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‘Diplomatic Divergence: the Japanese and British Responses to Indonesia’s Confrontation of Malaysia 1963–1966’

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Abstract

While Indonesia’s policy of Confrontation towards Malaysia brought it into direct military conflict with Britain, this same event prompted Japan to pursue its first explicit postwar diplomatic initiative. Due to different strategic goals for the region, Britain and Japan’s approaches to Indonesian bellicosity were markedly different. Notably, while Britain took a hard-line stance with President Sukarno, Japan in contrast took a lenient approach eschewing economic and diplomatic isolation of Indonesia. With a latent warming in Anglo–Japanese ties beginning in this decade, this paper demonstrates that despite their antithetical approaches to this Southeast Asian crisis bilateral relations were not adversely affected.

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Notes

  1. Primary sources include the National Archives of Australia (NAA), the British Foreign Office, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) documents, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) archives in Tokyo. This research also draws heavily from the MOFA Joho Kokai Shitsu (Information Disclosure section), which is the lesser known source of diplomatic archives in Tokyo and separate to the more accessible and well-known MOFA Diplomatic Records Office.

  2. J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University, 1974, p. 221.

  3. Under pressure by the British the Tunku prematurely announced that Malaysia would be formed in September—angering Sukarno immensely.

  4. J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 311.

  5. Although he was kept on in a symbolic capacity until 1968 chiefly because the army generals feared he still maintained significant sway with the Indonesian people as the ‘father of Indonesia’.

  6. Ohira Notes on Sukarno Meeting. November 5, 1962, File No. 0120-2001-01553 A 423, Diplomatic Records Office, Tokyo.

  7. In addition to Indonesia’s raw materials, Japan’s essential imports, most notably oil from the Middle East and raw materials from Australia such as iron ore and coal, passed through the key sea lanes that are found around Indonesia - chiefly the Straits of Malacca, the Lombok Strait, the Sunda Strait and the Strait of Sulawesi.

  8. The Chief of South East Asian Affairs in MOFA stated in late 1962 that unlike Cuba “the Indonesian archipelago was so vast it cut across Japan’s lines of communication, particularly shipping in the Pacific and Indian Oceans...[which if it went communist] would seriously affect Japan’s trade with India, the Middle East and Africa.” Record of Discussion between Inada, Chief of the MOFA South East Asian Bureau and Nutter (Australian Embassy official) October 26, 1962, National Archives of Australia 1838 3103/10/1.

  9. MOFA Notes on Ikeda’s meeting with the Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Rahman on May 31, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  10. Sukarno responded by suggesting the formation of a ‘Japan-Indonesia axis’ in Asia, which explicitly linked Japanese economic assistance to Indonesia’s rich natural resource base. MOFA Notes on Ikeda’s meeting with the President Sukarno on May 30, 1963, and MOFA Notes on Ikeda’s meeting with the Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Rahman on May 31, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  11. MOFA notes on the Tokyo Sukarno Tunku Rahman Meeting, June 10, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  12. MOFA notes on the Tokyo Sukarno Tunku Rahman Meeting, June 10, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  13. ‘Maphilindo’ was a term used to describe an informal grouping or confederation of Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia which gained currency in the 1963 and 1964 tri-partite and bilateral meetings. See Taylor, A.M. Malaysia, Indonesia—and Maphilindo, International Journal, Vol. XXI No. 2, 1963–1964, p. 168.

  14. Nagai Shigenobu suggests that Ikeda and his closest advisors quietly hatched this plan prior to Ikeda’s departure which caught MOFA unawares. Interview with Mr. Nagai Shigenobu, Tokyo, Third Secretary at the Japanese Embassy in Jakarta during Confrontation, Tokyo, September 23, 2005.

  15. Sukarno saw the Tunku’s unwillingness on this point as a major obstacle to Ikeda’s proposal for multilateral talks. Meeting Notes of the Ikeda–Sukarno Meeting in Jakarta, September 28, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  16. President Kennedy sent two letters to Sukarno in September 1963, the first on the 13th the second on the 28th. In the first he supported the formation of Malaysia “as the best hope for the security of the area” adding that Sukarno is now at “the crossroads” where he can either “fulfil the promise of Maphilindo” or “risk bitter confrontation that will open the area to unfriendly influences.” In the September 28 letter he urged Sukarno that “all concerned stand down for a few days until communications can be restored and the art of statesmanship can perform its function of healing wounds” also adding that “[I]f you are agreeable I am sure I can persuade others to join in a standstill.” See Internal Secret White House Memo, September 27, 1963, including copies of Outgoing Telegrams No. 379 JFK to Sukarno & 384 State Department to Jakarta Embassy. United States Department of State, September 28, 1963, JFK Library, Boston.

  17. Meeting Notes of the Ikeda–Sukarno Meeting in Jakarta, September 28, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  18. Meeting Notes of Ikeda’s Second Meeting with Sukarno in Jakarta, September 29, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  19. Usha Mahajani, The Malaysia Dispute: A study in Mediation and Intervention, The Australian Outlook, April 1967, Vol. 20 No. 2 p. 181.

  20. According to Holsti, rapid decolonization from the late 1940s was prompted by “great wars of the twentieth century, by the increasing influence of the United States and the Soviet Union over the colonial agenda, by the appropriation of liberal discourses on self- government and self determination by indigenous elites, by armed resistance in some cases and by financial constraints facing colonial governments after World War II.” In K. J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 273.

  21. Jones notes that Singapore had four crucial roles: (1) provide external defence to Malaysia; (2) to deter Indonesian aggression; (3) to meet SEATO obligations; and (4) to reinforce Hong Kong. See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 145.

  22. ibid., p. 28.

  23. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–1965, Great Britain, Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 43.

  24. The British Foreign Secretary (Douglas-Home) was hoping that if the quadripartite meeting went well he could warn the Indonesians “that if they continue their present course the Western world will be united against them.” See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 132.

  25. The US was greatly concerned over Indonesia’s drift to the left. In Washington in 1965, a ‘Special National Intelligence Estimate’ report painted a worrying picture of a communist-aligned Indonesia, stating that “the overt accession to communism of a country like Indonesia-large populous, rich in resources, and strategically situated-would have an important impact on other countries in South and East Asia.” See Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 55–65, September 1, 1965. Foreign Relations of the United States, Foreign Relations 1964-1968, Vol. XXVI, Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines, Sukarno’s Confrontation with the US Dec 1964–Sept 1965, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2001.

  26. The British correctly viewed the US as restraining Australia and New Zealand in their military support of Britain against Indonesia, chiefly because the US did not want to be dragged into a second Southeast Asian conflict because of its ANZUS commitments.

  27. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–1965, Great Britain, Macmillan, 2000, p. 53.

  28. As regular clashes with Indonesian insurgents had been taking place since April, with casualties accumulating on both sides, trust amongst officials in Whitehall over Sukarno’s intentions was in very short supply by the end of the first year of Confrontation.

  29. John Subritzky, Confrontinf Sukorno Brotish, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian–Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–65, Great Britain, Macmillan Press, 2000, p. 53.

  30. ibid., p. 61.

  31. Alastair M. Taylor, ‘Malaysia, Indonesia—and Maphilindo’, in International Journal, Vol. XXI, No. 2, 1963–1964, p. 169.

  32. The Manila conference from June 7–11, 1963 (a summit that had resulted from the Tokyo meeting), indicated that further conciliation had taken place between the disputants. The key points of the Agreement were: (1) agreement that the three countries be primarily responsible for the maintenance of security and stability; (2) support for the initial steps of Maphilindo; (3) an admission by Malaya that the Philippines’ claim to North Borneo would not would not be prejudiced by its incorporation into Malaysia; and (4) an affirmation of adherence to the self-determination principle in relation to the formation of Malaysia. See J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 150.

  33. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 230.

  34. ibid., p. 176.

  35. Gaimusho Outward Telegram to the Embassies of North America, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia and the UN (‘The Malaysia Dispute’), October 21, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  36. ibid.

  37. Solutions for Resolving the Malaysian Problem, October 12, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  38. Solutions for Resolving the Malaysian Problem, October 12, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  39. Solutions for Resolving the Malaysian Problem, October 12, 1963, JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  40. Macintyre reporting on discussions with Oda in Tokyo, February 5, 1964. Secret Cablegram from Australian Embassy in Tokyo to DEA. National Archives of Australia 1838 3103/10/1.

  41. Proposal for Solving the Malaysian Dispute, April 16, 1964. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  42. Japanese officials at MOFA hoped to enshrine these conditions in a mutual binding agreement. In Japanese Proposal for Solving the Malaysian Dispute, April 16, 1964. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  43. Japanese Proposal for Solving the Malaysian Dispute, April 16, 1964. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  44. Japan’s ambassador in Jakarta was optimistic that “Sukarno would be satisfied with a face-saving gesture” such as an expression of public regret and the promise of a plebiscite, which would then allow Sukarno to drop Confrontation. McIntyre Discussion with Ushiroku (Director Asian Affairs Bureau, Tokyo, January 30, 1964. Inward Cablegram from Tokyo Embassy to DEA. National Archives of Australia 1838 3034/11/89 Part 4.

  45. Named after the Deputy Vice Foreign Minister Oda Takio, which incidentally became increasingly detailed as Japan pursued mediation.

  46. Notes on Ikeda’s Meeting with Sukarno, No. 30-1-30, June 10, 1964. JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  47. Notes on Ikeda’s Meeting with Sukarno, No. 30-1-30, June 10, 1964. JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  48. Notes on Ikeda’s Meeting with Rahman, June 16. JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  49. Notes on Ikeda’s Meeting with Rahman, June 16. JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  50. Notes on Ikeda’s Meeting with Rahman, June 16. JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  51. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–1965, Great Britain, Macmillan, 2000, p. 99.

  52. ibid., p. 100.

  53. President Johnson was reportedly “fed up” with Sukarno. He was particularly angered at Indonesian rioters burning the Kennedy Memorial Library in Jakarta. See Confidential Inward Cablegram No. 386 from the Australian High Commission in Ottawa, December 10, 1964, A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  54. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961-65, Great Britain, Macmillan, 2000, p. 103.

  55. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 248.

  56. All parties also agreed that there must be a withdrawal of Indonesian forces, and settlement be negotiated by the principals that ‘will not publicly humiliate Sukarno or weaken Malaysia, and that the bases of the US and UK as well as defence agreements be preserved. Agreement was also reached on possible joint action at the UN in the event of a resumption of Indonesian hostilities. See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002. pp. 259–260.

  57. These included an attempt to blow up the Merdeka Bridge in Singapore and to cut the water supply in Johore, an additional attempt to derail the train between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur was also carried out. See J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 258.

  58. J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, p. 259.

  59. ibid., p. 259.

  60. This was expressed from Oda through a contact in Jakarta and also reportedly in a personal note sent from Ikeda. Memo from Rundall to Peck, September 5, 1964, FJ103162/9, FO 371/176012, British National Archives.

  61. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002. p. 271.

  62. J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, p. 262.

  63. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002.

  64. It was not only the Federal Reserve Bank in New York that came to Britain’s rescue to save a rapidly devaluing pound in November, notably so did the Bank of Japan. Chris Braddick, ‘Distant Friends: Britain and Japan since 1958—the Age of Globalization,’ in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, England, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000, pp. 240–241.

  65. Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN, in stark contrast to Tokyo’s response, was loudly applauded in Peking.

  66. Nishihara, M. The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia–Tokyo–Jakarta Relations 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 135.

  67. Gordon Walker, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, also pointedly commented at the time that “Britain hoped that none of her friends would encourage irrational elements in Indonesia to think they could escape the adverse consequences of rash action.” Record of Anglo–Japanese Consultations, January 25, 1965, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  68. While the Tunku was visiting Tokyo in April for the Asian Confederation of Football Associations conference, Sukarno was reportedly planning a trip via Tokyo to a third country.

  69. The AACC idea was the only positive outcome to result from the June 1964 Tokyo meeting. The AACC idea centred on Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines each selecting one nation as their representative and then these three nations unanimously agreeing on another. This would in effect form a commission that would adjudicate in the dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia. See J. A. C. Mackie, Konfrontasi—The Indonesia–Malaysia Dispute 1963–1966, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974, pp. 233–235.

  70. Plan for Mediation in the Malaysia Dispute, February 9, 1965, MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  71. President Johnson saw Sato as being in a “unique position” to assist in mediating in Confrontation as an Asian ally who was also friendly with Indonesia. See Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, January 25, 1965, Foreign Relations of the United States, Sukarno’s Confrontation with the United States December 1964–September 1965, Vol. XXVI Indonesia; Malaysia; Singapore; Philippines, December, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001.

  72. Kawashima was a shadowy behind the scenes power broker who has been described as a ‘fixer’ within the ruling LDP. Interview with Professor Makoto Iokibe, Graduate School of Law, Kobe University, September 7, 2005.

  73. Nishihara, M. The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia— Tokyo–Jakarta Relations 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 139.

  74. Kiuchi interestingly notes that Kawashima’s other motive in attending the Afro-Asian conference, was to “use Sukarno as an intermediary between Tokyo and Peking” in order to create an avenue of informal dialogue with China. Interview with Mr. Akitane Kiuchi, former Head of the Southeast Asian MOFA section 1964–1968, September 21, 2005.

  75. The Japanese media had started to call Japan’s loans to Indonesia ‘Kawashima loans’ by this stage.

  76. Prime Minister Rahman’s Intentions and the Malaysian Dispute—the Approach of Japan’s special Envoy, No. 30-30, February 24, 1965. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  77. The Japanese officials were also hopeful that the Malaysians would pass on this view to the British. See Prime Minister Rahman’s Intentions and the Malaysian Dispute - the Approach of Japan’s special Envoy, No. 30-30, February 24, 1965. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  78. Prime Minister Rahman’s Intentions and the Malaysian Dispute—the Approach of Japan’s special Envoy, No. 30-30, February 24, 1965. MOFA JOHO KOKAI SHITSU, Tokyo.

  79. This was seen at the time as conclusive evidence of the PKI’s increasing influence, as it had pressured Sukarno consistently not to attend another conference with the Tunku. The Japan Times noted that it was a “huge victory for the Indonesian communist party.” The Japan Times, May 2, 1965.

  80. Nishihara, M. The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia–Tokyo–Jakarta Relations 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, p. 141.

  81. Interview with Dr. Miyagi Taizo, Tokyo, September 25, 2005.

  82. Telegram from Foreign Office to Tokyo, No. 792, August 5, 1965, FO262/2136, British National Archives.

  83. John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation, 1961–1965, Great Britain, Macmillan, 2000, p. 146.

  84. Dean Rusk made it known to the British that the US would be ready for an escalation of the conflict with Indonesia “if she raises the stakes too high.” See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 278.

  85. Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 288.

  86. Denis Healy for one, Britain’s Defence Minister, certainly saw this development as a good chance to scale back defence commitments in Southeast Asia. See Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia, 1961–1965, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 288.

  87. Interview with Mr. Kiuchi Akitane, Tokyo, former head of the MOFA Southeast Asian division (1963–1968), September 21, 2005.

  88. Nishihara, M. The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia–Tokyo–Jakarta Relations 1951–1966, Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976, pp. 142–143.

  89. A telegram from London to the Tokyo Embassy explicitly stated that “The fact that they [the Generals] are opposed to the PKI....does not mean that they do not share the PKI’s appetite for Confrontation. They too dream of using Indonesia’s 103 million people to further Javanese expansionist ambitions of dominating South East Asia.” Telegram from FO to Tokyo, No. 410, October 14, 1965, FO 262/2136, British National Archives.

  90. G. A. Posthumous, The Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia, Netherlands, Rotterdam University Press, 1971, p. 12.

  91. Foreign Office Internal Memo February 14, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  92. Confidential Memo No. 1468 from the Office of the Australian High Commissioner in London, ‘Anglo–Japanese Consultations’ September 16, 1964, A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  93. Japan’s Attitude to Indonesia, Brief for Lord Carrington’s Interview with the Japanese Ambassador, January 9, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives.

  94. Foreign Office Internal Memo February 14, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  95. Japan’s Attitude to Indonesia, Brief for Lord Carrington’s Interview with the Japanese Ambassador, January 9, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives.

  96. A Commentary on the Memorandum ‘The Malaysia Question and Indonesia’ Prepared by the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, January 10, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives. When Lord Carrington met with the Japanese Ambassador to London shortly after these comments were made he made it quite clear that Britain highly disapproved of reports that Japan was providing tankers to Indonesia on easy credit terms.

  97. A Commentary on the Memorandum ‘The Malaysia Question and Indonesia’ Prepared by the Asian Affairs Bureau of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, January 10, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives.

  98. Visit of the Foreign Secretary to Japan, May 1–5, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  99. Visit of the Foreign Secretary to Japan, May 1–5, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  100. Anglo–Japanese Relations from Foreign Office to Whitehall, May 12, 1964, DO169/395 British National Archives.

  101. Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo on May 2, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  102. Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo on May 2, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives. The British Embassy in Jakarta saw a plebiscite as inviting Sukarno to step up subversion and would cast doubt on the UN fact finding mission and the role already played by U Thant. See Telegram from Jakarta to Foreign Office, No. 784, April 24, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives.

  103. Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo on May 2, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  104. Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Prime Minister in Tokyo on May 2, 1964, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  105. Record of Conversation between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Foreign Minister held at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 2, 1964. DO169/395, British National Archives.

  106. Report on Anglo–Japanese Relations from the Foreign Office to Whitehall, January 25, 1965, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  107. Confidential Memo from the Office of the Australian High Commission, London, ‘Anglo–Japanese Ministerial Talks 14–15 January 1965’ January 29, 1965, A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  108. Confidential Memo from the First Secretary to the Secretary of External Affairs, January 19, 1965 ‘Anglo-Japanese Ministerial Consultations’ A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  109. Record of Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Minster of Foreign affairs, January 15, 1965, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  110. Due largely to the US security guarantee, conventional or traditional security terms could be overlooked by Japanese policymakers thus permitting them to focus on economic security. Soeya calls this Japan’s “dual identity.” See Yoshihide Soeya, ‘Japan - Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives,’ in Muthiah Alagappa (ed.), Asian Security Practice, California, Stanford University Press, 1998, p. 232.

  111. A conclusion that Professor Arthur Stockwin from Oxford University also agreed to in an interview (via e-mail) on September 10, 2005.

  112. Internal Memo from Giffard to Bentley ‘Japanese Interests in Indonesia and Malaysia’, September 11, 1964, FO371/176005, British National Archives.

  113. However, with Britain’s military and finances stretched to breaking point and the hitherto ‘firm but friendly’ policy clearly untenable, it was only the fortunate turn of events in Jakarta towards late 1965 that saved Whitehall from a serious policy predicament.

  114. Although it highlighted different strategic goals vis-à-vis Southeast Asia: for Britain to withdraw from Southeast Asia and for Japan, to expand its regional economic influence.

  115. Tanaka notes that Japanese governments from Yoshida to Kishi continued to send a clear signal to the British government of their desire to create a common front against the US on select issues (i.e. China). London was however, understandably unwilling to risk its relationship with Washington, although they accepted the underlying logic of Japan-Chinese trade. See Tanaka Takahiko, ‘Anglo-Japanese Relations in the 1950s: Cooperation, Friction and the Search for State Identity ,’ in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, England, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000, p. 230.

  116. Chris Braddick, ‘Distant Friends: Britain and Japan since 1958—the Age of Globalization,’ in Ian Nish and Yoichi Kibata (eds.), The History of Anglo–Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, England, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000, p. 276.

  117. Outward Savingram, From the Office of the Australian High Commission, London, ‘Anglo-Japanese Ministerial Talks’ November 8, 1966, A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  118. Prime Minister Wilson expressed his gratitude to Shiina for Japan’s support of the British currency during the January 1965 Anglo-Japanese consultations. See Record of Conversation between the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Shiina at No. 10 Downing Street, January 15, 1965, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  119. Report on Anglo–Japanese Relations from the Foreign Office to Whitehall, January 25, 1965, DO169/395, British National Archives.

  120. Confidential Memo No. 1468 from the Office of the Australian High Commissioner in London, ‘Anglo-Japanese Consultations’ September 16, 1964, A9564 227/13/1 Part 2, National Archives of Australia.

  121. In previous Anglo–Japanese consultations the issue of Confrontation had been a major topic of discussion.

  122. Record of Meeting between the Foreign Secretary and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Tuesday, 19 October 1965, DO169/395 British National Archives.

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  1. Kobe University, Kobe, Japan

    James Llewelyn

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Llewelyn, J. ‘Diplomatic Divergence: the Japanese and British Responses to Indonesia’s Confrontation of Malaysia 1963–1966’. AEJ 4, 583–605 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-006-0081-3

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