Abstract.
The N-player iterated prisoner's dilemma (NIPD) game has been widely used to study the evolution of cooperation in social, economic and biological systems. This paper studies the impact of different payoff functions and local interactions on the NIPD game. The evolutionary approach is used to evolve game-playing strategies starting from a population of random strategies. The different payoff functions used in our study describe different behaviors of cooperation and defection among a group of players. Local interaction introduces neighborhoods into the NIPD game. A player does not play against every other player in a group any more. He only interacts with his neighbors. We investigate the impact of neighborhood size on the evolution of cooperation in the NIPD game and the generalization ability of evolved strategies.
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Received 18 August 1999 / Revised 27 February 2000 / Accepted 15 May 2000
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Seo, YG., Cho, SB. & Yao, X. The Impact of Payoff Function and Local Interaction on the N-Player Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Knowledge and Information Systems 2, 461–478 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00011652
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/PL00011652