Abstract
We discuss an analytically tractable discrete-time dynamic game in which a finite number of players extract a renewable resource. We characterize a symmetric Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium of this game and derive a necessary and sufficient condition under which the resource does not become extinct in equilibrium. This condition requires that the intrinsic growth rate of the resource exceeds a certain threshold value that depends on the number of players and on their time-preference rates.
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Notes
Dasgupta (2005) provides a comprehensive account of the early static models which appeared in the economic literature on common property resources. His survey covers some game-theoretic ideas, but these are in static or repeated game frameworks, not in dynamic games such as the one analyzed in the present paper.
The concept of asymptotic extinction has to be contrasted with extinction in finite time, which does not occur in the model under consideration.
The focus of Benhabib and Rustichini (1994) is on the implications of various depreciation schemes which they incorporate using a vintage capital approach.
Of course, the problem depends also on the parameters \(b,\,\eta \), and \(\rho \). For our purpose, however, it is convenient to focus on the dependence on \(a\).
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Appendix
Appendix
In this “Appendix,” we prove that for every \(x_0\ge 0\), the trajectory generated by (10) and the consumption stream defined by \(c_t=\lambda f(x_t)\) form an optimal solution to problem (1)–(3).
Suppose first that \(x_0=0\). Because of \(f(0)=0\), it follows that every feasible state trajectory satisfies \(x_t=0\) for all \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\). Since this is the only feasible state trajectory, it must be an optimal one.
Now assume that \(x_0>0\) and denote by \((x_t)_{t=0}^{+\infty }\) the unique trajectory of (10) emanating from \(x_0\). Let \((\tilde{x}_t)_{t=0}^{+\infty }\) be any other feasible state trajectory with the same initial state \(\tilde{x}_0=x_0\). Finally, denote by \(c_t=\lambda f(x_t)\) and \(\tilde{c}_t=f(\tilde{x}_t)-\tilde{x}_{t+1}\) the corresponding control paths. We need to show that
We define
for all \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\). Since \(x_t>0\) and \(u\) is strictly increasing and continuously differentiable on \((0,+\infty ),\,p_t\) is well defined for all \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\), and it holds that \(p_t>0\). Since \(c_t\) maximizes the right-hand side of the Bellman equation given by \(u(c)+\rho W(f(x_t)-c)\) and since \(c_t\in (0,f(x_t))\), it follows that
Furthermore, from the envelope theorem applied to the optimization problem in (6), we obtain
Combining the last two equations, we get
for all \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\). Let us define for \((x,c)\in \mathbb {R}^2_+\) and \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\)
and note that \(L\) is strictly concave in \((x,c)\) for all \(t\in \mathbb {N}_0\). Furthermore, it holds that
where we have used (23). We have
In the first step, we have used the definition of the function \(L\) and, in the second step, the concavity of \(L\) in \((x,c)\) and the feasibility of the two solutions. In the third step, we have made use of (25)–(26); in step four, we have rearranged the terms; in step five, we have used \(x_0=\tilde{x}_0\) and (24). The last step follows from \(\tilde{x}_{T+1}\ge 0\) and \(p_{T}\ge 0\). From the above result, it follows that (22) is implied by the transversality condition
We distinguish two cases. First, if \(a\rho >1\), then we know from Lemma 2(a) that \(\lim _{T\rightarrow +\infty }x_T=x^*>0\), and therefore, \(\lim _{T\rightarrow +\infty }p_T=\lim _{T\rightarrow +\infty }u'(c_T)=\lim _{T\rightarrow +\infty }u'(\lambda f(x_T))=u'(\lambda f(x^*))\). Since both \(x_{T+1}\) and \(p_T\) have finite limits and \(\rho \in (0,1)\), it is obvious that (27) holds.
Second, let us assume that \(a\rho \le 1\) holds. We have
and it follows therefore that (27) holds if \(\lim _{T\rightarrow +\infty }\rho ^Tx_{T+1}^{1-\eta }=0\). Since this property has been proven in Lemma 2(b), we have verified the transversality condition (27) also in this case.
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Mitra, T., Sorger, G. Extinction in common property resource models: an analytically tractable example. Econ Theory 57, 41–57 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0799-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-013-0799-2