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Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games

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Abstract.

In the framework of values for TU-games, it is shown that a particular type of consistency, called linear consistency, together with some kind of standardness for two-person games, imply efficiency, anonymity, linearity, as well as uniqueness of the value. Among others, this uniform treatment generalizes Sobolev's axiomatization of the Shapley value.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Tchaikovsky st. 1, 191187 St. Petersburg, Russia (E-mail: eyanov@iatp20.spb.org or eyanov@emi.spb.su), , , , , , RU

    Elena Yanovskaya

  2. Faculty of Mathematical Sciences, University of Twente, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, The Netherlands (E-mail: t.s.h.driessen@math.utwente.nl), , , , , , NL

    Theo Driessen

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  1. Elena Yanovskaya
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  2. Theo Driessen
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Revised version: December 2001

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Yanovskaya, E., Driessen, T. Note On linear consistency of anonymous values for TU-games. Game Theory 30, 601–609 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200093

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820200093

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