Abstract
Allocation rules for cooperative games can be manipulated by coalitions merging into single players, or, conversely, players splitting into a number of smaller units. This paper collects some (im)possibility results on merging- and splitting-proofness of (core) allocation rules for cooperative games with side-payments.
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Knudsen, P.H., Østerdal, L.P. Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. Int J Game Theory 41, 763–774 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-012-0337-7