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The political economy of climate policy-making in the European Union

  • Climate Policy
  • Published:
Intereconomics

Abstract

The European Union's climate policy is characterized by uncoordinated measures taken at national level, and a preference for inefficient economic instruments. The vanguard role taken by the EU in international climate negotiations stands in contrast to the lack of action in meeting far-reaching emissions-reduction targets on a European level. The following article attempts to explain these shortcomings by using the instruments of the New Political Economy.

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References

  1. Cf. Commission of the European Communities: The Greenhouse Effect and the Community, COM (88) 656/final.

  2. Cf. A. Lenschow: Der umweltpolitische Entscheidungsprozeß in der Europäischen Union am Beispiel der Klimapolitik, in: H. G. Brauch (ed.): Klimapolitik, Heidelberg etc. 1996, p. 92.

  3. see: J. B. Skjaerseth: The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, pp. 27–32.

  4. Cf. A. Lenschow, op. cit. Der umweltpolitische Entscheidungsprozeß in der Europäischen Union am Beispiel der Klimapolitik, in: H. G. Brauch (ed.): Klimapolitik, Heidelberg etc. 1996, pp. 97–99.

  5. Cf. M. Grubb: European Climate Change Policy in a Global Context, in: H. O. Bergesen et al. (eds.): Green Globe Yearbook, Oxford 1995, p. 44.

  6. Cf. European Commission: Amended proposal for a Council Directive introducing a tax on carbon dioxide emissions and energy, COM (95) 172 final.

  7. EC Council: Limitation of carbon dioxide emissions by improving energy efficiency (SAVE), Directive 93/76/EEC, in: Official Journal L 237, 22nd September 1993, p. 28.

  8. Cf. P. Palinkas, A. Maurer: Erneuerbare Energien als Teil der Energiestrategie der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Entwicklung, Stand und Perspektiven, in: H.-G. Brauch (ed.): Energiepolitik, Berlin 1997, p. 217.

  9. Cf. U. Collier: The EU and the climate change policy: the struggle over competences, in: U. Collier, R. Löfstedt (eds.): Cases in climate change policy: political reality in the European Union, London 1996, p. 56.

  10. Cf. P. Palinkas, A. Maurer, op. cit. Erneuerbare Energien als Teil der Energiestrategie der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Entwicklung, Stand und Perspektiven, in: H.-G. Brauch (ed.): Energiepolitik, Berlin 1997, pp. 215ff.

  11. Cf. European Commission: Directive 96/57/EC on energy efficiency requirements for household electric refrigerators, freezers and combinations thereof, in: Official Journal L 236, pp. 36–42.

  12. Cf. EC Council: Promotion of renewable energy sources in the Community (ALTENER programme), Decision 93/500/EEC, in: Official Journal L 235, 18h September 1993, p. 41.

  13. Cf. European Commission: Proposal for a Council Decision concerning a multiannual programme for the promotion of renewable energy sources in the Community (Altener II), COM (97) 87/fin.

  14. Cf. P. Palinkas, M. Maurer, op. cit. Erneuerbare Energien als Teil der Energiestrategie der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Entwicklung, Stand und Perspektiven, in: H.-G. Brauch (ed.): Energiepolitik, Berlin 1997, pp. 215f.

  15. Cf. EC Council: Monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, Decision 93/389/EEC, in: Official Journal L 167, 9th July 1993, p. 31.

  16. Cf. European Commission: Proposal for a Council Decision amending Decision 93/389/EEC for a monitoring mechanism of Community CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions, COM (96) 369/fin.

  17. Cf. EU Council: Community strategy on climate change—Council conclusions, CONS/ENV/97/1 REV 1.

  18. Cf. European Commission: Climate change—towards an EU post-Kyoto strategy, COM (98) 353.

  19. Cf. K. Holzinger: Politik des kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenners? Umweltpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in der EG am Beispiel der Einführung des Katalysatorautos, Berlin 1994, pp. 67–70.

  20. However, measures to limit emissions in the energy sector “should not be taken on the basis of para. 2 as a matter of course, but only if their impact on energy policy in a particular member state would be so substantial that certain primary fuels could either no longer be used at all or only to a much reduced extent;…” (unofficial translation from: C. O. Lenz: Kommentar zu dem Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 1st ed., Cologne 1994, p. 970).

  21. Cf. EU Council: Conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Decision 94/96/EC, in: Official Journal L 33, 7th February 1995, p. 11

  22. For a similar approach, cf. B. Steunenberg: Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, pp. 642–669; P. Moser: A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure, NEMEU Working Paper, No. 96-1.

  23. For a comprehensive description of the model and the determination of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the games discussed here, see: A. Böckem: Die Bedeutung der EU-Institutionen in der Klimapolitik—eine Public-Choice-Analyse, HWWA Discussion Paper No. 66.

  24. Cf. B. Streunenberg, op. cit. Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, p. 645.

  25. This right of withdrawal is implied by the terms of Art. 189a (2). Cf. H. von der Groeben et al.: Kommentar zum EU-/E.G.-Vertrag, 5th ed., Baden-Baden 1997, p. 1070.

  26. Cf. B. Steunenberg, op. cit. Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, p. 648.

  27. Cf. H. von der Groeben et al., op. cit. Kommentar zum EU-/E.G.-Vertrag, 5th ed., Baden-Baden 1997, pp. 1070–72.

  28. Cf. P. Moser, op. cit. A Theory of the Conditional Influence of the European Parliament in the Cooperation Procedure, NEMEU Working Paper, No. 96-1. p. 9.

  29. Cf. G. Tseblis: The Power of the European Parliament as a Conditional Agenda-Setter, in: American Political Science Review, Vol. 88, pp. 128–142.

  30. Cf. B. Streunenberg, op. cit. Decision Making under Different Institutional Arrangements: Legislation by the European Community, in: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Vol. 150, p. 654.

  31. Cf. H. von der Groeben et al., op. cit. Kommentar zum EU-/E.G.-Vertrag, 5th ed., Baden-Baden 1997, p. 1070–72.

  32. Cf. European Commission: Intergovernmental Conference 1996. Commission report to the Reflection Group, Office for Official Publications of the EC, Luxembourg 1995, p. 28.

  33. For an analysis of the codecision procedure with incomplete information at the opening stage of the game, cf. B. Streunenberg: Redesigning institutions: the codecision procedure in the European Union, NEMEU Working Paper No. 97-2.

  34. Cf. R. Vaubel: The public choice analysis of European integration: A survey, in: European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 10, pp. 228–230.

  35. For an enquiry into the European Parliament's position on environmental policy, cf. H. A. Arp: The European Parliament in European Community Environmental Policy, EUI Working Paper EPU No. 92/13.

  36. Cf. J. A. Faiña Medin, P. Puy Fraga: A Framework for a Public Choice Analysis of the European Community, in: Economia delle scelte pubbliche, Vol. 6, p. 150.

  37. Cf. R. Vaubel: Die politische Ökonomie der wirtschaftspolitischen Zentralisierung in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, in: Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie, Vol. 11, pp. 45 f.

  38. Cf. J. B. Skjaerseth, op. cit. The Climate Policy of the EC: Too Hot to Handle?, in: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 32, p. 28.

  39. Cf. M. Grubb, op. cit. European Climate Change Policy in a Global Context, in: H. O. Bergesen et al. (eds.): Green Globe Yearbook, Oxford 1995, p. 42.

  40. A preference for command-and-control regulations and subsidies rather than market-based instruments is generally in evidence in environmental fields. One example of a public-choice explanation of the phenomenon can be found in: F. Schneider, J. Volkert: No Chance for Incentive-oriented Environmental Policies in Representative Democracies? A Public Choice Approach, University of Linz, Austria: Working Paper No. 9711.

  41. Cf. K. Holzinger, op. cit. Politik des kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenners? Umweltpolitische Entscheidungsprozesse in der EG am Beispiel der Einführung des Katalysatorautos, Berlin 1994.

  42. Cf. U. Collier, op. cit. The EU and the climate change policy: the struggle over competences, in: U. Collier, R. Löfstedt (eds.): Cases in climate change policy: political reality in the European Union, London 1996, p. 57.

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  1. Hamburg Institute for Economic Research (HWWA), Hamburg, Germany

    Alexandra Böckem

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Böckem, A. The political economy of climate policy-making in the European Union. Intereconomics 33, 260–273 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02929887

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