Abstract
In the absence of oppression, citizens of a sub-unit who contemplate secession carefully weigh the benefits and costs of different outcomes. Here these costs are shown to be highly variable: they depend on the strategic behavior of each state and on whether cooperative relations would be re-established after secession. Using Quebec as a case, it is shown that threats of non-cooperation by the predecessor state may be discounted as not credible. Elementary game theory, however, shows that, with repeat play, retaliatory non-cooperation could be a rational strategy. Moreover, it is shown that reaching a compromise solution requires a credible threat on the part of the potential secessor to accept a sovereignty where there would be no economic cooperation. In modern welfare states, these risks are severe enough to make secession rare, and incremental constitutional change the norm.
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For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I am grateful to Gordon Tullock, Isidoro Massa, other participants at meetings of the Public Choice Society and the European Public Choice Society, Ignatius Horstmann, Douglas Brown, the editors, and two anonymous referees. Errors are mine.