Summary
It is shown that the perfect and the proper equilibria for 2×n bimatrix games can be determined systematically by means of the geometric-combinatorial approach of Borm et al. (1988). Moreover, for these games, stable sets and persistent retracts can be characterized. In particular, it is found that each stable set consists of either one or two perfect equilibria, that each stable component contains a proper equilibrium and that each persistent equilibrium is perfect.
Zusammenfassung
Ein Prozedur für die Bestimmung aller perfekten, properen und persistenten Gleichgewichte als aller stabilen Mengen eines 2×n Bimatrix Spieles wird angegeben. Besonders folgt, daß jede stabile Menge entweder ein oder zwei Elemente hat, daß jede stabile Komponente ein properes Gleichgewicht enthält und daß jedes persistente Gleichgewicht perfekt ist.
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Borm, P. On perfectness concepts for bimatrix games. OR Spektrum 14, 33–42 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01783500
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01783500