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Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series

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Abstract

We consider series of M/M/m queues with strategic customer behavior. Customers arrive to the first queue and decide whether to enter the system or balk and, if they enter, up to which queue to proceed before departing. Each customer makes an independent decision, with the objective of maximizing her total net benefit, which is equal to the value of service minus a cost due to expected delay. We formulate the customer decision as a game and identify the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, which is expressed in a backward recursive form. We also analyze the problem of maximizing the total customer welfare and establish the relationship between the equilibrium and the welfare maximizing strategies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, University of Athens, Panepistemiopolis, Athens, Greece

    Apostolos N. Burnetas

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  1. Apostolos N. Burnetas
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Correspondence to Apostolos N. Burnetas.

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Burnetas, A.N. Customer equilibrium and optimal strategies in Markovian queues in series. Ann Oper Res 208, 515–529 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-011-1010-4

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