Abstract
A game with a continuum of players is described by a function assigning payoff functions to players and satisfying some measurability properties. In this note we establish the equivalence between several measurability assumptions that have been made in the literature.
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I thank an anonymous referee for very helpful comments and John Huffstot for editorial assistance. Financial support from a Nova Fórum grant is gratefully acknowledged.
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Carmona, G. A remark on the measurability of large games. Econ Theory 39, 491–494 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0350-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0350-z