Abstract
The issue considered in this study is whether there is misreporting in official data on disability status. While there is a rather large literature on misreporting of self-assessed disability, evidence regarding register data is scant. It seems to be a widely held view among researchers that, since individuals out of work are inclined to respond towards poor health, it would be best to have official data provided by the relevant administrative bodies. But we argue that such administrative data should be regarded with some suspicion, since the administrators also may have incentives to misreport. The empirical evidence, based on a large sample of Swedish jobseekers, suggests systematic misreporting by the Public Employment Service of official disability measures due to incentives to misreport disability.
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Johansson, P., Skedinger, P. Misreporting in register data on disability status: evidence from the Swedish Public Employment Service. Empir Econ 37, 411–434 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-008-0238-6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-008-0238-6