Abstract
One-sided assignment problems combine important features of two well-known matching models. First, as in roommate problems, any two agents can be matched and second, as in two-sided assignment problems, the division of payoffs to agents is flexible as part of the solution. We take a similar approach to one-sided assignment problems as Sasaki (Int J Game Theory 24:373–397, 1995) for two-sided assignment problems, and we analyze various desirable properties of solutions including consistency and weak pairwise-monotonicity. We show that for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems (i.e., the subset of one-sided assignment problems with a non-empty core), if a subsolution of the core satisfies [Pareto indifference and consistency] or [invariance with respect to unmatching dummy pairs, continuity, and consistency], then it coincides with the core (Theorems 1 and 2). However, we also prove that on the class of all one-sided assignment problems (solvable or not), no solution satisfies consistency and coincides with the core whenever the core is non-empty (Theorem 4). Finally, we comment on the difficulty in obtaining further positive results for the class of solvable one-sided assignment problems in line with Sasaki’s (1995) characterizations of the core for two-sided assignment problems.
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Acknowledgements
We thank Çağatay Kayı, William Thomson, an anonymous referee, and an associate editor for helpful comments. We thank the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) for its support under grant VIDI-452-06-013.
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Open Access This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0), which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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Klaus, B., Nichifor, A. Consistency in one-sided assignment problems. Soc Choice Welf 35, 415–433 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0447-8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-010-0447-8