Abstract.
This paper analyses multi-period regulation or procurement policies under asymmetric information between the regulator and regulated firms. As well known in the literature, some degree of separation is always optimal under any form of commitment. In contrast, we show that full pooling is optimal under noncommitment when the discount factor is sufficiently high. We also discuss the meaning of full pooling under double randomization. Finally, we provide a graphical analysis of the second-best policy in terms of the regulator's commitment capacity.
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Received: 4 December 1996 / 7 October 1999
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Dionne, G., Fluet, C. Full pooling in multi-period contracting with adverse selection and noncommitment. Rev Econ Design 5, 1–21 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050045
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s100580050045