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Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games

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Abstract.

The validity of the axiomatization of the Harsanyi solution for NTU-games by Hart (1985) is shown to depend on the regularity conditions imposed on games. Following this observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric egalitarian solution (Kalai and Samet, 1985) and one of the consistent solution (Maschler and Owen, 1992). The three axiomatic results are studied, evaluated and compared in detail.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Chargé de Recherches FNRS; CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Belgium

    Geoffroy de Clippel

  2. Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200, MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    Hans Peters

  3. School of Economic Studies, The University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK

    Horst Zank

  4. Department of Economics, Brown University, USA

    Geoffroy de Clippel

Authors
  1. Geoffroy de Clippel
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  2. Hans Peters
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  3. Horst Zank
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Hans Peters.

Additional information

Revised October 2004

We thank an anonymous referee and an associate editor for their helpful comments. Geoffroy de Clippel also thanks Professors Sergiu Hart, Jean-François Mertens and Enrico Minelli. Horst Zank thanks the Dutch Science Foundation NWO and the British Council for support under the UK-Netherlands Partnership Programme in Science (PPS 706). The usual disclaimer applies.

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Clippel, G., Peters, H. & Zank, H. Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games. Int J Game Theory 33, 145–158 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400193

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400193

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