Conclusion
In this article we tried to offer an explanation for the evolution in Belgian government spending over the period 1961 – 1984. This explanation was based on a demand model featuring the median voter and a supplement with a political module. In the traditional part of the model price, income and population variables were used. For the political module we called upon the pressure group theory of Mueller and Murrell (1983), while we also developed our own theory.
The empirical tests show a high significance for the variables used, with the exception of the electoral variables. Wagner's law was not proven, while the proof for Baumol's theory did not always point in the same direction. According to our tests, the most important causes for the growth in spending were population growth and labor union strength measured by the degree of syndicalization.
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Naert, F. Pressure politics and government spending in Belgium. Public Choice 67, 49–63 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01890156
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01890156