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Efficient spoofing identification using baseline vector information of multiple receivers

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Abstract

In a spoofing environment, a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver must employ anti-spoofing techniques for obtaining a normal navigation solution from the GNSS signal. We propose a new method for identifying spoofing signals using the norm of the difference of baseline vectors (NDB) obtained from multiple receivers. The main focuses of this research are to reduce the initial time required to identify the spoofing signal and to mitigate the physical constraints on multiple antennas placement. First, the multi-correlators of each receiver track both GNSS and spoofing signals simultaneously and classify them into two signal groups. Then, the baseline vectors are generated from the double-differenced carrier phase measurements of the classified signal groups, and the NDB is calculated. If the target positions of the spoofing signal groups are almost the same, the NDB has a fairly small value when the base position of the selected baseline vectors is calculated from one of the GNSS groups and the rover positions of the baseline vectors are calculated from each spoofing group of the multiple receivers. Using the NDB, a hypothesis is established, and a hypothesis test is conducted for identifying the spoofing signal. The performance of the proposed test statistics is analyzed with respect to the distance between the GPS antennas and the tuning parameter. Our experimental results show that the proposed method effectively performs spoofing identification with a short baseline. Additionally, the method exhibits a very low probability of fault detection and fast response time. This means that the immediate anti-spoofing can work properly in spoofing environments.

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Acknowledgements

This work has been supported by the National GNSS Research Center Program of the Defense Acquisition Program Administration and the Agency for Defense Development.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Electronics Engineering, Konkuk University, 1118, New Engineering Building, 120, Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

    Seong-Hun Seo

  2. EW R&D Center, Hanwha Systems, 188, Panhyoyeok-ro, Bundang-gu, Seongnam-si, Gyeonggi-do, Republic of Korea

    Byung-Hyun Lee

  3. Korea Aerospace Research Institute, 169-84, Gwahak-ro, Yuseong-gu, Daejeon, Republic of Korea

    Sung-Hyuck Im

  4. Electronics Engineering, Konkuk University, 325, Engineering Building C, 120, Neungdong-ro, Gwangjin-gu, Seoul, Republic of Korea

    Gyu-In Jee

  5. Agency for Defense Development, 160, Bugyuseong-daero 488beon-gil, Yuseong-gu, Deajeon, Republic of Korea

    Kwan-Sung Kim

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  1. Seong-Hun Seo
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  2. Byung-Hyun Lee
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  3. Sung-Hyuck Im
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  4. Gyu-In Jee
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  5. Kwan-Sung Kim
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Correspondence to Gyu-In Jee.

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Seo, SH., Lee, BH., Im, SH. et al. Efficient spoofing identification using baseline vector information of multiple receivers. GPS Solut 22, 115 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10291-018-0779-x

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