Abstract
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have proposed that decision frames act to bias the processing of decision-relevant information by decision makers. Decision frames act as illusions to which most decision makers are susceptible. We believe that catastrophe theory provides a unique framework by which the effects of decision framing can be studied. Catastrophe theory has been proposed as a way to explain the sudden shifts in preference in perceptual experiments (Stewart & Peregoy, 1983). Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) decision-framing concept, in decision situations, is proposed to be analogous to the cognitive, organizing centers underlying catastrophic changes in response in perceptual experiments. The results of this study were interpreted as demonstrating the heuristic value of catastrophe theory in describing the decision-framing phenomenon as a cognitive illusion.
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A version of this paper was presented to the Second Annual Convention of the american Psychological Society, June 7–10, 1990, Dallas, Texas.
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Svyantek, D.J., Deshon, R.P. & Siler, M.T. The illusion of certainty: A catastrophe model of decision framing. Current Psychology 10, 199–209 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686775
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02686775