Abstract
This paper explores principal-principal conflicts in corporate governance during times of economic crisis. We address the question: What external and internal governance mechanisms can best protect minority shareholders? Drawing on 877 publicly listed large corporations with concentrated ownership in seven Asian countries and regions, we compare different control structures between family firms and non-family firms during crisis. We find that family firms tend to choose certain control structures associated with potential principal-principal conflicts. However, these choices can be constrained by external and internal governance mechanisms. Specifically, legal institutions and presence of multiple blockholders serve as useful external and internal governance mechanisms, respectively, to constrain potential expropriation of minority shareholders.
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Jiang, Y., Peng, M.W. Principal-principal conflicts during crisis. Asia Pac J Manag 28, 683–695 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-009-9186-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-009-9186-8