In December 2007, the European Society of Intensive Care Medicine established the Task Force for Intensive Care Unit (ICU) Triage during an Influenza Epidemic or Mass Disaster to develop recommendations and standard operating procedures (SOPs). At this time worldwide intensive care, infectious disease/microbiology, pulmonary and nursing societies were contacted to send representatives to participate. Society representatives from intensive care (Society of Critical Care Medicine, Australia and New Zealand Intensive Care Societies, Canadian Critical Care Society, American Thoracic Society, American College of Chest Physicians, Chinese Critical Care Society, Colombia Intensive Care Society, Scottish Intensive Care Society, Singapore Critical Care Society and the UK Intensive Care Society), infectious disease/microbiology (European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, Infectious Diseases Society of America, British Infection Society and the French Infectious Disease Society) and pulmonary disease (French Respiratory Society) have been involved in the project from its initiation. The Task Force consists of experts in intensive care medicine, microbiology/infectious diseases, nursing, epidemiology, public health, medical engineering and ethics. The initial idea was that the recommendations and standard operating procedures (SOPs) would be relevant for any disaster that would create an increased demand for hospital beds, a demand that would be difficult to meet. A procedure described below was developed to provide consensus for the final recommendations and SOPs. Although the procedure has not ended, the potential for a severe H1N1 pandemic outbreak in the upcoming winter months in the Northern hemisphere and the demands such an outbreak will create for ICU resources led the Task Force to immediately publish the recommendations and SOPs in their present state. The following chapters present the recommendations and SOPs of the key topics identified and developed by the Task Force, stressing points relevant to H1N1. A summary of these recommendations has been published as a review [1]. The information should also be helpful for other hospital areas and other types of emergency scenarios including mass casualty events. Search terms used for the literature review are shown in Appendix 1. The author’s first-hand experience with emergency responses is found in Appendix 2.

Preliminary information regarding H1N1 patients is available. Approximately 8% of H1N1 patients are hospitalized [2, 3] (23 per 100,000 population) [4]; 6.5–25% of these require being in the ICU [2, 4, 5]; (28.7 per million inhabitants) [6] for a median of 7–12 days [6, 7] with a peak bed occupancy of 6.3–10.6 per million inhabitants [6]; 65–97% of ICU patients require mechanical ventilation [3, 68] with median ventilatory duration in survivors of 7–15 days [5, 7, 8]; 5–22% require renal replacement therapy [6, 7], and 28-day ICU mortality is 14–40% [5, 7, 8].

Standard operating procedures (SOP)

Health care professionals in many countries have recognized the need to develop plans or programs to respond to both man made and natural emergencies and disasters [9, 10]. A SOP is a set of written instructions that describe a routine or repetitive activity that is performed in an organization [11]. SOPs are viewed as the basis for efficient management of all types of emergencies and are an integral part of a successful quality system as they provide guidance to the staff on how to perform a job properly and facilitate consistency of actions [10, 11].

A hospital SOP defines the specific procedures, precautions and equipment needed for management of emergencies, and provides guidelines and protocols for the hospital to plan its response, prepare the infrastructure required and train medical teams [9, 12]. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that preplanning saves time, facilitates integrated efforts and helps ensure that essential activities are carried out efficiently [13].

It is important to recognize that the availability of an SOP in itself does not guarantee efficient and effective functioning of personnel and the organization during an emergency. In order for an SOP to be effective, it should be periodically updated, and the personnel involved in managing an emergency should be trained how to utilize it [14]. The aim of this project was to develop recommendations and SOPs for the effective operation of ICUs during an influenza epidemic or mass disaster. The materials focus on the ICU, but are also helpful for the hospital.

Purpose of the SOPs

SOPs provide direction for the medical personnel to manage the emergency situation [15]. The SOPs establish the minimum acceptable performance criteria for dealing with the emergency and are aimed at outlining standards that are fair and equitable for all who choose to adopt them [16]. An SOP defines the legal basis for emergency management activities, outlines the authority and organizational relationships during emergency situations, and describes how actions should be coordinated. The SOP assigns responsibilities to the organizations and individuals for carrying out specific emergency actions to protect lives; to identify personnel, equipment, facilities, supplies and other resources available for use during response and recovery operations; to define prevention and response actions to reduce threats and damages and to outline procedures to expand surge capacities and reinforce resources [13]. The SOP defines the performance expectations for personnel, provides a benchmark for evaluating the operational performance, and helps to standardize activities and promote coordination and communication among the medical teams [17].

SOP development

In developing the SOPs, the following process was implemented [16, 18]. Based on a literature review and contribution of content experts, a listing of essential categories and subcategories for which SOPs would be developed were identified. A modified Delphi process was used by the Task Force members to obtain consensus regarding the categories and subcategories and rate their importance. Task Force members voted for the major categories by agreeing, disagreeing or modifying them and rating their level of importance as essential, important or not important for inclusion. They were also requested to add categories that might impact on the emergency preparedness and that they believed were missing. Categories for which 80% or more of the raters agreed on the level of importance were defined as having achieved “consensus” and warranted inclusion in the study. Categories that did not receive this level of consensus were returned to the Task Force members with a request that they modify them in such a way that would be rated as important or that they be discarded as a category. A total of three Delphi cycles were conducted. Following the completion of the third Delphi cycle, agreement was reached that the following categories are important for emergency preparedness: triage, infrastructure, essential equipment, manpower, protection of staff and patients, medical procedures, hospital policy, coordination and collaboration with interface units, registration and reporting, administrative policies and education. Following the consensus for determining the categories and subcategories to be included in the SOPs, each category was assigned a primary author and expert group to draft the SOPs for that category. The drafted materials were then sent for review and comments to task members in order to map consensus and determine which elements were not agreed upon. To date, an organized poll of the entire task force for each chapter has not yet been implemented. Similar modified Delphi cycles will be conducted in order to approve each specific part of the chapters. As chapters for hospital policy, registration and reporting and administrative policies have not yet been written, important factors for those chapters have been incorporated in the present chapters. The chapters are presented in the order one might prepare their hospital for a disaster or H1N1 pandemic outbreak.

Conclusions

These SOPs have been developed to provide guidance in the preparation and management of a mass disaster or disease outbreak. This guidance should be used as a framework to guide the development of detailed systems and processes at local facilities. The detailed guidelines for frontline use should therefore be a product of the SOP, local situational awareness and the specific threat faced. Even in the setting of H1N1, assumptions based on previous H1N1 data may change based on the present deployment of effective vaccines, viral mutations and resistance to antiviral drugs such as neuraminidase inhibitors for which the H1N1 virus is presently sensitive [6]. Known data are evolving rapidly and should result in appropriate responses and changes in frontline guidelines. Such changes will be necessary because preparations must occur as soon as possible. “Any deaths from 2009 influenza A (H1N1) will be regrettable, but those that result from insufficient planning and inadequate preparation will be especially tragic [19].”