Coalition formation in the presence of continuing conflict

Abstract

This paper studies endogenous coalition formation in a rivalry environment where continuing conflict exists. A group of heterogeneous players compete for a prize with the probability of winning for a player depending on his strength as well as the distribution of strengths among his rivals. Players can pool their strengths together to increase their probabilities of winning as a group through coalition formation. The players in the winning coalition will compete further until one individual winner is left. We show that in any equilibrium there are only two coalitions in the initial stage of the contest. In the case of three players, the equilibrium often has a coalition of the two weaker players against the strongest. The equilibrium coalition structure with four players mainly takes one of the two forms: a coalition of the three weaker players against the strongest or a coalition of the weakest and strongest players against a coalition of the remaining two. Our findings imply that the rivalry with the possibility of coalition formation in our model exhibits a pattern of two-sidedness and a balance of power. We further study the impact of binding agreements by coalition members on equilibrium coalition structures. Our analysis sheds some light on problems of temporary cooperation among individuals who are rivals by nature.