Abstract
An agent-based artificial market is developed to investigate the impact of confirmatory bias on volatility and kurtosis in one-period returns. Sentiment investors (similar to chartists) trade based on their assessment of future prices and the views of connected neighbours. Confirmatory bias reduces volatility and kurtosis, as new information becomes biased towards their previous decision thereby reducing trading activity. However, when the trading volume of the fundamental investor is low, confirmatory bias increases the levels of kurtosis in return suggesting that while overall trading activity of the sentiment investors falls, it becomes more coordinated.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
For example, an investor who has experienced a protracted and deep correction may develop a negative view on the market long after the end of the correct.
Typically, the SoW variable is exogenous. This is the case for many models used in the social learning literature. This paper looks to use the models and methods developed in the social learning literature to examine what happens if sentiment investors source their information from each other in addition to central sources such as past prices. To do this, the SoW is determined endogenously in a way that is consistent with fundamental trader, chartist models that emerged from Day and Huang (1990) and Lux (1998), and consistent with the papers outlined in the paragraph above. Bowden and McDonald (2008) and Bowden (2014) consider the impact on aggregate opinion dynamics in the presence of an exogenously set SoW within the framework of the social network used in this model.
The impact of changing the time horizon of sentiment investors was analysed in Bowden (2012). The key result was that the relationships between network structure and levels of volatility and kurtosis held for all lengths of time horizon between 1 and 50 periods.
The probabilities associated with other possible combinations of \(\bar{{x}}_{i,t} \), \(\bar{{x}}_{i,t-1} \) and the SoW are determined using the same method.
This is consistent with definitions used in finance.
To confirm that, demand from sentiment investors falls as confirmatory bias \(({\omega })\) increases Fig. 5 was reproduced with \(T_\mathrm{F} = 1\). This figure has been omitted from this paper but can be obtained from the author upon request.
References
Akerlof, G.A., Dickens, W.T.: The economic consequences of cognitive dissonance. Am. Econ. Rev. 72(3), 307–319 (1982)
Argentesi, E., Lütkepohl, H., Motta, M.: Acquisition of information and share prices: an empirical investigation of cognitive dissonance. Ger. Econ. Rev. 11(3), 381–396 (2010)
Bisière, C., Décamps, J.-P., Lovo, S.: Risk attitude, beliefs updating and the information content of trades: an experiment. Manag. Sci. doi:10.1287/mnsc.2013.1886 (2014)
Bowden, M.: Information contagion within social networks in the presence of confirmatory bias. Malays. J. Econ. Stud. 51(2), 11–26 (2014)
Bowden, M.P.: Information contagion within small worlds and changes in kurtosis and volatility in financial prices. J. Macroecon. 34(2), 553–566 (2012)
Bowden, M., McDonald, S.: The impact of interaction and social learning on aggregate expectations. Comput. Econ. 31(3), 289–306 (2008)
Brady, G.L., Clark, J.R., Davis, W.L.: The political economy of dissonance. Public Choice 82(1), 37–51 (1995)
Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., Malkiel, B.G., Xu, Y.: Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration of idiosyncratic risk. J. Finance 56(1), 1–43 (2001)
Chiarella, C., Dieci, R., Gardini, L.: The dynamic interaction of speculation and diversification. Appl. Math. Finance 12(1), 17–52 (2005)
Chiarella, C., He, X.-Z., Hommes, C.: A dynamic analysis of moving average rules. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 30(9–10), 1729–1753 (2006)
Day, R.H., Huang, W.: Bull, bears and market sheep. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 14(3), 299–329 (1990)
Dickinson, D.L., Oxoby, R.J.: Cognitive dissonance, pessimism, and behavioral spillover effects. J. Econ. Psychol. 32(3), 295–306 (2011)
Dieci, R., Westerhoff, F.: Heterogeneous speculators, endogenous fluctuations and interacting markets: a model of stock prices and exchange rates. J. Econ. Dyn. Control 34(4), 743–764 (2010)
Drees, B., Eckwert, B.: Asset mispricing due to cognitive dissonance. In: International Monetary Fund IMF Working Papers. 05/9. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=874230 (2005)
Farmer, J.D., Joshi, S.: The price dynamics of common trading strategies. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 49(2), 149–171 (2002)
Festinger, F.: A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Stanford University Press, Stanford (1957)
Friesen, G., Weller, P.A.: Quantifying cognitive biases in analyst earnings forecasts. J. Financ. Mark. 9(4), 333–365 (2006)
Goetzmann, W.N., Peles, N.: Cognitive dissonance and mutual fund investors. J. Financ. Res. 20(2), 145–158 (1997)
Goldsmith, A.H., Sedo, S., Darity, W., Hamitlon, D.: The labor supply consequences of perceptions of employer discrimination during search and on-the-job: integrating neoclassical theory and cognitive dissonance. J. Econ. Psychol. 25(1), 15–39 (2004)
Konow, J.: Fair shares: accountability and cognitive dissonance in allocation decisions. Am. Econ. Rev. 90(4), 1072–1091 (2000)
Lin, H.-W., Wu, R.-S.: Analysts incentive and cognitive-based processing biases: evidence from recommendation revisions. 22nd Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, 16–18 December, Sydney. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1460657 (2009)
Lux, T.: The socio-economic dynamics of speculative markets: interacting agents, chaos, and the fat tails of return distributions. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 33(2), 143–165 (1998)
Manzan, S., Westerhoff, F.H.: Heterogeneous expectations, exchange rate dynamics and predictability. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 64(1), 111–128 (2007)
Matthey, A., Regner, T.: Do I really want to know? A cognitive dissonance-based explanation of other-regarding behavior. Games 2(1), 114–135 (2011)
Mullainathan, S., Washington, E.: Sticking with your vote: cognitive dissonance and voting. NBER Working Paper No. 11910. http://www.nber.org/papers/w11910.pdf (2006)
Nickerson, R.S.: Confirmation bias: a ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Rev. Gen. Psychol. 2(2), 175–220 (1998)
Olsen, R.A.: Cognitive dissonance: the problem facing behavioral finance. J. Behav. Finance 9(1), 1–4 (2008). doi:10.1080/15427560801896552
Oxoby, R.J.: Attitudes and allocations: status, cognitive dissonance, and the manipulation of attitudes. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 52(3), 365–385 (2003)
Oxoby, R.J.: Cognitive dissonance, status and growth of the underclass. Econ. J. 114(498), 727–749 (2004)
Park, J., Konana, P., Gu, B., Kumar, A., Raghunathan, R.: Confirmation bias, overconfidence, and investment performance: evidence from stock message boards. In: McCombs Research Paper Series. vol. No. IROM-07-10. http://misrc.umn.edu/wise/papers/p1-3.pdf (2010)
Pouget, S., Villeneuvez, S.: Price formation with confirmation bias. Working Paper, Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse. http://www.creedexperiment.nl/enable2008/pouget.pdf (2009)
Prast, H.M.: Herding and financial panics: a role for cognitive psychology? In: WO Research Memoranda (discontinued), vol. 611. Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department. http://www.dnb.nl/en/binaries/wo0611_tcm47-145928.pdf (2000)
Prast, H.M., de Vor, M.P.H.: Investor reactions to news: a cognitive dissonance analysis of the euro–dollar exchange rate. Eur. J. Polit. Econ. 21(1), 115–141 (2005)
Rabin, M.: Cognitive dissonance and social change. J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 23(2), 177–194 (1994)
Rabin, M., Schrag, J.L.: First impressions matter: a model of confirmatory bias. Q. J. Econ. 114(1), 37–82 (1999)
Righi, S., Carletti, T., Aldashev, G.: Behavioral biases and informational inefficiency in an agent-based financial market. In: 8th Proceedings of European Social Simulation Association Conference, Salzburg, Austria (2012)
Smith, J.: Cognitive dissonance and the overtaking anomaly: psychology in the principal–agent relationship. J. Socio-Econ. 38(4), 684–690 (2009)
Suen, W.: The self-perpetuation of biased beliefs. Econ. J. 114(495), 377–396 (2004)
Watts, D., Strogatz, S.: Collective dynamics of ‘small-world’ networks. Nature 393, 440–442 (1998)
Watts, D.J.: Small Worlds : The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness. Princeton University Press, Princeton (1999)
Wei, S.X., Zhang, C.: Why did individual stocks become more volatile? J. Bus. 79(1), 259–292 (2006)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Bowden, M.P. A model of information flows and confirmatory bias in financial markets. Decisions Econ Finan 38, 197–215 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-015-0164-y
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10203-015-0164-y