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The inequalities that determine the bargaining setM (i)1

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Abstract

It is well-known that the payoffs of the various bargaining sets of a cooperativen-person game are finite unions of closed convex polyhedra. In this paper, the system of inequalities that determines these polyhedra for the bargaining setM (i)1 is expressed in explicit form.

It turns out that this system also expresses the condition that certain games, derived from the original game and from the potential payoffs, have full-dimensional cores.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Jerusalem, Israel

    Michael Maschler

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  1. Michael Maschler
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Additional information

The research described in this paper was partially supported by the United States Office of Naval Research, under Contract No. N62558-4355, Task No. NR047-045. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.

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Maschler, M. The inequalities that determine the bargaining setM (i)1 . Israel J. Math. 4, 127–134 (1966). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02937457

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02937457

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