22(3): 257–283.
Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. 2004. The diffusion of ideas over contested terrain: The (non)adoption of a shareholder value orientation among German firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 501–534.
Friedland, R., & Alford, R. R. 1991. Bringing society back in: Symbols, practices and institutional contradictions. In W. W. Powell, & P. J. DiMaggio (Eds.). The new institutionalism in organizational analysis: 232–263. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Geng, X., Yoshikawa, T., & Colpan, A. M. 2016. Leveraging foreign institutional logic in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms. Strategic Management Journal, 37: 1472–1492.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Haynes, K. T., Núñez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K. J., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. 2007. Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52: 106–137.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. 2003. The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 226–237.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Makri, M., & Kintana, M. L. 2010. Diversification decisions in family-controlled firms. Journal of Management Studies, 47: 223–252.
Gómez-Mejía, L. R., Núñez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. 2001. The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44: 81–95.
Greenwood, R., Díaz, A. M., Li, S. X., & Lorente, J. C. 2010. The multiplicity of institutional logics and the heterogeneity of organizational responses. Organization Science, 21: 521–539.
Greenwood, R., Hinings, C. R., & Whetten, D. 2014. Rethinking institutions and organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 51: 1206–1220.
Hoskisson, R. E., Eden, L., Lau, C. M., & Wright, M. 2000. Strategy in emerging economies. Academy of Management Journal, 43: 249–267.
Huang, Y., Chen, A., & Kao, L. 2012. Corporate governance in Taiwan: The nonmonotonic relationship between family ownership and dividend policy. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 29(1): 39–58.
Jaskiewicz, P., Heinrichs, K., Rau, S. B., & Reay, T. 2016. To be or not to be: How family firms manage family and commercial logics in succession. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 40: 781–813.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.
Jiang, Y., & Peng, M. W. 2011. Are family ownership and control in large firms good, bad, or irrelevant?. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 28(1): 15–39.
Joseph, J., Ocasio, W., & McDonnell, M. H. 2014. The structural elaboration of board independence: Executive power, institutional logics, and the adoption of CEO-only board structures in U.S. corporate governance. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1834–1868.
Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. 2004. Globalization and convergence in corporate governance: Evidence from Infosys and the Indian software industry. Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 484–507.
Kleinbaum, D. G., Kupper, L. L., & Muller, K. E. E. 1988. Applied regression analysis and other multivariable methods. Boston: PWS-Kent Publishing.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance, 54: 471–517.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. 2000. Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 58: 3–27.
Le Breton-Miller, I., Miller, D., & Lester, R. H. 2011. Stewardship or agency? A social embeddedness reconciliation of conduct and performance in public family businesses. Organizational Science, 22: 704–721.
Li, J., & Qian, C. 2013. Principal-principal conflicts under weak institutions: A study of corporate takeovers in China. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 498–508.
Li, X. C., Chen, L., Chua, J. H., Kirkman, B. L., Rynes-Weller, S., & Gómez-Mejía, L. 2015. Research on Chinese family businesses: Perspectives. Management and Organization Review, 11: 579–597.
Lounsbury, M. 2007. A tale of two cities: Competing logics and practice variation in the professionalization of mutual funds. Academy of Management Journal, 50: 289–307.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. 2009. Agency problems at dual-class companies. Journal of Finance, 64: 1697–1727.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2010. Family ownership and acquisition behavior in publicly-traded companies. Strategic Management Journal, 31: 201–223.
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., & Lester, R. H. 2011. Family and lone founder ownership and strategic behaviour: Social context, identity, and institutional logics. Journal of Management Studies, 48: 1–25.
Miller, D., Minichilli, A., & Corbetta, G. 2013. Is family leadership always beneficial?. Strategic Management Journal, 34: 553–571.
Misangyi, V. F., Weaver, G. R., & Elms, H. 2008. Ending corruption: The interplay among institutional logics, resources, and institutional entrepreneurs. Academy of Management Review, 33: 750–770.
Morck, R., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics, 20: 293–315.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2003a. Exploring the agency consequences of ownership dispersion among the directors of private family firms. Academy of Management Journal, 46: 179–194.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., & Dino, R. N. 2003b. Toward a theory of agency and altruism in family firms. Journal of Business Venturing, 18: 473–490.
Schulze, W. S., Lubatkin, M. H., Dino, R. N., & Buchholtz, A. K. 2001. Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12: 99–116.
Seo, M. G., & Creed, W. D. 2002. Institutional contradictions, praxis, and institutional change: A dialectical perspective. Academy of Management Review, 27: 222–247.
Shipilov, A. V., Greve, H. R., & Rowley, T. J. 2010. When do interlocks matter? Institutional logics and the diffusion of multiple corporate governance practices. Academy of Management Journal, 53: 846–864.
Su, Y., Xu, D., & Phan, P. H. 2008. Principal-principal conflict in the governance of the Chinese public corporation. Management and Organization Review, 4: 17–38.
Suddaby, R., & Greenwood, R. 2005. Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Administrative Science Quarterly, 50: 35–67.
Thornton, P. H. 2001. Personal versus market logics of control: A historically contingent theory of the risk of acquisition. Organization Science, 12: 294–311.
Thornton, P. H. 2002. The rise of the corporation in a craft industry: Conflict and conformity in institutional logics. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 81–101.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958-1990. American Journal of Sociology, 105: 801–843.
Thornton, P. H., & Ocasio, W. 2008. Institutional logics. In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, K. Sahlin, & R. Suddaby (Eds.). The Sage handbook of organizational institutionalism: 99–129. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Thornton, P. H., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. 2012. The institutional logics perspective: A new approach to culture, structure, and process. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tihanyi, L., Graffin, S., & George, G. 2014. Rethinking governance in management research. Academy of Management Journal, 57: 1535–1543.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value. Journal of Financial Economics, 80: 385–417.
Villalonga, B., & Amit, R. 2009. How are US family firms controlled?. Review of Financial Studies, 22: 3047–3091.
Wang, D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Accounting Research, 44: 619–656.
Wiklund, J., Nordqvist, M., Hellerstedt, K., & Bird, M. 2013. Internal versus external ownership transition in family firms: An embeddedness perspective. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 37: 1319–1340.
Wooldridge, J. M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Xu, D., Lu, W. J., & Gu, Q. 2014. Organizational forms and multi-population dynamics: Economic transition in China. Administrative Science Quarterly, 59: 517–547.
Xu, D., Zhou, C., & Phan, P. H. 2010. A real options perspective on sequential acquisitions in China. Journal of International Business Studies, 41: 166–174.
Yoshikawa, T., Tsui-Auch, L. S., & McGuire, J. 2007. Corporate governance reform as institutional innovation: The case of Japan. Organization Science, 18: 973–988.
Young, M. N., Peng, M. W., Ahlstrom, D., Bruton, G. D., & Jiang, Y. 2008. Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal–principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45: 196–220.
Zellweger, T. M., Kellermanns, F. W., Chrisman, J. J., & Chua, J. H. 2012. Family control and family firm valuation by family CEOs: The importance of intentions for transgenerational control. Organization Science, 23: 851–868.
Zhang, J., & Ma, H. 2009. Adoption of professional management in Chinese family business: A multilevel analysis of impetuses and impediments. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 26(1): 119–139.
Acknowledgements
We acknowledge partial financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC-71102056 for Chuang Chen; NSFC-71172056 and NSFC-71572167 for Xiaohui Wu). We also thank Yan Zhang for excellent research assistance.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Xu, D., Chen, C. & Wu, X. Ownership structure and the use of non-family executives in family-dominated Chinese listed firms: An institutional logics perspective. Asia Pac J Manag 36, 797–820 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-017-9550-z
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-017-9550-z