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Payoffs and strategies in territorial contests: ESS analyses of two ecotypes of the spiderAgelenopsis aperta

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Summary

Game-theoretic analyses were completed on the territorial contest behavior of two populations of a desert spider that exhibit markedly different levels of within-species competition. Numerical payoff matrices were constructed from field data collected on the behavior and demography of each population. Payoffs were expressed in terms of expected future egg production. Three behavior patterns that a spider might exhibit following assessment of its weight relative to that of its opponent and the value of the site were considered: withdraw, display, or escalate. The model predicts for the more harsh grassland habitat an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) that makes ownership decisive in settling contests between opponents with small weight differences, whereas it otherwise assigns victory to the heavier opponent. Whereas the empirical data collected for this grassland population closely approximates the predicted ESS, that for a population occupying a more favorable riparian habitat deviates significantly. The ESS prediction for this latter population is that an intruding spider will withdraw from a contest if it is similar in weight to the web-owner. Withdrawal is common in this population, but so are display and threat and these actions were not predicted. We hypothesize that gene flow from surrounding habitats is preventing the riparian population from completely adapting to its local environment.

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Hammerstein, P., Riechert, S.E. Payoffs and strategies in territorial contests: ESS analyses of two ecotypes of the spiderAgelenopsis aperta . Evol Ecol 2, 115–138 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02067272

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