Skip to main content

Advertisement

Log in

Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance

  • Published:
Asia Pacific Journal of Management Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Previous studies on Japanese corporate governance were largely based on the agency theory framework, and can be seen as attempts to understand the unique monitoring mechanisms in the Japanese context. This paper briefly reviews prior research and then discusses the recent changes in the environment that have been affecting Japanese corporate governance. Our central argument is that there is both change and continuity in Japanese Corporate Governance. We also present emerging research from an institutional theory perspective. In this line of research, corporate governance is treated as part of a nation’s institutional framework and hence, researchers need to understand unique institutional arrangements that affect corporate governance practices and their change or continuity.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Figure 1

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Kabushiki Bunpu Chosa (Stock distribution survey), 2004.

  2. In Asia, Japan is not alone in this regard. In China, Peng (2004) finds that outside directors do not contribute to improvement of firms’ financial performance.

References

  • Abe, N., Gaston, N., & Kubo, K. 2005. Executive pay in Japan: The role of bank-appointed monitors and the main bank relationship. Japan and the World Economy, 17: 371–394.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aguilera, R. V., & Jackson, G. 2003. The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: Dimensions and determinants. Academy of Management Review, 28: 447–465.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahmadjian, C. L., & Robbins, G. E. 2005. A clash of capitalisms: Foreign shareholders and corporate restructuring in 1990s Japan. American Sociological Review, 70: 451–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ahmadjian, C. L., & Robinson, P. 2001. Safety in numbers: Downsizing and deinstitutionalization of permanent employment in Japan. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46: 622–654.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, C., & Makhija, A. 1999. Deregulation, disintermediation, and agency costs of debt: Evidence from Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 51: 309–339

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, H. 2004. Boardroom reform in Japanese business: An analysis of the introduction of the executive officer system and its effects. Asian Business & Management, 3: 173–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, M. 2001. Toward a comparative institutional analysis. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Aoki, M., Patrick, H., & Sheard, P. 1994. The Japanese main bank system: An introductory overview. In M. Aoki & H. Patrick (eds.), The Japanese Main Bank System: Its Relevance for Developing and Transforming Economies: 3–50. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Arisawa, Y., & Miyajima, H. 2005. Relationship banking and debt choice: Evidence from Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 408–418.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bebchuk, L. A., & Roe, M. J. 1999. A theory of path dependence in corporate ownership and governance. Stanford Law Review, 52: 127–170.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buhner, R., Rasheed, A., Rosenstein, J., & Yoshikawa, T. 1998. Research on corporate governance: A comparison of Germany, Japan, and the US Advances in International Comparative Management, 12: 121–155.

    Google Scholar 

  • Caves, R., & Uekusa, M. 1976. Industrial organization in Japan. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charkham, J. 1994. Keeping good company: A study of corporate governance in five countries. Oxford: Claredon Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coffee, J. C. 1999. The future as history: The prospects for global convergence in corporate governance and its implications. Northwestern University Law Review, 93: 641–707.

    Google Scholar 

  • David, P., Yoshikawa, T., Chari, M. D. R., & Rasheed, A. 2006. Strategic investments in Japanese corporations: Do foreign portfolio owners foster underinvestment or appropriate investment? Strategic Management Journal, 27: 591–600.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dore, R. 2000. Stock market capitalism: welfare capitalism: Japan and Germany versus the Anglo-Saxons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dow, S., & McGuire, J. 1999. The sources and advantages of Japanese industrial organization. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 16: 47–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fama, E. 1980. Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88: 288–307.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fiss, P. C., & Zajac, E. J. 2004. The diffusion of ideas: The (non) adoption of a shareholder value orientation among German firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49: 501–534.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fukao, M. 1999. Japanese financial instability and weakness in the corporate governance structure, OECD Working Paper. Paris.

  • Gedajlovic, E., & Shapiro 2002. Ownership structure and firm profitability in Japan. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 565–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gedajlovic, E., Yoshikawa, T., & Hashimoto, M. 2005. Ownership structure, investment behavior and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing industries. Organization Studies, 26: 7–35.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerlach, M. L. 1992. Alliance capitalism: The social organization of Japanese business. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gilson, R. J., & Milhaupt, C. J. 2004. Choice as regulatory reform: The case of Japanese corporate governance. Columbia University Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No.251.

  • Guillen, M. 2000. Corporate governance and globalization: Is there convergence across countries? Advances in International Comparative Management, 13: 175–204.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hansmann, H., & Kraakman, R. 2001. The end of history for corporate law. Georgetown Law Journal, 89: 439–468.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heftel, C. L. 1983. Corporate governance in Japan: The position of shareholders in publicly held corporations. University of Hawaii Law Review, 5: 135–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoshi, T. 1994. The economic role of corporate grouping and the main bank system. In M. Aoki & R. Dore (eds.). The Japanese Firm: Sources of Competitive Advantage: 285–309. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hoshi, T., Kashyap, A., & Scharfstein, D. 1991. Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: Evidence from Japanese industrial groups. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106: 33–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoskisson, R. E., Hitt, M. A., Johnson, R. A., & Grossman, W. 2002. Conflicting voices: The effects of institutional ownership heterogeneity and internal governance on corporate innovation strategies. Academy of Management Journal, 45: 697–716.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Inoue, H. 1999. The accelerating dissolution of stock cross-holding. Tokyo: NLI Research Institute.

    Google Scholar 

  • Isobe, T., Makino, S., & Goerzen, A. 2006. Japanese horizontal keiretsu and the performance implications of membership. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23: 453–466.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Itami, H. 2000. Nihon-gata koporeito gabanansu (Japanese style corporate governance). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha (in Japanese).

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, G., & Moerke, A. 2005. Continuity and change in corporate governance: Comparing Germany and Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 351–361.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jensen, M. 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review, 76: 323–329.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kang, J. K., & Shivdasani, A. 1995. Firm performance, corporate governance, and top executive turnover in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 11: 5–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kang, J. K., & Shivdasani, A. 1997. Corporate restructuring during performance declines in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46: 29–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, S. 1994. Top executive rewards and firm performance: A comparison of Japan and the United States, Journal of Political Economy, 102: 29–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kaplan, S., & Minton, B. 1994. Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers. Journal of Financial Economics, 36: 510–546.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kato, T. 1997. Chief executive compensation and corporate groups in Japan: New evidence from micro data. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 15: 455–467.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kato, T., & Kubo, K. 2006. CEO compensation and firm performance in Japan: Evidence from new panel data on individual CEO pay. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 20: 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kester, W. C. 1991. Japanese takeovers: The global contest for corporate control. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Khanna, T., & Palepu, K. G. 2004. Globalization and convergence in corporate governance: Evidence from Infosys and the Indian software industry. Journal of International Business Studies, 35: 484–507.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kim, H., Hoskisson, R. E., & Wan, W. P. 2004. Power dependence, diversification strategy, and performance in keiretsu member firms. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 613–636

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kubo, K. 2005. Executive compensation policy and company performance in Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 429–436.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Matta, E., & McGuire, J. 2006. Convergence in transparency: Implications for firm market value. Paper presented at the Academy of Management Annual Meetings.

  • McGuire, J., & Dow, S. 2003. The persistence and implications of Japanese keiretsu organization. Journal of International Business Studies, 34: 374–388.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milhaupt, C. J. 2003. A lost decade for Japanese corporate governance reform? What’s changed, what hasn’t, and why. Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No.234.

  • Miwa, Y., & Ramseyer, J. M. 2005. Who appoints them, what do they do? Evidence on outside directors from Japan. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 14: 299–337.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Miyajima, H., & Kuroki, F. 2005. Unwinding of cross-shareholding: Causes, effects, and implications. RIETI Discussion Paper Series 05-E-006.

  • Morck, R., & Nakamura, M. 1999. Banks and corporate control in Japan. Journal of Finance, 54: 319–339.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morck, R., & Yeung, B. 2006. Purifying Japan’s banks: Issues and implications. Asian Economic Papers, 5: 1–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Morck, R., Nakamura, M., & Shivdasani, A. 2000. Banks, ownership structure, and firm value in Japan. Journal of Business, 73:539–567.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nakatani, I. 1984. The economic role of financial corporate grouping. In M. Aoki (ed.), The Economic Analysis of the Japanese Firm: 227–258. Amsterdam: North-Holland.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nitta, K. 2000. Kabushiki mochiai to kigyo keiei: Kabushiki kousei ni kansuru jissho bunseki (Cross shareholdings and business management: An empirical analysis on the effects of ownership structure). Security Analysts Journal 38: 72–93.

    Google Scholar 

  • NLI Research Institute 2004. Kabushiki mochiai jokyo chosa 2003 (Cross-shareholdings survey 2003). Tokyo (in Japanese).

  • Oliver, C. 1992. The antecedents of de-institutionalization. Organization Studies, 13: 563–588.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Paker, B., & Hodder, J. 2002. Japanese capital structure during a turbulent period, Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Series.

  • Peng, M. W. 2003. Institutional transitions and strategic choices. Academy of Management Review, 28: 275–296.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W. 2004. Outside directors and firm performance during institutional transitions. Strategic Management Journal, 25: 453–471.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peng, M. W., & Delios, A. 2006. What determines the scope of the firm over time and around the world? An Asia Pacific perspective. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23: 385–405.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Phan, P. H., & Yoshikawa, T. 2000. Agency theory and Japanese corporate governance. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 17: 1–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Porter, M. E. 1992. Capital disadvantage, America’s failing capital investment system. Harvard Business Review, 70(5): 65–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Prowse, S. D. 1990. Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the United States and Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 27: 43–66

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Prowse, S. D. 1992. The structure of corporate ownership in Japan. Journal of Finance, 47: 1121–1140

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Seki, T. 2005. Legal reform and shareholder activism by institutional investors in Japan. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 377–385.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheard, P. 1989. The main bank system and corporate monitoring and control in Japan. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 11: 399–422.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sheard, P. 1994a. Interlocking shareholdings and corporate governance. In M. Aoki & R. Dore (eds.), The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength: 310–349. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sheard, P. 1994b. Bank executives on Japanese boards. Monetary and Economic Studies, 12: 85–121.

    Google Scholar 

  • Suto, M., & Toshino, M. 2005. Behavioural biases of Japanese institutional investors: Fund management and corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 466–477.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Thomsen, S., & Pedersen, T. 2000. Ownership structure and economic performance in the largest European companies. Strategic Management Journal, 21: 689–705.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Useem, M. 1998. Corporate leadership in a globalizing equity market. Academy of Management Executive, 12(4), 43–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watanabe, S., & Yamamoto, I. 1992. Corporate governance in Japan: Ways to improve low profitability, NRI Quarterly, 1(3): 28–45.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weimer, J., & Pape, J. C. 1999. A taxonomy of systems of corporate governance. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 7: 152–166.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weinstein, D. E., & Yafeh, Y. 1995. Japan’s corporate groups: Collusive or competitive? An empirical investigation of keiretsu behavior. Journal of Industrial Economics, 43: 359–377.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Weinstein, D., & Yafeh, Y. 1998. On the costs of a bank-centered financial system: Evidence from the changing main bank relations in Japan. The Journal of Finance, 53: 635–672.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Whitley, R.D., 1992. European business systems: Firms and markets in their national context. London: Sage.

    Google Scholar 

  • Wu, X., & Xu, L. L. 2005. The value information of financing decisions and corporate governance during and after the Japanese deregulation. Journal of Business, 78: 243–280.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yeung, H.W.C. 2006. Change and continuity in Southeast Asian ethnic Chinese business. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 23: 229–254.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yoshikawa, T., & Gedajlovic, E. R. 2002. The impact of global capital market exposure and stable ownership on investor relations practices and performance of Japanese firms. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 19: 525–540.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P.H. 2001. Alternative corporate governance systems in Japanese firms: Implications for a shift to stockholder-centered corporate governance. Asia Pacific Journal of Management, 18: 183–205.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yoshikawa, T., & Phan, P.H. 2003. The performance implications of ownership-driven governance reform. European Management Journal, 6: 698–706.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yoshikawa, T., Phan, P.H., & David, P. 2005. The impact of ownership structure on wage intensity in Japanese corporations. Journal of Management, 31: 278–300.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Yoshikawa, T., Tsui-Auch, L. S., & McGuire, J. M. Corporate governance reform as institutional innovation: The case of Japan. Organization Science, forthcoming.

  • Yoshimori, M. 2005. Does corporate governance matter? Why the corporate performance of Toyota and Canon is superior to GM and Xerox. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 13: 447–457.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Toru Yoshikawa.

Additional information

We would like to thank Mike Peng (Editor-in-Chief) and Chris Ahmadjian for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Yoshikawa, T., McGuire, J. Change and continuity in Japanese corporate governance. Asia Pacific J Manage 25, 5–24 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-007-9064-1

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-007-9064-1

Keywords

Navigation