Abstract
This paper provides a self-contained definition and a characterization of the class of extensive form games that are adequate for applications, but still do not employ any finiteness assumptions. In spite of its simplicity, the resulting definition is more general than the classical ones. Moreover, we show that this class satisfies the basic desiderata that strategies induce outcomes and do so uniquely. Within the class of playable extensive forms, the characterization is by the existence of an immediate predecessor function on the set of moves.
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The authors acknowledge financial support by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) and the German Research Foundation (DFG) under projects I338-G16 and Al1169/1. We also thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments.
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Alós-Ferrer, C., Ritzberger, K. Large extensive form games. Econ Theory 52, 75–102 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0674-y