Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

The private value single item bisection auction

  • Research Article
  • Published:
Economic Theory Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this paper we present a new iterative auction, the bisection auction, that can be used for the sale of a single indivisible object. The bisection auction has fewer rounds than the classical English auction and causes less information to be revealed than the Vickrey auction. Still, it preserves all characteristics the English auction shares with the Vickrey auction: there exists an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies in which everyone behaves truthfully, the object is allocated in accordance with efficiency requirements to the buyer who has the highest valuation, and the price paid by the winner of the object equals the second-highest valuation

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  • Clarke E.H. (1971). Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice XI:17–33

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Conen, W., Sandholm, T.: Partial-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In: Proccedings of 18th National Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp 367–372 (2002).

  • Engelbrecht-Wiggans R., Kahn C.M. (1991). Protecting the winner: second-price versus oral auctions. Econ Lett 35(3):243–248

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fujishima, Y., McAdams, D., Shoham, Y.: Speeding up ascending-bid auctions. In: Proceedings of the 16th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp 554–563 (1999)

  • Gilpin, A., Sandholm, T.: Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. In: Proccedings of the AAMAS-03 Workshop on Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce V (2003)

  • Groves T. (1973). Incentives in teams. Econometrica 61:617–631

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mas-Colell A., Whinston M., Green J. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Oxford University Press, New York

    Google Scholar 

  • Nisan, N., Blumrosen, L.: Auctions with severely bounded communication. In: Proceedings of 43th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (2002)

  • Parkes, D.C.: Auction design with costly preference elicitation. In: Annals of mathematics and AI, special issue on the foundations of electronic commerce (forthcoming) (2004)

  • Rothkopf M.H., Tisberg T.J., Kahn E.P. (1990). Why are Vickrey auctions rare? J Polit Econ 98:94–109

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vickrey W. (1961). Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16:8–37

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Quantitative Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Elena Grigorieva, Rudolf Müller & Dries Vermeulen

  2. Department Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    P. Jean-Jacques. Herings

Authors
  1. Elena Grigorieva
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. P. Jean-Jacques. Herings
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Rudolf Müller
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. Dries Vermeulen
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to P. Jean-Jacques. Herings.

Additional information

Elena Grigorieva acknowledges support by the Dutch Science Foundation NWO through grant 401-01-101. Jean-Jacques Herings acknowledges support by the Dutch Science Foundation NWO through a VICI-grant. Rudolf Müller acknowledges support by European Commission through funds for the International Institute of Infonomics

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Grigorieva, E., Herings, P.JJ., Müller, R. et al. The private value single item bisection auction. Economic Theory 30, 107–118 (2007). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z

Download citation

  • Received:

  • Accepted:

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-005-0032-z

Keywords

JEL Classification Numbers

Search

Navigation