Some game-theoretical aspects of parasitism and symbiosis

Abstract

Given a two-person continuous non-constant sum game, a “solution” can be arrived at even in ignorance of the pay-off functions as each player tries to maximize his own pay-off by trial and error. The solution of the game considered here is either the intersection of two “optimal lines” (the case of the stable equilibrium) or parasitism of one player upon the other (the case of unstable equilibrium). The introduction of secondary satisfactions (linear combinations of the pay-offs) affects both the position and the stability of the equilibrium and thus the resulting primary satisfactions (the pay-offs). These effects of the matrix of transformation are investigated. In particular, it is shown that the social optimum, which is also the solution of the game where collusion is allowed, is attained if and only if the columns of the matrix are identical, and that this solution is generally stable. Some suggested connections with biological situations are discussed.