Abstract
Spoofing attacks have become an increasing threat to global navigation satellite system receivers. Existing anti-spoofing algorithms concentrate on the detection of these attacks; however, they are unable to prevent the counterfeit signal, which causes false position and timing results. Some defense techniques require the assistance of other sensors or measurement devices located at different positions. These impose many restrictions on the practical applications of anti-spoofing algorithms. In this study, the multicorrelator estimator, designed initially to prevent multipath signals, is applied to detect and mitigate spoofing. A statistic is proposed for spoofing detection based on the code phase difference between counterfeit and authentic signals. This statistic can significantly reduce the rate of false and missed alarms. Assuming there is no spoofing at the beginning, the pseudorange difference between epochs is derived for spoofing validation, allowing spoofing suppression in a single receiver. Based on this study, an estimation-validation-mitigation structure is presented. A robust extended Kalman filter is proposed to reduce gross errors in the multicorrelator measurements and improve estimation accuracy. Public-spoofing datasets recorded in real environments were used to verify the performance of different parameters. A total of 81 complex correlators were introduced in the experiments. Results show that using the proposed scheme, the position or time offsets caused by spoofing drop from 600 m to approximately 20 m, and the spoofing is mitigated considerably. The proposed method provides an effective anti-spoofing structure that requires only a single antenna and does not require additional sensors.
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Acknowledgements
The authors thank the Radionavigation Laboratory of the University of Texas at Austin for providing the datasets. We would like to acknowledge the reviewers for their valuable comments. This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation of China under Grant 41674027.
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Shang, X., Sun, F., Zhang, L. et al. Detection and mitigation of GNSS spoofing via the pseudorange difference between epochs in a multicorrelator receiver. GPS Solut 26, 37 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-022-01224-4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-022-01224-4